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ABSTRACT 
The nexus between finance and economic growth has been theoretically and 
empirically examined in the literature. A well-functioning financial system is an 
essential factor that ensures the sustainable development of economies. 
Measurements of efficiency and productivity can be used to identify good/bad 
financial systems. In Vietnam, commercial banks dominate and contribute 90% of 
the total assets of the financial system (IMF, 2014). Thus, the efficiency and 
productivity of the banking sector is pivotal to the attainment of economic growth 
and development in Vietnam. In joining the WTO in 2007 Vietnam had to implement 
reform measures aimed at further liberalising and increasing the competitiveness of 
the banking sector. Nonetheless, the existing literature lacks a comprehensive and 
rigorous analysis of the impact of WTO entry on the performance of Vietnamese 
banks. 
The objective of this research is to conduct an empirical investigation of the 
performance of the Vietnamese banking sector over the years from 2005 to 2012, 
encompassing the pre- and post-WTO entry periods. Using measures of efficiency 
and productivity this thesis sheds light on the following questions: (1) How has the 
Vietnamese banking sector evolved since its transformation from a one-tier to two-
tier system in 1988? (2) Which methods can be utilised to measure and analyse the 
efficiency and productivity of a banking sector? (3) What has been the level of 
efficiency and extent of productivity changes in Vietnam‘s banks encompassing the 
pre- and post-WTO entry? (4) What has been the impact of policy changes 
implemented after WTO entry on Vietnam‘s banks? (5) What are the important 
sources of inefficiency from the perspective of the Vietnamese banking system?  
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Data envelopment analysis, a common non-parametric method, is utilised to 
empirically analyse the technical efficiency and productivity changes of the 
Vietnamese banking sector. To examine the efficiency difference between periods or 
bank groups, the Li test and Simar and Zelenyuk (2007) test are utilised. By 
combining the meta-frontier approach and double-bootstrap two-stage DEA method 
of Simar and Wilson (2007), the impact of environmental variables on bank 
efficiency is investigated. A variant of the Malmquist index (so-called aggregate 
Malmquist productivity index) and Hicks−Moorsteen index (a multiplicatively 
complete TFP index) is employed to measure and analyse the evolution of the 
productivity of the Vietnamese banking sector.  
Using data for Vietnamese banks covering the post-WTO period (2005-2012), it is 
found that there is no obvious change of efficiency between the pre- and post-WTO 
era. State-owned bank groups are the most efficient and have the smallest technology 
gap relative to that of industry technology. By contrast, and contrary to the 
mainstream view, joint stock banks are the least efficient group and have the biggest 
gap relative to the meta-frontier. The impact of reform measures such as 
transforming rural to urban banks and allowing industrial groups to become involved 
in the banking sector have contributed negatively to bank performance. There is 
evidence to suggest that SOCBs privatisation has improved their capability to earn 
profit but has reduced their efficiency in terms of providing loans. The participation 
of foreign investors has improved the efficiency of joint stock banks. Regardless of 
ownership the results illustrate a negative relationship between bank capitalisation 
and performance as well as a positive impact on profitability. Foreign and joint 
venture banks are found to be less dependent on lending activities and are more 
diversified in their operations than domestic banks.  
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The responses of various bank types can be different to the same explanatory factors. 
For example, the income efficiency of state-owned banks is positively related with 
the loan to asset ratio while a negative relationship is recorded in the case of joint 
stock banks. While financial soundness facilitates the magnitude of lending in the 
case of foreign and joint venture banks, we observe a negative relationship in the 
case of domestic banks. The profitability of foreign rivals is independent of 
intermediation services but a significant dependence is recorded for domestic banks. 
The analysis of productivity showed that the banking system witnessed a decline 
during the period 2007–2012 under both the operating and intermediation approach. 
This issue can be explained by regression of the technical component while the 
efficiency component was largely unchanged. 
This thesis has created a number of contributions to the literature on efficiency and 
banking. First, this is the first study to take into account the heterogeneity of the 
business environment when measuring and analysing bank efficiency. Second, by 
combining the meta-frontier analysis with double-bootstrap two-stage DEA, the 
author has provided a new approach to analyse the impact of variables on bank 
efficiency in separate groups operating under different technology sets. Accordingly, 
ownership is employed as an ex ante rather than an ex post factor, unlike previous 
studies, when examining the influence of this environmental variable. Third, 
outcomes from this study clarify the impact of policy changes‘ on Vietnamese 
banking performance in the post WTO era. Fourth, this is the first time that the 
aggregate Malmquist productivity index that allows accounting for the contribution 
of individual firms to a whole industry‘s productivity has been applied in the context 
of a banking system. Fifth, from the empirical results, a number of policies have been 
recommended to improve the performance of Vietnamese banking sector from the 
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perspective of economic integration that Vietnam has been officially a member of 
ASEAN Economic Community at the end of 2015 and the Trans Pacific Partnership 
agreement has been signed in December of 2015. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background, motivation and objective 
It is undeniable that a sound and efficient financial system provides a solid foundation 
to foster economic growth due to its critical role of providing financial resources in an 
efficient and effective manner to the rest of the economy (Levine, 2001; Barth et al., 
2004). This function is implemented via facilitating the trading of risk, allocating 
capital, monitoring managers, mobilising savings, and easing the trading of goods, 
services and financial contracts (Levine, 1997). A well-functioning financial sector 
facilitates a more effective and sustainable usage of an economy‘s scarce financial 
resources. However, the quality and functioning of the financial system depends on the 
financial structure - the mix of financial instruments, markets, institutions and the 
soundness of the regulatory-supervisory framework.  
Over the last two decades, so-called transition economies
1
 have been transforming their 
financial structure from rigid state control to a free market model in which the banking 
sector has played the predominant role in the financial system. Substantial efforts have 
been made to build a new financial structure suitable to a market driven economy 
                                                 
1
 According to the Oxford dictionary of economics (the online 4
th
 edition), a transition economy can be 
understood as ―An economy in the process of major changes in its mode of economic organization. This 
may be from a centrally planned economy to a market-based economy, as in the former Soviet Union and 
many countries of Eastern Europe [also as in China and Vietnam in East Asia]. It may also be from a 
policy regime with considerable state intervention to a more liberalized one, as in many developing 
countries. Transitional economies face special microeconomic difficulties, as they may need to reform 
their institutions, for example by creating clear property laws and introducing bankruptcy procedures. 
They also face special macroeconomic problems, as they may need to reform their tax systems, and their 
monetary authorities may lack relevant experience on which to base their policies. Many transitional 
economies have experienced slumps in real output and bursts of inflation in the early stages of transition‖. 
Downloaded from: http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199696321.001.0001/acref-
9780199696321-e-3186?rskey=YihSUx&result=3 
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subject to the limitations and legacies arising from the old central-planning regime
2
. The 
infrastructure of the banking sector has been transformed from a mono-
3
 into a two-
tiered structure including the central bank and a system of commercial banks totally 
owned by the state. Financial liberalisation has occurred in all transition economies in 
order to increase competition and the performance of domestic banks that, 
consequently, have decreased state-ownership of the sector. The range and speed of 
liberalisation of banking systems in transition economies has been divergent and can be 
divided into two categories.  
First, full liberalisation which does not impose limits on liberalising measures, such as, 
for example, regulating the maximal proportion of bank equity possibly owned by 
foreign investors. Furthermore, governments of transition economies treat banks equally 
regardless of ownership type and they do not see public banks as a tool to conduct their 
macroeconomic policies. This type of liberalisation can be observed in the former 
transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe, where transformation to a 
competitive and privately-controlled banking sector has been implemented (Bonin and 
Schnabel, 2011). The second category consists of partial liberalisation in which 
                                                 
2
The liberalization of former centrally planned economies is logical and essential due to a number of 
factors including: (1)inefficient resource distribution, critics of planned economies argue that planners 
cannot detect consumer preferences, shortages, and surpluses with sufficient accuracy and therefore 
cannot efficiently co-ordinate production (Machan, 2002); (2) suppression of economic democracy and 
self-management,  planners could never have delivered economic self-management, they would always 
have been slow to innovate as apathy and frustration took their inevitable toll, and they would always 
have been susceptible to growing inequities and inefficiencies as the effects of differential economic 
power grew  (see Hahnel, 2015); and (3) economic instability, Zielinski (1977) shows that greater 
fluctuations in output in planned economies compared with market economies is recorded during the 
same period.   
3
 In centrally planned economies, the mono-bank system was responsible for issuing currency, receiving 
saving deposits, providing payment services among the state-owned enterprises as well as granting 
financial resources to facilitate the undertaking of various investments, and financing state budget 
deficits. The collapse of the Communist bloc in the late 1980s and early 1990s triggered a transition of the 
mono-banking systems in these former centrally planned economies. The first aspect of the transition 
process was conducted by introducing new central banks with new banking laws, and establishing a two-
tier banking system with separate functions for the central bank and commercial banks (Kenjegalievaet 
al., 2009). 
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liberalising measures are limited and state-owned banks still dominate the banking 
sector, ensuring the states‘ control, and consists of countries such as China, Russia and 
Vietnam. While partial liberalisation, on the one hand, brings private sector 
opportunities from entering the banking market, it can create a heterogeneous business 
environment favouring public banks and discriminating against private banks. In the 
literature the relationship between environmental heterogeneity by ownership type and 
bank performance has not been examined.        
Vietnam has been in the process of transitioning to a fully market oriented economy 
since the implementation of Doi Moi in 1986. However, the state-owned enterprise 
sector (SOE), including state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs), still plays a central 
role in Vietnam‘s economic development strategies and the Government expects the 
sector to be a key driver of growth; and to be the material force for the State to orient, 
regulate and stabilise the macro-economy (Beresford, 2008; Anh et al., 2013). By 
transforming SOEs in general, and SOCBs in particular, into business groups and 
eventually sizable corporations, the State has not only favoured them with many 
resources (especially land, capital, credits, public purchase contracts) but has also 
created an unfair field of competition, notably a legal framework and policies that 
discriminate against the private sector, especially domestic private enterprises (Anh et 
al., 2013). This discriminatory policy has resulted in an asymmetric business 
environment by ownership type between public and private sector enterprises. Hence, 
Vietnam is an appropriate case study for research on the association between 
environmental heterogeneity and enterprise performance.  
The entry of Vietnam to the WTO in 2007 marked an important point for liberalisation 
of the country‘s banking sector; accordingly, a number of policy measures were 
 
 
4 
 
conducted to improve bank performance and competitiveness. As part of the country‘s 
commitments to the WTO, overseas banks were now allowed to open 100% foreign-
invested banks that operated with advanced technology and a high quality of 
governance. Foreign investors were allowed to take part in domestic banks as minority 
shareholders. Rural banks were permitted to transform to urban banks under inadequate 
selective processes (NAEC, 2012; IMF 2014). Four of the five state-owned banks were 
equitized but the bulk of equity is still held by the State ensuring its continuous control 
over this important sector.
4
 Moreover, foreign strategic investors were encouraged to 
participate under the expectation that they would bring in their advanced banking 
technologies as well as expertise.  
The pre- and post-WTO entry periods experienced rapid credit growth at an average rate 
of 35% annually. In an infant financial system with a weak regulatory and supervisory 
framework such as Vietnam‘s, the booming credit resulted in high non-performing 
loans (NPLs) and systemic problems (Pincus 2009; IMF 2014). These above-mentioned 
policy changes after WTO entry are likely to have significantly impacted bank 
efficiency; however, no study has been carried out to assess these possible impacts. 
Therefore, using data for the years 2005–2012, the main aim of this study is to shed 
light on the impact of WTO entry on bank performance in Vietnam. 
This study investigates the performance of the Vietnamese banking system under the 
impact of WTO entry with the objectives described as below: 
                                                 
4
 After being equitized the shares of these banks are traded in the stock exchange. 
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First, this study investigates the level of bank efficiency and whether there has been an 
improvement and convergence of the technical efficiency of the Vietnamese banking 
sector since accession to the WTO.  
Second, this study will identify the key determinants of efficiency change in the 
banking system in the pre and post-WTO entry periods. 
Third, this study will measure and analyse the sources of total factor productivity 
changes of Vietnam‘s commercial banks. 
Finally, this study will identify effective policy measures that will improve the technical 
efficiency and productivity of the Vietnamese banking sector. 
1.2 Research questions and Hypotheses 
 
The conduct of this study is to answer the following questions:  
1) How has the Vietnamese banking sector evolved during its transforming from a one-
tier to two-tier system starting in 1988?  
2) What methods can be utilised to measure and analyse the efficiency and productivity 
of a banking sector, especially in the case of a transition economy such as Vietnam‘s?  
3) What has been the level of efficiency and productivity changes in Vietnam‘s banks 
encompassing pre- and post-WTO entry?  
4) What has been the impact of policy changes implemented after WTO accession?  
5) What are the important sources of inefficiency in the Vietnamese banking system? 
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Hypotheses 
The SBV did not consistently supervise the capital participation by business groups into 
banks, and especially that of SOEs. The chartered capital invested in the JSBs by SOEs 
increased from 1 trillion dong in 2005 to 15 trillion dong in 2012 (World Bank, 2012). 
The expansion of industrial group involvement in the financial sector raised questions 
over the allocative efficiency of credit when these groups have used the banks as a 
source of financing for their own business activities (intra lending) rather than profitable 
projects. It is assumed that permitting business groups to take part in the banking sector 
would decrease banking efficiency. Hence: 
Hypothesis 1:  
The capital participation of several large SOEs and private business groups decreased 
the efficiency scores of banks.  
The privatisation of SOCBs was a logical and essential step in order to increase their 
competitiveness and market-orientation in their operation.
5
 Lending by the SOCBs is 
significantly affected by the SBV which still holds the majority ownership of these 
banks. Furthermore, local governments can influence the allocation of credit due to an 
administrative relationship between these local authorities and SOCBs‘ branches in 
provinces and cities (Oh, 1999; Kovsted et al, 2005). These interventions can lead to 
adverse selections; consequently less profitable, and politically driven, projects are 
funded while commercially viable projects are abandoned. When their loans became 
riskier the expected profits of the SOCBs declined sharply as a result of high loan-loss 
                                                 
5
 Via privatisation, public banks can reduce the proportion of shares held by the state, therefore the 
problem of agency can be diminished (Bonin et al., 2005b). 
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provisioning (Kovsted et al, 2005; WB, 2007). One important solution against this 
problem is to privatise the SOCBs and list these banks in the domestic stock exchange 
(WB, 2007). To do so, SOCBs have had to be audited by international independent 
auditing companies and disclose financial statements to the public and investors. Via 
privatisation the management model of joint stock corporate has been applied and 
private investors can take part in the board of directors of these banks. Such changes 
have resulted in a more transparent and perhaps efficient operation of the SOCBs. In 
fact, in this way, privatisation can reduce agency problem and therefore increase the 
private banks‘ input/output management (Bonin et al., 2005a; b). Thus, the impact of 
privatisation on SOCBs‘ performance will be tested in this thesis with below 
hypotheses:‖ 
Hypothesis 2:  
Privatisation of SOCBs has increased the technical efficiency of these banks.  
As a requirement of WTO entry Vietnam has had to open its banking market. Foreign 
investors are now allowed to partly own domestic banks through purchasing banks‘ 
shares. Through assigning their staff to the Board of Directors, and Board of 
Management, foreign banks can positively contribute to the decision making process to 
improve technology, quality of management, and develop new banking services and 
products.
6
 Moreover, through capital participation foreign banks can refinance domestic 
                                                 
6
 Some may argue that there are three potential impacts of foreign involvement in domestic banks. Firstly, 
it improves the quality of management (technical efficiency). Second, foreign participation can help 
improve technologies using in these banks (technical progress). Lastly, more products and banking 
services originating from foreign investors can be provided to customers (economies of scope). However, 
only technical efficiency of domestic banks can be considered. Because to make the regression results 
significant, we need a large size of sample and so the annual data was pooled. Consequently, the 
movement of production frontiers over time (technical regress/progress) and a variety of efficiency 
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banks, helping these banks achieve the capital adequacy ratio imposed by the SBV. 
Consequently, the involvement of foreign investors can be expected to have a positive 
impact on banking development in Vietnam. In this thesis, the impact of foreign 
involvement on the quality of management leading to an improvement of technical 
efficiency of Vietnamese banks will be tested via the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: 
Foreign involvement in domestic banks (both SOCBs and JSBs) has exerted a positive 
impact on the technical efficiency of Vietnamese banks.  
The post-WTO duration has witnessed deregulation of banking authority. During 
2005−2007, 13 rural banks, which had a narrow scope of operation in rural areas and 
low-quality management, were permitted to transform into urban banks. As a result, 
these banks were forced to increase their equity by 10-20 times more than that in 2011 
(NAEC, 2012). A dramatic growth in the equity and assets of these banks raised 
questions about their loans and asset quality. It is assumed that the transformed banks 
would reduce the efficiency of the banking sector; accordingly the below hypothesis 
will be considered: 
Hypothesis 4:  
The deregulation
7
 of rural banks into urban banks by the SBV reduced the mean 
efficiency of the banking sector.  
                                                                                                                                               
measures including economies of scope cannot be observed. It is worth noting that only technical 
efficiency can be measured when annual data is pooled. 
7
Transforming rural to urban banks is a policy measure in order to increase competitiveness and 
efficiency of Vietnamese banking system and this measure is allowed by the regulators. However, this 
process is inadequately selective and so the term ―deregulation‖ was used to present this process. 
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1.3 Methodology and Data 
The above mentioned research questions and hypotheses will be addressed utilising an 
appropriate methodology that can be applied in the context of a transition economy such 
as Vietnam‘s. 
Hughes and Mester (2008) argue that there are two common approaches to measuring 
the performance of banks: non-structural and structural. The non-structural approach, 
based on a variety of financial ratios which capture a specific aspect of performance, 
compares bank performance based upon different investment strategies adopted and 
characteristics of governance. For example, the return to assets ratio demonstrates the 
correlation of profitability and the quality of banks‘ governance. Despite the fact that a 
number of formal and informal theories advocate such investigation, no general theory 
of performance provides a unifying framework for these studies (Das and Ghosh, 2006; 
Richard et al., 2009). The structural approach is grounded on so-called traditional 
microeconomic theory of the production process and the concept of optimisation 
(Hughes and Mester, 2008). The advantage of this method relative to the non-structural 
is that it accounts for the multidimensional character of bank performance which is not 
the case for the non-structural approach (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). Therefore, the 
structural approach is the focus of this study and will involve deriving an efficient 
production frontier for Vietnamese commercial banks during the 2005−2012 period.  
 
A unique aspect of this study is recognition of the heterogeneous nature of the business 
environment in Vietnam due to discriminatory policies by government favouring state-
owned enterprises over those in the private sector, for the economy as a whole and the 
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banking system in particular. Accordingly, public banks may be in a better position to 
reach the best-practice performance than their private counterparts. To address this issue 
a new technical approach will be applied based on the meta-frontier approach of 
O‘Donnell et al. (2008), which allows for measuring and analysing firm efficiency in 
separate groups belonging to different technology sets. This approach can account for 
the heterogeneity of the economic environment based upon using various group-
frontiers.  
There are two popular methods to estimate an efficiency frontier in empirical studies: 
stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) and data envelopment analysis (DEA). The DEA 
method, however, is preferable in this study because, unlike SFA, it does not make 
assumptions about the functional form of the relationship between inputs and outputs. 
Instead, a production set is established from the inputs/output combinations consisting 
of a piecewise linear boundary identifying the best-practice firms or efficient firms and 
interior including the inefficient firms. The second reason behind this preference is that 
DEA is a non-parametric technique; hence, it is more suitable to apply in small-sample-
size studies in comparison with SFA, a parametric one, requiring big data sets (Sathye, 
2001). DEA models allow multiple-outputs which is a significant advantage when 
compared to SFA where a single output is regressed against a set of inputs under an ad 
hoc production function. Based on the above comparisons this thesis is more suited to 
using the DEA method in the context of the Vietnamese banking sector where there are 
a limited number of banks but a variety of products relating to lending and payments.  
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Despite these mentioned merits of DEA it is, however, exposed to the limitation that 
technical efficiency estimated by this method is downward biased and it is impossible to 
build a confidence interval with a given degree of accuracy. Simar (1992) suggests 
applying bootstrapping, a statistical technique for making inferences of certain 
estimates, as a solution to this problem. In this study, several bootstrap-based DEA 
models are utilised to acquire consistent results of banking performance in Vietnam. To 
investigate differences in efficiency amongst groups the Simar and Zelenyuk (2007) 
test, based on the subsampling bootstrap technique and the concept of aggregate 
efficiency, is used. The Li (1996) test, adapted in the context of efficiency analysis by 
Simar and Zelenyuk (2006) on the equality of the efficiency distribution, is used to 
examine the capability of different groups to mimic the efficient production frontier. In 
addition, the study chooses a truncated regression suggested by Simar and Wilson 
(2007) (the so-called double-bootstrap two-stage DEA) to examine the influence of 
environmental variables on bank efficiency as the appropriate method that can 
overcome the biased nature of DEA estimates in comparison with that of the OLS and 
Tobit methods.  
 
In terms of productivity analysis a modified and aggregate version of the Malmquist 
index, based on aggregate technical efficiency, is used to measure and analyse the 
productivity of banks, accounting for the relative importance of individual banks in the 
index. The aggregate Malmquist index enables decomposition of the causes of 
productivity changes into two different sources: efficiency change and technical change. 
By cross-tabulating the productivity index to types of ownership (public versus private) 
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the impact of different types of ownership on the performance of Vietnamese banks can 
be identified. 
Data 
Panel data is collected from the financial statements of commercial banks in Vietnam, 
including their balance sheet and income reports. These statements are compiled under 
Vietnamese Accounting Standards (VAS), which are regarded as being of a lower 
standard than that of international accounting standards. Being a transition economy, 
Vietnam experiences data problems that are relevant to all other similar countries 
(Havrylchyk, 2006). Banks do not compile their financial statements strictly by 
accounting standards; and non-compliance to the rules set by the supervisory authorities 
is widespread. Additionally, the other serious problem is unequal treatment between 
private and public banks, which has deteriorated the transparency of the banking sector.   
The period of coverage of the data is from 2005 to 2012. Due to a significant change of 
regulations on bad loan classification and loan-loss provisioning in 2005, only data from 
2005 forwards ensures homogeneity. Furthermore, the studied period should cover the 
pre- and post-WTO era to observe the impact of policy changes on bank efficiency. 
Nonetheless, the data is unbalanced due to new bank entries and bank mergers during 
the post-WTO period.  
With a two-digit inflation rate on average covering the period 2005−2012 (about 11-
12%), the balance sheet of banks has significantly deteriorated. It is, therefore, 
appropriate and essential to convert all data into real terms. 
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1.4 Contribution of the study 
 
This study contributes to the literature of bank efficiency in several unique ways. First, 
this thesis takes into account the heterogeneity of the business environment when 
analysing the performance of the banking sector in Vietnam - a transition economy. All 
previous studies have overlooked the significance of environmental differences when 
examining the impact of financial liberalisation on bank performance. Hence, this thesis 
conducts an in-depth analysis on the impact of reform measures on bank efficiency 
under the assumption that ownership can result in a divergence of technologies utilised 
by bank groups. Accordingly, the author employs ownership as an ex ante rather than an 
ex post factor, unlike previous studies, when observing the influence of this 
environmental variable. Second, this is the first study to investigate the impact of 
joining the WTO on a country‘s banking sector, where the government of that country 
has to remove restrictions against foreign investors. Third, it is the first study to apply 
the method of aggregating technical efficiency in a banking system to measure and 
compare the bank efficiency of different bank sub groups. Fourth, by combining a meta-
frontier analysis with double-bootstrap two-stage DEA this study provides a new and 
unique approach to analyse the asymmetric impact of variables on bank efficiency in 
separate groups operating under different technologies. 
1.5 Organisation of the dissertation 
This thesis consists of eight chapters. After this introductory chapter the rest of the 
study is structured as follows:  Chapter 2 overviews the evolution of the Vietnamese 
banking system from 1988 to the present. An historical approach is adopted in this 
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chapter due to the fact that historical events and structures have had an enduring effect 
on recent banking issues. Development of the Vietnamese banking sector is divided into 
four different phases. In each phase, both positive and negative changes in policies, 
legislation and institutions which have influenced the performance of banks are 
reviewed. 
Chapter 3  reviews the literature on banking efficiency including methods used in 
previous studies to measure and analyse bank performance; furthermore, the impact of 
liberalisation on the banking sector is overviewed under a reversed pyramid model 
starting with the worldwide context, next to transition economies and lastly to the 
Vietnamese circumstance. 
Chapter 4 presents the methods used to obtain the empirical results from this study. In 
general, a meta-frontier analysis is demonstrated to be an appropriate approach to 
analyse the Vietnamese banking sector where the business environment is 
heterogeneous. Production frontiers at both the industry and group levels are estimated 
by DEA, a linear programming technique. The methods of Simar and Zelenyuk (2006; 
2007) are used to investigate differences in the efficiency of bank groups in this chapter. 
To investigate the variation of bank efficiency, the double-bootstrap two-stage DEA of 
Simar and Wilson (2007) is adapted, giving consistent and unbiased coefficients. 
Productivity change is also measured using a variant of the Malmquist index, grounded 
in the concept of aggregate efficiency. 
Chapter 5 provides a description of the data and presents the technical efficiency results. 
Specifically, the efficiency of banks between pre- and post-WTO accession is compared 
using the Li (1996) and Simar and Zelenyuk (2007) tests. These tests are also applied to 
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investigate differences in efficiency amongst three groups (state-owned, private and 
foreign banks).   
Chapter 6 provides an in depth interpretation and explanation of efficiency variation by 
employing the double-bootstrap two-stage DEA. In detail, variables consisting of those 
proxied for policy changes, bank characteristics and time trends are separately 
investigated. In addition, bank productivity and sources of productivity changes are 
considered using the aggregate Malmquist index.  
Chapter 7, based on the empirical results and findings of the two previous chapters, 
proposes several policy implications and recommendations to the relevant authority in 
order to improve the efficiency and productivity of the Vietnamese banking sector.  
The last chapter, chapter 8, summarises the major contents of this thesis and highlights 
its contributions as well as limitations; accordingly, further research is also suggested. It 
also discusses major findings relating to the research questions posed in Chapter 1. 
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Chapter 2: Banking Sector of Vietnam 1988−2015 
2.1 Introduction 
There is evidence to suggest that economic growth is closely and positively related with 
a country‘s level of financial development (Levine, 1997; Beck et al, 2000a; 2000b; 
Bonin and Wachtel, 2003; Fethi and Pasiouras, 2010). In particular, economies with 
larger banks and more dynamic stock markets achieve higher growth rates even after 
controlling for many other factors underlying economic growth (Levine, 1997).
8
 The 
positive impact of financial development on growth has been recorded in both 
developing countries and developed countries (Levine, 1997; 1998; Sarazervos, 1998). 
Through functions such as allocating capital, monitoring managers, mobilising saving 
and easing the trading of goods/services a well-functioning financial system contributes 
to efficient resource allocation, which in turn generates higher efficiency and 
productivity in the production process (Levine, 1998; Sarazervos, 1998).  
The banking sector is the traditional component of financial systems in transition or 
newly emerging market economies, where non-bank financial institutions
9
 did not exist 
before the transition process from centralised to market oriented economies started 
(Harsan and Marton, 2003). In Vietnam, after the initiation of the transition process 
began in 1986 under the slogan of ―Renovation‖ -―Doimoi‖, the banking sector has 
dominated the financial system (O‘Connor, 2000; Kovsted et al., 2005; Leung, 2009). 
Regardless of the development of non-bank financial institutions in recent years, 
commercial banks maintain a crucial and dominating role in the Vietnamese financial 
                                                 
8
 The size of banks in particular countries was measured by total assets or liabilities relative to GDP. The 
author used market capitalisation relative to GDP to measure the size of stock markets. 
9
 Non-banks include insurance companies, investment banks, finance companies and pension funds. 
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system. Therefore, this explains the explicit concentration on one type of financial 
intermediation – the banking sector, in this thesis. 
The objective of this chapter is to perform an analysis of the evolution and development 
of the banking sector over the period 1988−2015. In addition, the performance of the 
commercial banks will be analysed in depth for the post-WTO entry period 
(2007−2015). 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. A brief history of the banking 
sector is conducted in Section 2.2. The performance of commercial banks in the post-
WTO entry period (2007−2015) will be focused upon in section 2.3. Lastly, a summary 
of the key issues identified in this chapter will be discussed in section 2.4.  
2.2 A Brief History of Vietnam’s Banking Sector 
A reasonable explanation for the historical approach adopted in this section is that 
historical events and structures continue to exert large and significant effects on the 
contemporary problems and issues of the Vietnamese financial sector (Kovsted et al, 
2005). In line with analyses of external financial crises (the East Asian Financial Crisis 
triggered in 1997 and the Global Financial Crisis triggered in 2008) as well as internal 
changes, the historical background of the Vietnamese banking system can be usefully 
divided into several phases:  
1. The first phase was marked by a transition of the banking system from 1988 to 
1997. The transition process resulted in the creation of a two-tier banking system 
that consisted of the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) playing the role of a central 
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bank, and a number of commercial banks. This phase ended with the onset of the 
East Asian Financial Crisis (EAFC) in 1997. 
2. The second phase started in 1998 with a substantial change in the legal system. 
The issuance of the Banking Law strengthened the autonomy and functions of 
the SBV, and eliminated direct political control over the interest rate. The 
banking sector was urged to reform not only the State-Owned Commercial 
Banks (SOCBs) but also the Joint Stock Banks (JSBs). Furthermore, preparation 
for WTO entry
10
 was initiated with a master plan
11
 for the banking sector.   
3. The third phase witnessed a dramatic growth in the banking sector after joining 
the WTO in 2007. Large capital inflows from the world market were directed to 
Vietnam with the prospect of financial liberalisation. However, hidden risks 
from financial asset bubbles or intra-lending activities have threatened the 
stability and sustainability of this sector. The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 
exposed these risks and brought the banking sector to the brink of a crisis in 
2009.  
4. The fourth phase started from 2010 up to the present 2015 with a series of 
measures in order to stabilise the system. These measures consisted of applying 
restrictive monetary policy, imposing a credit growth rate for each bank, issuing 
a new capital adequacy ratio, and consistently supervising weak banks. 
However, the results and efficiency gains arising from these measures remain 
questionable for both the public and the authorities.  
                                                 
10
 Vietnam was accepted to be a member of the WTO in November 2006 and officially became a WTO 
member from 1 January 2007.  
11
 The master plan included all the changes as part of the agreement for WTO entry through establishing a 
legal framework. Furthermore, the plan also referred to solutions which aimed to improve the banking 
sector including SOCBs privatisation, strategic foreign investors, and increasing minimum capital 
requirements. 
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2.2.1 Establishing a Market-Oriented Banking System (1988−1997) 
In the centrally planned economy of Vietnam (1975−1986)
12
 the state had monopoly  
control over all financial transactions through the SBV, which operated both as a central 
bank and as a commercial bank (Irvin, 1995). Furthermore, the state controlled two 
other specified banks, namely the Vietnam Commercial Bank (VCB) a foreign trade 
bank, and the Bank for Investment and Development of Vietnam (BIDV). The SBV and 
these two specified banks were responsible for providing credit to SOEs or 
compensating for budget deficits (Harvie and Hoa, 1997; Beresford and Phong, 2000). 
The functions of the banking system were restricted, being seen primarily as an 
instrument of government for executing its economic policies (IMF, 1998).   
At its sixth National Congress in December 1986, Vietnam‘s Communist Party made a 
decisive step to abandon the centralised economic model and to adopt a socialist 
market-oriented economy – also known as ―DoiMoi‖ (Renovation) (Harvie and Hoa, 
1997; Beresford, 2008). A wide scope of reforms consisted of those relating to State-
Owned Enterprises (SOEs), foreign trade liberalisation, tax reform and banking reform 
(Harvie and Hoa, 1997; Oh, 1999; Beresford and Phong, 2000; Phan et al., 2006). In the 
banking sector the mono-bank system, which only served the needs and demands of the 
state sector, was split into a two-tier banking system, including the SBV as the central 
bank and four SOCBs
13
.  
                                                 
12
The North and South of Vietnam were unified in 1975, and in the aftermath the country adopted a 
centrally planned model of economic development, imitating the Soviet Union. 
 
13
 VCB and BIVD are two SOCBs established during the time of the centrally planned economy. In 1988 
the government established two other SOCBs, they are the Vietnamese Bank for Agriculture and Rural 
Development and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of Vietnam. 
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From 1990 entry into the banking sector has been liberalised with the participation of 
private sector and foreign investors (WB, 1993; IMF, 1998). This was one of the most 
impressive reforms implemented by the government (WB, 1993). At the end of 1992 the 
structure of the banking sector included the following:  
- The four SOCBs (VCB, BIDV, Agribank -Vietnamese Bank for Agriculture and 
Rural Development, and ICB -Industrial and Commercial Bank of Vietnam); 
- Five branches of foreign banks (including Natixis (France), ANZ (Australia), 
Credit Agricole (France), Bangkok Bank (Thailand), and BNP (France)); 
- Two Joint-Venture Banks (JVBs): Indovina with a  50-50 partnership between  
ICB and Cathay United Bank (Taiwan); and VID-Public Bank also with a 50-50 
partnership between  BIDV and Maybank (Malaysia), and; 
- 24 JSBs with various ownership forms including private and public firms, 
cooperatives, peoples‘ committees, and individuals.  
Despite participation of the private sector as well as foreign investors in the banking 
sector, the size of banking operations, as measured by the ratio of gross domestic saving 
(deposits) to gross domestic production (GDP), remained very small (see Table 2.1). In 
terms of the ratio of money supply M2 to GDP, even by the end of 1997 it only stood at 
about 28 percent which was far below the 128 percent for China and 90 percent for 
Thailand. The underdevelopment of the banking sector, low per capita income and 
restrictive monetary policy discouraged financial mobilisation (domestic savings) and 
consequently limited credit provision to the economy (Oh, 1999) (see Table 2.2). 
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1Table 2.1: Financial deepening, end-1997 (%) 
 
Items 
Viet 
nam 
Ja 
pan 
Hong 
Kong  
Singa 
pore  
Ko 
rea 
Chi 
na 
Thai 
land 
Indo 
nesia 
Malay 
sia 
M2/GDP 27.6 143.8 205.7 93.1 48.3 119.6 89.9 57.0 116.9 
Deposits/GDP 10.0 103.7 165.0 85.0 46.8 88.5 82.8 40.8 100.5 
Currency/Deposits 42.7 11.8 3.7 9.5 7.8 15.1 8.4 12.1 8.5 
Source: Adapted from Oh (1999) 
2Table 2.2: Gross domestic savings (% of GDP) 
 
Economies 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
China 38.3 41.5 42.2 41.9 41.4 42.6 
Indonesia 35.3 32.5 32.2 30.6 30.2 31.0 
Korea 35.2 35.4 36.5 36.8 35.2 34.5 
Malaysia 36.5 37.7 38.8 39.5 42.6 43.8 
Philippines 17.0 15.2 17.0 16.8 18.8 19.2 
Thailand 35.2 35.6 36.0 33.6 33.7 31.0 
Vietnam  16.9 17.4 16.9 17.0 16.7 17.7 
Source: Adapted from Oh (1999) 
State-Owned Commercial Banks 
SOCBs continued to dominate the banking sector even after its reform. At the end of 
1997 they held 77 percent of total outstanding credit while non-state banks contributed 
only 23 percent (see Table 2.3). Since budgetary support for SOEs was significantly 
reduced after 1988 and a stock market had not been established, the provision of 
financial resources from the SOCBs became critical for the ongoing financing and 
production of SOEs. More than half of the credit from SOCBs was extended to SOEs 
(see Table 2.4).  The remaining credit was mainly distributed to farming households and 
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a very trivial proportion of credit was extended to the non-farm private sector (Webster, 
1999).  
3Table 2.3: Sources of Bank Credit 
 
Year  
Total bank credit Credit extended by SOCBs 
Credit extended by non-state 
banks 
Amount 
(VND billion) 
Percent 
Amount 
(VND billion) 
Percent 
Amount 
(VND billion) 
Percent 
1994 33.345 100% 27.610 83% 5.735 17% 
1995 42.277 100% 33.647 80% 8.630 20% 
1996 50.751 100% 38.320 76% 12.431 24% 
1997 62.201 100% 48.042 77% 14.159 23% 
Source: IMF (1998; 2000) 
4Table 2.4: Distribution of bank credit 
 
Year  
Credit extended by SOCBs to Credit extended by non-state banks to 
SOEs Non-SOEs SOEs Non-SOEs 
Amount 
(VND billion) 
Percent 
Amount 
(VND billion) 
Percent 
Amount 
(VND billion) 
Percent 
Amount 
(VND billion) 
Percent 
1994 18.604 67.4 9.006 32.6 2.400 41.8 3.335 58.2 
1995 20.855 62.0 12.792 38.0 3.224 37.3 5.406 62.6 
1996 22.030 57.5 16.293 42.5 4.780 38.4 7.651 61.6 
1997 26.625 55.4 21.417 44.6 4.597 32.5 9.562 67.5 
Source: IMF (1998; 2000) 
The allocation of a large proportion of loans from SOCBs to the SOE sector has 
manifested an intimate nexus. There are two approaches to explain this circumstance. 
First, a structural characteristic of the industry sector is its dominance by SOEs and 
three quarters of banking sector assets were held by SOCBs during the 1990s (Oh, 
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1999; Beresford, 2008; WB, 2012). Since the dependence of SOEs on financing through 
the state budget was eliminated in 1988 and a stock market had not been established, the 
role of banks in providing financial resources to SOEs was crucial to their development 
as well as for the overall development of the Vietnamese economy. Second, and 
originating from institutional factors, the government remained in favour of a leading 
role for SOEs in the economy (Kokko and Sjoholm, 2000). As a result the government 
was decisive in prioritising the allocation of credit from SOCBs to support SOEs as a 
part of its economic development strategy (Moreno et al, 1999; Gates, 2000; Harvie, 
2004). The intimate relationship between SOCBs and SOEs adversely affected the 
strength of the banking sector in several ways (O‘Connor, 2000; Kovsted et al, 2005).  
- A characteristic of SOEs is their inefficiency. A dominant proportion of SOEs 
(60 percent) were unprofitable, while their debt-to-equity ratio reached 1.94 in 
1997 (WB, 1998). The persistently poor performance of SOEs resulted in 
difficulties in servicing their debts which caused a deterioration of the balance 
sheets of SOCBs.  
- The high concentration of SOCBs‘ loans given to SOEs resulted in a higher 
share of non-performing loans (NPLs) in their lending portfolios. At the end of 
1997 the rate of overdue loans to the total loans of SOCBs was 8.2 percent, 
whereas this rate was only 7 percent for non-state banks
14
. 
- Interference by government at both the central and local levels relating to credit 
allocation implied that banks‘ staff with skills and knowledge of credit screening 
                                                 
 
14
 The author calculated this from the raw data of the SBV.  
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and monitoring became superfluous. Consequently, adverse selection and moral 
hazard turned out to be common in lending activities (Kokko, 1998).   
The above-mentioned problem in the banking sector was viably observed in the first 
phase (1988−1997). Due to the close relationship between SOEs and SOCBs, reform in 
SOEs would be the precondition to conduct measures that increased efficiency and 
transparency in the banking sector (WB, 2000).  
Joint Stock Banks 
JSBs are private banks established by pooling the capital from shareholders who are 
individuals, private or state-owned companies. According to O‘Connor (2000), there 
were three factors that contributed to the rapid expansions of JSBs in the mid-1990s. 
The first and most important was the process of financial liberalisation itself where the 
government issued regulations permitting private entities to enter the banking sector. 
Second, the government wanted to hold SOCBs accountable for their loan-losses; 
hence, they were more cautious when providing loans. The last factor was the desire of 
several SOEs to establish their own JSBs in order to ensure their own sources of 
finance.     
However, the quality of these JSBs at that time was very weak and unsustainable. Many 
JSBs were established from the ailing credit cooperatives
15
 in the early 1990s and some 
JSBs were founded by business families or a group of related SOEs, which were seen as 
influential shareholders (IMF, 1998). Moreover, undercapitalisation was a common 
                                                 
15
 Credit cooperatives (CCs) are credit institutions which are collectively owned. Playing the role as the 
sole funding source in local areas CCs mobilised the majority of local savings by offering very high 
interest rates. Nonetheless, these CCs began to encounter problems since the early 1990s. A number of 
CCs collapsed with billions of dong of unpaid deposits. A number of agricultural CCs had to close as 
government subsidies dried up. This panicked depositors. They rushed to withdraw their money causing 
most CCs to go bankrupt (Fforde and De Vylder, 1996).  
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characteristic of JSBs, as 70 percent of JSBs failed to meet the minimum chartered 
capital requirement set down by the SBV. In 1998, there were more than 40 JSBs 
operating in the banking market, but they accounted for only 7 percent of total banking 
sector assets.   
JSBs were not only faced with difficulties in terms of financial capacity but also in 
terms of management capability. They were engaged in financing high-risk projects 
such as properties for residential development, which subsequently experienced a 
serious downturn. With the East Asia Financial Crisis (EAFC) of 1997-98 a bursting of 
real estate bubbles occurred and spread throughout the region including some of 
Vietnam‘s major cities. The JSBs were left exposed and some went insolvent when the 
collateral value of their clients plummeted (O‘Connor, 2000). Furthermore, lending 
decisions were significantly affected by influential shareholders who had positions on 
the Board of Directors, and who encouraged extending credit to related parties (IMF, 
1998; WB, 2000).  
In general, the operation of JSBs during this phase exposed them to more risk resulting 
in high NPLs and insolvency. Intervention by the government and the SBV to improve 
the quality and increase the capability of JSVs had become a high priority. 
Foreign Bank Branches 
From 1991 Vietnam permitted the entry of foreign investors into the banking sector by 
establishing foreign bank branches. However, the operation of foreign bank branches 
was restrictive due to regulations imposed by the SBV which favoured domestic banks. 
For instance, the time length of business licences given to the branches of foreign banks 
was only 20 years. They could take Vietnamese dong deposits but only up to an 
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equivalent value of US$1.5 million. In addition, private enterprises in Vietnam were not 
allowed to collateralise land-use rights to borrow from foreign bank branches.  
In summary, the weaknesses of the banking sector as highlighted above can be 
explained using several arguments. First, the existence of a dominant but inefficient 
state sector contributed to structural weaknesses in the banking sector. Second, both 
central and local government authorities interfered in the lending decisions of banks. 
Hence, lending policy became politicised and not determined on the basis of 
commercial viability. Other important reasons included the capability and competence 
of the SBV in conducting its roles as both the regulator and supervisor of the banking 
sector. These limitations needed to be solved to prevent a possible banking crisis and 
facilitate the longer term growth and development of the economy. 
2.2.2 The Second Banking Sector Reform period (1998−2006) 
In contrast with other countries in the East Asian region such as Korea, Thailand, 
Indonesia or the Philippines, the Vietnamese banking sector was spared much of the 
trauma arising from the impact of the EAFC. This was due to the absence of a 
liberalised capital account in combination with an inconvertible currency (Kovsted et al, 
2005). The primary indirect impact of the EAFC was on enterprises which experienced 
deteriorating export earnings and a reduction of FDI capital inflows. Furthermore, 
Vietnamese enterprises had borrowed heavily in foreign currency as well as from 
commercial banks so as to take advantage of a low interest rate in a stable exchange rate 
environment. However, a ten-percent devaluation of the official exchange rate (the 
dong) to the US dollar in August 1998 worsened the condition of both enterprises and 
banks‘ asset quality.    
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To protect the state sector from the negative influences of the EAFC the government 
implemented favourable measures to assist SOCBs during 1998, including: (1) 
abolishing the requirement for SOEs to put up collateral when borrowing from SOCBs; 
(2) permitting SOCBs to lend to unprofitable SOEs; (3) writing off the bad loans of the 
SOCBs; (4) lowering lending interest rates; (5) and lengthening the loan maturity of 
troubled SOEs. These measures placed a heavier financial burden on SOCBs which 
were already struggling with many difficulties.  
A combination of a three-year economic slowdown (1998−2000) and a fear of repeating 
the mistakes in other East Asian countries‘ banking sectors encouraged the government 
to commit towards a comprehensive and far-reaching reform of the banking sector. The 
scope of this reform covered several dimensions: (1) establishing a consistent and 
transparent legal and regulatory environment; (2) improving the quality of domestic 
banks; (3) and preparing for WTO accession.  
Establishing a consistent legal and regulatory environment 
The Law on the State Bank of Vietnam was approved by the National Assembly and 
promulgated in October 1998, defining the roles and functions of the SBV in 
implementing monetary policy as well as regulating credit institutions (WB, 1998). 
While the new law was believed to be a milestone in the development process of 
Vietnam‘s banking system or at least a first step in the right direction (Murray, 1999), 
Oh (1999) and Kovsted et al (2005) questioned the independence of the SBV. They 
supposed that the SBV was assigned as a ministry under the control of government, so 
that it must follow the government‗s decisions or even be interfered with in the conduct 
of monetary policy. 
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The Law on Credit Institutions also took effect at the same time, aimed at building a 
Vietnamese banking system with provisions on prudential operations and putting credit 
institutions on a legal basis to facilitate the conduct of monetary policy and stimulate 
economic growth (Hall, 2003). The role of credit institutions was described as being 
―contributors to a socialist-oriented, multi-sector market economy operating under the 
management of the state‖ (the Law on Credit Institutions 1998). Financial resources 
would continue to be favourably allocated to SOEs and cooperatives which played a 
leading role in the economy, as well as to poor and needy regions.  
The two above-mentioned laws included regulations on the following items (Oh, 1999):  
- Improvement of credit rules; 
- Strengthening the legal framework for banks‘ loan collateral, mortgages and 
guarantees; 
- Loan-loss provisioning; 
- Credit line for clients; 
- External debt management 
Following the two laws there were 24 decrees which helped detail the contents in the 
laws (WB, 1998). These decrees pointed to three main goals: (1) providing quantitative 
regulations on banks‘ activities; (2) defining responsibilities of related parties in a credit 
relationship consisting of depositors, borrowers, and banks; (3) and providing the 
measures to enforce the borrowers‘ repayment obligations.  
In order to increase the level of safety and stability in the banking sector in the aspects 
of deposit-taking, lending and portfolio investment, the SBV promulgated a series of 
quantitative regulations on commercial banks. These included the following: 
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- Increasing the chartered capital and limiting capital transfers; 
- Imposing a minimum ratio on  equities to assets at 5 percent; 
- Liquidity ratio to at least three days of business repayment; 
- Limitation of deposit-taking (not to exceed 20 times a bank‘s equity); 
- The maximum credit amount to a client (not to exceed 15 percent of a bank‘s 
equity); 
- The maximum credit to the 10 biggest clients (not to exceed 30 percent of total 
outstanding credit). 
However, the regulatory framework did not impose an adequate requirement on loan 
classification and loan-loss provisioning which could build up a standard for identifying 
non-performing loans and financial sources to solve bad-loans.  
In April 2005 the SBV issued Decision 493 on loan classification and provisioning
16
. 
The Decision was an important step towards bringing Vietnamese loan classification 
and provisioning practices up to International Accounting Standards (IAS) (WB, 2006; 
2007). One of the differences between Decision 493 and IAS is that Decision 493 
mostly depends on the quantitative assessment of the loan quality based on the number 
of days that servicing of a loan is overdue. Observers from the IMF and WB expected 
that it would take several years to transform the current standard of loan classification to 
the international qualitative standard based on the expected solvency of the borrowers.  
Despite ongoing improvement of the assessment on loan quality under Decision 493, 
there remains a substantial gap in loan-loss provisioning as measured by Vietnamese 
Accounting Standards (VAS) and IAS. For instance, in 2004 and based on IAS the 
                                                 
16
This Decision was subsequently supplemented by Decision 18 issued in 2007. 
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amount of loan-loss provisioning was estimated to be around 15 percent of the 
outstanding credit, but this figure was approximately halved from 8 to 10 percent when 
employing VAS after writing off bad debts (WB, 2007). This was less than many 
observers had expected but twice as high as the estimates based on the old VAS
17
.  
Improving the quality of domestic banks 
The weakness of the banking sector during the 1990s was reflected in low profitability 
and inefficient financial intermediation (Oh, 1999; Hall, 2003). Moreover, the 
contribution of commercial banks needed to be enhanced to stimulate economic 
growth.
18
 It was widely accepted that both SOCBs and JSBs needed to be restructured, 
but simultaneous restructuring both types of banks was impossible. This was due to the 
limited capability of both the SBV and government, and fears of losing control by the 
Vietnamese Communist Party over the banking sector made the restructuring plan 
piecemeal and cautious (Kovsted et al, 2005). Another important reason was the 
intimate relationship between SOEs and SOCBs, which required the restructuring plan 
of SOCBs to be conducted in parallel with the SOE reform plan. Consequently, the 
SBV chose JSBs to be restructured first and then SOCBs (WB, 1998). 
The restructuring process involving JSBs was implemented in two steps. In the first step 
(cleaning up), depending on financial capability JSBs were classified into three groups: 
(i) strong banks which had a low level of NPLs, high liquidity, and a relatively high 
capital base; (ii) banks with a temporary lack of liquidity and moderate level of NPLs; 
                                                 
17
Only from 2005 has data for the banking sector become more accurate and homogenous.  
18
Levine (1997) pointed out the relationship between development of the financial system and economic 
growth. Accordingly, a more efficient financial system would provide more loans and financial services 
that corporates can use in their production process. In Vietnam, the banking sector dominates the financial 
system, contributing up to 90% of the total assets of the system (IMF, 2014). Thus, the banking sector 
would substantially impact on Vietnam‘s economy. 
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(iii) banks with a persistent lack of liquidity and a very high level of NPLs. Strong 
banks in the first group were encouraged to be audited by IAS and improve their 
operations, corporate governance and develop new products and services for specific 
segments (Oh, 1999; WB, 2006). In contrast, the two other weak JSB groups were 
subject to strict measures imposed by the SBV. These JSBs were to be consolidated 
through the establishment of explicit and timely procedures for merging, or even closing 
non-viable banks. By the end of 2000, 13 of the 48 JSBs were placed under special 
supervision of the SBV; three banks‘ licences were revoked; two banks were merged 
(Kovsted et al, 2005). 
The second step involved strengthening the financial capability of JSBs through loss 
allocation and increasing their capital (recapitalisation). To maintain the right incentives 
during the process of restructuring any losses were allocated first to shareholders, next 
to borrowers and eventually to large depositors. Current shareholders were given time to 
raise their additional capital to at least the minimum capital requirement (WB, 1998; 
Hall, 2003). If the requirements from the SBV were not satisfied the government would 
take control and close insolvent banks.  
Restructuring SOCBs was more problematic than JSBs. Three reasons can explain this. 
First, the plan for restructuring SOCBs had to ensure that after restructuring SOCBs 
would lend only on the basis of commercial criteria and manage their business 
efficiently. The IMF and WB worried that as long as the government remained the sole 
owner of SOCBs, incentives for SOCBs to reform remained weak. Second, due to a 
predominant proportion of loans belonging to SOEs, and they were still in trouble, the 
restructuring plan of SOCBs had to go hand in hand with SOE reform. Third, any 
unrecoverable capital deficiency would be covered by the national budget.  
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Hence, the SOCBs restructuring process involved phasing out their policy lending, 
cleaning up NPLs, conducting IAS-applied audits and recapitalising (WB, 2007). Policy 
lending, which had been seen as a duty of the SOCBs, was transferred from them in 
2004 to two specialised institutions: Development Aid Fund (DAF) and Bank for Social 
Policy (BFSP). DAF is responsible for lending to national economic programs while the 
poor and people in isolated mountainous areas received preferential credit from BFSP.  
The resolution of NPLs was achieved mainly through writing off ―policy‖ loans and 
frozen loans related to SOEs. However, these measures had not solved the causes of 
NPLs. The problem that SOCBs faced was that they had to improve their ability in 
screening and monitoring loans on the basis of profit orientation (WB 1998; IMF, 
2000). A package of solutions was suggested including reorganising management, 
improving internal control, and training banking staff. Equitising SOCBs with the State 
being the predominant shareholder was another solution. The participation of a strong 
foreign bank playing the role as the strategic shareholder was anticipated to positively 
affect the performance of SOCBs. This is because foreign shareholders would help 
improve the management model and share their valuable expertise (WB, 2009). 
Lastly, SOCBs needed to be recapitalised. A plan to address this issue, adopted from 
2001, required Agribank to double its capital and for this to triple for the other SOCBs 
(WB, 2006). A capital amount equivalent to approximately 10 trillion Vietnamese dong 
was injected into the SOCBs to increase their equity during the period 2000−2005 (see 
Table 2.5).  
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5Table 2.5: Relative size of SOCBs (trillion dong) 
 
  
Chartered Capital Outstanding Loans 
2003 2004 2003 2004 
Four large SOCBs 14.53 17.37 214.80 296.07 
Agribank 5.45 6.14 87.08 123.47 
     VCB 2.42 4.03 30.00 46.49 
     BIDV 3.75 3.87 48.09 64.01 
     ICB 2.91 3.33 49.63 62.10 
DAF 4.98 4.98 64.81 76.93 
Source: Adapted from World Bank Report 2006 
Preparing for global integration 
Vietnam submitted its first application to be a WTO member in 2002. After many 
rounds of negotiation Vietnam was accepted to be the 150
th
 member of the world‘s 
largest trade organisation – WTO from January 2007. This event marked a milestone in 
the transition process of Vietnam, committing it to open markets to potential foreign 
competitors and to reduce and eliminate any subsidies and technical barriers to trade 
(WB, 2006).  
In the banking sector technical barriers were to be gradually removed from 2007, and 
Vietnam committed to totally eliminating all obstacles applying to foreign investors 
from 2011. From April 2007 overseas banks were allowed to open 100 percent foreign-
invested banks in Vietnam and joint-venture banks with a foreign capital contribution 
not exceeding 50 percent. Foreign banks were allowed to provide all services which 
were provided by domestic banks. However, during the first 5 years from the date of 
accession, Vietnam was permitted to limit the right of foreign bank branches to take 
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deposits in Vietnamese dong. The total equity held by foreign institutions and 
individuals in each of Vietnam's joint-stock commercial bank was limited to 30 percent 
of the bank's chartered capital.  
Capital participation in the banking market by foreign investors generated concerns 
among the authorities on the competiveness of domestic banks. Both SOCBs and JSBs 
faced difficulties including low efficiency, out-of-date technology and a small size of 
capital. Consequently, WTO accession challenged domestic banks with foreign banks 
having high competitiveness, modern technology, and strong financial capability. 
Responding to this threat a strategy providing a comprehensive roadmap to improve the 
quality of the banking sector was issued through Decision 112 in May 2006 (WB, 
2007). The main measures included the following: 
- Elaborating a legal and regulatory framework 
Two new laws, the Law of State Bank and the Law of Credit Institutions would be 
submitted to the National Assembly after 2007. Moreover, the Law of Deposit 
Insurance and the Law of Banking Supervision would be developed to ensure stability 
and public confidence in the banking sector.  
- Strengthening the financial capability of domestic banks 
Decree 141 issued in November 2006 identified the minimum capital requirement and a 
roadmap for domestic banks to implement. Accordingly, by the end of 2008 the 
minimum level of capital was 1000 billion Vietnamese dong rising to 3000 billion by 
the end of 2010. Any bank that could not satisfy these requirements would be specially 
supervised and stringent measures would be applied including bankruptcy.  
- Increasing the quality of management  
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The SBV applied a modern joint stock corporation model to bank management 
including a Shareholder Assembly, a Board of Directors, and Internal Control. 
Independent auditing was obligatory in order to ensure a transparent environment and 
maintain the confidence of depositors. Foreign investors were offered to buy the shares 
of domestic banks. The participation of foreign investors with their expertise and high 
technology as members of the Board of Directors was expected to raise the efficiency of 
domestic banks.  
- Developing banking technology  
Domestic banks modernised their banking services based on information technology 
such as internet banking, automated teller machines (ATM), and payment cards. The 
SBV upgraded its electronic system for interbank settlement. 
2.2.3 Accelerating after WTO Entry (2007−2009)
19
 
The subsequent period after WTO accession was characterised by an acceleration of 
credit and assets in the banking sector. This rapid growth can be explained by several 
factors.  
Liberalisation 
Vietnam has to implement commitments on liberalising its banking sector. Foreign 
banks are allowed to provide their customers with all types of services such as 
acceptance deposits and other repayable funds from the public, lending of all types, 
financial leasing, all payment and money transmission services, guarantees and 
                                                 
19
 A detailed analysis of this phase will be presented in Section 2.3 
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commitments. Foreign credit institutions are permitted to establish a commercial 
presence in Vietnam. 
Foreign banks with expertise, advanced technology, good trademarks and financial 
capability may establish 100 percent foreign-invested banks in Vietnam. Foreign banks 
may contribute up to 30 percent of shares in a domestic bank. The participation of 
foreign banks as dominant shareholders supports domestic banks. Through assigning 
their staff in the Board of Directors, and Board of Management, foreign banks can 
positively contribute to the decision making process in order to improve technology, 
quality of management, and develop new banking services and products (Claessens et 
al., 2001). Moreover, through capital participation foreign banks can facilitate the 
refinancing of domestic banks, helping these banks achieve the capital adequacy ratio 
imposed by the SBV.  
At present there are two SOCBs with capital participation from Japanese banks. The 
first is Vietcombank which received US$567 million, equivalent to 15 percent of total 
equity, from Mizuho bank in 2011. In 2012 Vietinbank chose the third largest bank 
worldwide – The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ (BTMU) as its strategic foreign 
investor. BTMU purchased 20 percent of Vietinbank‘s shares equivalent to US$743 
million
20
.  
Large JSBs were even earlier than SOCBs in calling for capital participation from 
foreign investors. HSBC acquired a 10 percent stake in Techcombank in December 
                                                 
20
Japanese banks are favoured by the Vietnamese government to be strategic foreign investors of SOCBs 
because Japan is the most important partner of Vietnam in terms of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as 
well as Official Development Aid (ODA). Through capital participation in SOCBs, Japanese banks drive 
the activities of these banks in order to support their clients (Japanese companies having businesses in 
Vietnam). 
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2005, and increased it to 15 percent in 2007. The International Finance Corporation 
(IFC) of the World Bank, ANZ Bank, and Dragon Financial Holdings jointly hold the 
maximum allowable of 30 percent of Sacombank, the biggest JSB in terms of chartered 
capital. 
Financial deregulation  
The SBV implemented a more expansionary monetary policy after WTO entry. 
Between 2001 and 2006 banking credit grew at an average rate of 28.5 percent in 
nominal terms. A considerable acceleration occurred from 2007 onwards (WB, 2009; 
Vo and Nguyen, 2009). When Vietnam officially became a member of the WTO capital 
inflows started accelerating in the form of FDI and portfolio investment. Concerning the 
related appreciation of the Vietnamese dong the SBV intervened in the foreign 
exchange market by purchasing foreign currency up to a value of 10.1 billion dollars in 
just one year (2007). Consequently, the banking system received significant additional 
liquidity. Moreover, an overheating real estate market with high expected returns 
attracted more credit from banks. The result was a ballooning of banking credit, peaking 
at an annual growth rate of 63.2 percent in nominal terms in March 2008.   
An undesirable outcome in the post-WTO entry period was the venturing of economic 
groups from both state and private sectors into non-core business including banking, 
insurance and real estate (WB, 2009; 2012; Leung, 2010). This circumstance occurred 
during 2007 and early 2008 when these groups expected that mobilising financial 
resources would make substantial profits. In fact, the number of JSBs partly owned by 
SOEs increased from 4 in 2005 to 22 by 2010 (WB, 2012). The participation of business 
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groups in the banking sector reduced the efficiency of credit allocation when they 
channelled bank credit to themselves.  
The SBV substantially loosened its regulations when permitting 12 rural banks to 
transform into urban banks during the period 2006-2007 (NAEC, 2012). In 2005, the 
total capital of these banks was estimated at 165 billion Vietnamese dong, or 13.75 
billion dong on average for each bank. However, according to Decision 141 issued in 
May 2006, by the end of 2008 each urban bank had to achieve a chartered capital level 
of at least 1,000 billion Vietnamese dong. Consequently, transformed banks raced to 
increase their capital and they called upon capital contributions from the other big banks 
and business groups.   
2.2.4 A Slowdown after the Global Financial Crisis and Restructuring the Banking 
Sector (2010−2015) 
The past decade has recorded an extremely rapid expansion of the banking sector in 
Vietnam. The ratio of bank credit to GDP increased from 20 percent in the late 1990s to 
136 percent at the end of 2010 (VELP, 2012). While credit expansion in the first half of 
the 2000s resulted from the financial deepening plan, in recent years, after WTO 
accession, it was the result of a loosening of monetary policy. In the context of a 
shallow financial market and weak governance, rapid credit expansion could result in 
banking system problems (Tornell, 1999; Keeton, 1999; Kawai et al, 2001). The quality 
of bank assets considerably deteriorated during this period. Non-performing loans 
surged during the 2010-2012 period as a result of a plummeting property market, 
defaults of SOEs and the impact of the GFC. There is no consensus on the NPL rate 
computed by different organisations (individual banks, the National Financial 
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Supervisory Commission (NFSC), SBV, and Fitch
21
). This is due to applying different 
accounting standards. According to a report conducted by the National Assembly 
Economic Commission, the rate of NPLs of the entire banking sector was between 10 to 
12 percent at the end of 2011.This rate was estimated by credit rating agencies such as 
Fitch as being even higher at 13-15 percent. The SBV data indicated that it was 3.1 
percent at the end of 2011; however, it increased to 4.8 percent in September 2012 (see 
Figure 2.1).
22
 It has been documented that the banking sector is on the brink of a crisis 
and intervention by the government was seen as being imperative (Pincus, 2009; VELP, 
2012).  
Figure 2.1: NPL rate of the entire banking sector 
 
 
Source: State Bank of Vietnam 
Resolution No. 11 issued in February 2011 identified immediate measures to curb the 
high inflation rate and the extreme expansion of banking credit. It limited the growth 
rate of credit to under 20 percent and significantly reduced the fraction of lending to 
                                                 
21
 Fitch is a global rating agency dedicated to providing value beyond the rating through objective and 
balanced credit opinions, research and data (source: https://www.fitchratings.com). 
22
 The large difference in the NPLs assessment can be explained by different accounting standards used. 
Individual banks and the Vietnamese authorities employ VAS while IAS is utilised by international credit 
rating agencies such as Fitch. 
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financial markets. The priority in credit allocation was to be to agriculture, small and 
medium enterprises and supportive industries.  
Moreover, a long-run restructuring plan under Decision 254 was issued in March 2012. 
The overall objective of this was to restructure comprehensively the banking system 
with the 2020 vision to develop modern, safe, efficient, and sustainable banks capable 
of competing with foreign banks. In particular, in the period 2011-2015, emphasis was 
placed on improving financial conditions, safety, legal compliance, efficiency of banks 
and consolidating operational capabilities. A set of measurements has been drawn up, 
which includes:  
Measures vis-a-vis SOCBs:  
- SOCBs to keep up the pace of equitising but ensure that the State must hold the 
dominant share in these banks and develop from one to two SOCBs competing 
regionally.    
- SOCBs raise their equity through additional public offerings and from budgetary 
resources in order to meet the Basel II capital standard by 2015.  
- Solving and decreasing NPLs to below 3 percent according to the domestic 
standard by 2015. 
- Improving internal control and supervision, especially the risk management 
system. 
- Reducing the credit-to-deposit ratio to below 90 percent by 2015.  
Measures vis-a-vis JSBs:  
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- Healthy JSBs will be consolidated to increase their sale and competitiveness in 
terms of size, service quality, administration, and technology. They are expected 
to support weak banks by increasing their liquidity, or through merging. 
- In the case of temporarily illiquid JSBs the SBV will refinance them to ensure 
their liquidity. These JSBs are required to strengthen their financial condition, 
operations, and management under the close supervision and consultation of the 
SBV. 
- Weak JSBs are defined as those banks that cannot ensure liquidity in either the 
short- or long-term. Their rate of NPLs is so high that the volume of NPLs 
exceeds their equities. In other words, they are technically insolvent. These 
banks will be refinanced by the SBV up to their level of chartered capital and 
put under special supervision. Their good assets should be purchased by healthy 
banks and they are put under special control, dividends and other payments are 
limited, weak banks are forced to merge and foreign investors are allowed to 
acquire or directly inject capital.  
However, the government‘s bank restructuring plan exposed several limitations. First, 
although the plan provided a framework for comprehensive reform of the banking 
sector, the lack of implementation details implied that its application would be ad hoc 
and it suggested reluctance to close insolvent banks
23
 depriving the authorities of an 
important coercive tool (IMF, 2012). The cost that must be paid by the economy would 
be bigger if the government was still indecisive in dealing with weak banks. Merging 
them together was no solution in itself and extending liquidity should only be to solvent 
banks. Second, the plan lacked regulatory and supervisory measures that would 
                                                 
23
 The SBV makes no distinction between illiquid and insolvent banks.  
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introduce specific and progressive enforcement measures to prevent problems leading to 
insolvency, as well as a special bank resolution and insolvency regime. This would 
prevent the possibility of a reversal of supervisory authorities‘ decisions by the court 
system, and protect them from personal liabilities. Third, to support supervision the 
regulations should have been strengthened in line with the best international practices, 
especially for loan classification and loan-loss provisioning.  
2.3 Vietnam’s Commercial Banks in the Post-WTO Entry Period (2007−2015) 
2.3.1 Performance of Vietnam’s Commercial Banks 
Rapid Growth 
The immediate influence of banking liberalisation and deregulation has been the rapid 
growth of this sector in the post-WTO period. In 2001, banking credit accounted for 
only 39.3 percent of GDP, but it jumped up to 99 percent in 2007 and then to 125 
percent in 2010 (see Figure 2.2). This compares with the period 2001−2006 where the 
average annual growth rate of bank credit was only 28.5 percent. A considerable 
acceleration occurred from 2007 to 2010, as the average annual growth rate increased to 
37.8 percent. The restrictive monetary policy applied from 2011 imposed a ceiling on 
the credit growth of the banking sector to under 16 percent. As a result the rate of credit 
growth decreased significantly to 14.3 percent in 2011 and 8.9 percent in 2012.  
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Figure 2.2: Banking sector growth 
 
Source: State Bank of Vietnam 
The JSBs have achieved an even higher credit growth rate relative to the SOCBs, FBs 
and JVBs. In 2000 SOCBs dominated the banking system with a large share of the 
deposit market at 78.4 percent, but this rate continuously decreased to around 58 percent 
by 2007. The share of JSBs in the deposit market tripled during 2000−2007 reaching 29 
percent in 2007. In the lending market in 2000 the size of credit provided by SOCBs 
was seven times higher than that of JSBs. Nonetheless, JSBs caught up with SOCBs by 
2008 (see Table 2.6).  
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6Table 2.6:  Banking market shares (percentage) 
 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 6 Months 2008 
Deposit market share  
             SOCBs 78.4 80.8 80.5 79.5 78.1 78.6 70 58 NA 
    JSBs 11.3 9.2 10.1 11.2 13.2 14.3 22 29 NA 
    JVBs and FBs 10.3 10 9.4 9.3 9.7 7.1 8 13 NA 
Lending market share  
             SOCBs 72 76 74 73 75 68 63 54 50 
    JSBs 11 13 15 15 14 16 27 38 50 
    JVBs and FBs 17 14 12 13 12 16 10 8   
Source: Adapted from Leung (2009) 
Asset and Liability Structures 
According to a report by NFSC(2012) the bulk of assets in Vietnam‘s banking system is 
in the form of loans including the ―Placements with and Loans to other Banks‖ and 
―Loans for business and consumers‖ items, which accounted for 74 and 73 percent of 
the total in the two years 2010 and 2011 respectively (see Table 2.7). However, the 
share of total assets in the form of safe items such as ―Cash and Balances with the SBV‖ 
contributed a very small part at 4 percent. This implies that the banking system is very 
vulnerable to shocks from related financial institutions, debtors, and markets. Changes 
to policies on the capital adequacy ratio, or minimum chartered capital would negatively 
influence banks with a very low level of liquidity and high NPLs. A downward trend in 
the stock or property markets would significantly deteriorate the asset quality of banks, 
which have a considerable proportion of their loans allocated to these markets.  
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7Table 2.7:  Structure of the banking system‘s assets(percentage)24 
 
  2010 2011 
Cash and Balances with the SBV 4 4 
Placements with and Loans to other banks 21 22 
Trading and Investment Securities  13 12 
Loans for business and consumers 53 51 
Investment 1 1 
Fixed and Other Assets 9 10 
Source: Adapted from the NFSC Report 2012, page 4 
The inter-bank market has become more important in terms of financing for banks. In 
2010 the share of ―deposits and borrowings from other banks‖ item contributed only 16 
percent of the total, but it surged to 21 percent just a year later. Meanwhile, the 
proportion of ―Deposits from customers‖ decreased from 51 to 49 percent (see Table 
2.8). The restrictive monetary policy conducted from the beginning of 2011 generated 
difficulties for banks to mobilise deposits from individuals and companies. Therefore, 
the inter-bank market became an alternative source of financing.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24
Only the 2012 report of NFSC was published, the reports from 2013 onward have not been published.  
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8Table 2.8: Structure of the banking system‘s liabilities (percentage) 
 
  2010 2011 
Due to Government and borrowings from the SBV 6 5 
Deposits and borrowings from other Banks 16 21 
Deposits from customers 51 49 
Certificates of deposits 7 6 
Equity 7 8 
Others 14 11 
Source: Adapted from the NFSC Report 2012, page 5 
Profitability  
Based on data provided by the banks the ROE (Return on Equity) and ROA (Return on 
Assets) achieved 14.26 and 1.12 percent in 2011, respectively. Comparing profitability 
using the ROE indicator amongst the different types of banks, SOCBs reached a peak of 
18.01 percent, following by the JSBs (14.85 percent), and lastly the banking group 
consisting of JVBs and FBs (12.52 percent). However, the NFSC assessed that the 
reported data on profit from banks is not reliable and in most cases is underestimated. 
By adjusting data, specialists in the NFSC believed that the banking sector in 2011 
suffered a loss equivalent to 49.693 billion VND instead of a profit of 118.769 billion 
VND as reported by banks.  
In recent years the revenue of banks has become more dependent on lending activities. 
This is shown through the increasing trend of the ratio of loan-related revenues to total 
revenue. The ratio has continuously increased from 78.85 percent in 2009 to 83.98 
percent in 2010 and 92.13 percent in 2011 (see Table 2.9).  
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9Table 2.9: The ratio of loan-related revenue to total revenue (percentage) 
 
Bank Groups 
2009 2010 2011 
SOCBs 86.38 89.95 92.13 
JSBs 73.23 80.04 88.07 
JVBs and FBs 65.59 66.44 71.83 
Finance and Leasing firms 63.65 78.84 76.72 
Average 78.85 83.98 89.13 
Source:  Adapted from NFSC Report 2012, page 25 
Similarly, the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) is assessed differently between the data 
provided by banks and the adjusted data from the NFSC. According to the banks‘ 
reports the average CAR of the banking system was 11.56 percent in 2010 and 11.62 
percent in 2011. However, this ratio only achieved 5.35 percent as assessed by the 
NFSC.  
The gap between the above-mentioned data can be explained by the fact that banks have 
hidden their true NPLs through accounting practices, contributed to by problems of 
moral hazard. Consequently, their financial indicators are not accurate and are 
unreliable.  
2.3.2 Ownership Structure 
Before WTO entry the ownership structure of the SOCBs was absolutely dominated by 
the State, and the SBV played the role of State representative in these banks. The 
owners of JSBs were mostly individuals but also partly SOEs. 
The post-WTO entry period witnessed a significant change in the structure of bank 
ownership. SOCBs were permitted to sell their shares to foreign and domestic investors 
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through privatisation. Currently three of the four big SOCBs have completed their 
equitisation, and two of them have chosen Japanese banks as strategic foreign investors.  
Policy makers and observers from international financial organisations (IMF, WB, and 
ADB) have expressed their agreement of this trend. Equitisation and capital 
participation by foreign investors force SOCBs to become transparent in their operation 
and commercially oriented in their objectives. Additionally, foreign banks will bring 
expertise, advanced technology and financial power that will support SOCBs to 
improve their management, strategy and banking practices.  
Foreign capital participation not only occurs with SOCBs but also JSBs. There are a 
number of JSBs that have sold shares to foreign investors such as Techcombank, Asia 
Commercial Bank, and Sacombank. 
The number of JSBs partly owned by SOEs has steadily increased from the second half 
of the 2000s. In 2005, of 14 banks for which data on ownership is available, five had 
chartered capital from SOEs. The figure progressively increased to 22 by 2010 implying 
that three-fifths of JSBs had chartered capital from SOEs (see Figure 2.3 Panel A). The 
amount of SOEs‘ capital in JSBs has steadily increased from nearly 1 trillion in 2005 to 
15 trillion Vietnamese dong by 2010 (see Figure 2.3, Panel B). In both aspects, the 
number of banks and the absolute value of their chartered capital and the presence of 
SOEs in the banking sector have been remarkable. 
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Figure 2.3: Number of JSBs with state chartered capital and amounts involved 
 
 
  
Source: World Bank Development Report 2012 
The capital participation and subsequent taking of control of JSBs by SOEs is risky and 
potentially jeopardises the stability of the banking system (Pincus and Anh, 2008; 
Pincus, 2009). The combination of commercial and financial interests under the same 
roof and the related-party transactions it supports has been repeatedly associated with 
economic crises in middle-income countries (WB, 2009). The experience of Chile in 
1982-1983 and some East Asian countries experiencing the EAFC illustrate the risk 
involved. Crises in these countries were caused by excessively large investments, 
almost entirely funded by banking credit, in financial assets which eventually turned 
into bubbles. It is worth pointing out that the risk exists regardless of whether the 
commercial interests belong to the private or public sectors.  
The involvement of SOEs in the banking system makes the economy more vulnerable 
due to their inefficiency in the use of resources, including capital. The last few years has 
recorded a dramatic acceleration in the capital and fixed asset of SOEs. The average 
capital per SOE surged from 130 billion dong in 2000 to 768 billion dong in 2008. 
During the same period average fixed assets and investments increased sixfold from 110 
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to 677 billion dong. Assets generated in the state sector were mainly financed by bank 
credit. SOEs are also found to be less financially prudent (Pincus, 2009). During 
2007−2009 the debt-to-equity ratio of SOEs averaged 307 percent relative to 183 
percent for non-state firms and 145 percent for foreign firms. However, SOEs have been 
proven to be very inefficient and wasteful in using capital and credit. SOEs use several 
times more capital to produce one unit of output than the industry average. In 2000 the 
average ratio of turnover to capital (a proxy of capital productivity) in SOEs was 1.6 
compared to 8.8 for non-state enterprises. This circumstance was even more alarming in 
2009. The turnover to capital ratio in SOEs fell to 1.1 while in private and foreign 
sectors it reached 21.0 in manufacturing industry (WB, 2012). It is obvious that while 
enterprises owned by the state are getting worse in terms of their efficient usage of 
capital, by contrast their private counterparts are becoming more economically efficient 
in their capital usage. 
In the post-WTO accession period SOEs have, therefore, mobilised a significant amount 
of capital mainly through banking credit. Nonetheless, inefficient production, non-
transparency and non-accountability in the state sector easily turned banking credit into 
NPLs over a short time period.  
2.3.3 Effects of Asset Price Bubbles 
The period 2007-2008 recorded a drastic increase in asset prices which were seen as 
dangerous bubbles (Pincus, 2009; Leung, 2009). There are two types of assets: stocks 
and real estate. In the first year of being a WTO member the stock market index in Ho 
Chi Minh City (VN-index) tripled in value from around 350 in 2006 to a peak of 1171 
in March of 2007, and property doubled in price every few months. The former vice 
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minister of the Vietnam Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment – Dang Hung 
Vo stated that, on average, a Vietnamese citizen needs saving from 75 working years to 
buy a house
25
.  
The overheating growth of asset markets can be driven partly by the influence of WTO 
accession. The one remarkable influence of accession into the WTO is the substantial 
surge of foreign capital inflows from late 2006 (Leung, 2009). In 2007 alone a sum of 
foreign capital worth US$17.5 billion through channels such as Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI), portfolio investment and Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
flowed into Vietnam. When remittances are added, total capital inflow reached US$24 
billion dollars in 2007. Absorbing such a large capital inflow in a short period of time is 
not easy even for a developed country with mature financial markets. To keep the 
Vietnamese dong from appreciating relative to foreign currency the SBV bought the 
foreign cash inflows. Therefore, it injected dong into the economy which led to 
considerable excess liquidity in the banking system. This in turn resulted in a rapid 
growth of credit. In a shallow financial market like Vietnam it was anticipated that a 
significant fraction of credit would move into asset markets and fuel asset prices.
26
 
The second argument to explaining asset price bubbles is the movement of large SOEs 
into the financial sector. These enterprises have broadened their business into non-core 
areas including banks, securities firms, real estate companies and insurers
27
. SOEs insist 
                                                 
25
 The source is from http://vef.vn/2012-01-31-trang-page-3 
26
Positive and normative theory of regulation can be applied to explain the relationship between credit 
growth and asset price bubbles in a shallow financial market such as Vietnam‘s. A lack of relevant 
regulations may result in high-risk investments by banks in the stock or property markets and this can 
lead to a spike in asset prices. Furthermore, the experiences of emerging countries such as Thailand or 
Indonesia during Asian Financial Crisis also show that rapid growth of credit fuelled speculative activity 
that resulted in asset price bubbles (Keeton, 1999; Kawai and Schmukler, 2001). 
27
For example, Petro Vietnam, the state oil and gas group, has six financial firms, two banks, security and 
real estate companies.  
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that they have only invested 30 percent of their capital outside of their core business 
(Pincus, 2008). Nonetheless, it is difficult to measure the extent to which the data is real 
and accurate. In a non-transparent environment large SOEs have the privilege of not 
being audited annually by independent audit companies and not having to publish their 
financial statements.  
The influence of asset price bubbles on the banking system is extremely serious. Data 
on the size of loans in the stock and property markets has not yet been revealed, 
however according to VELP (2012) it would be very significant. Speculators raised the 
real estate and stock prices so as to achieve high capital gains. These actions will lead to 
bubble prices for assets. Therefore, under the upward trend of markets, the loans of 
banks are excessive and inefficiently allocated. On the other hand, when asset price 
bubbles burst these loans will be quickly turned into bad loans. The second negative 
effect of asset bubbles on the banking system is that approximately 70-percent of loans 
are backed by real estate as collateral. In the case where loans turn into NPLs and the 
banks have to liquidate collateral with a market value much lower than its book value, a 
significant proportion of loans will not be repaid. 
2.3.4 Non-Performing Loans 
International experience has shown that rapid growth in the banking sector under weak 
governance conditions will eventually result in instability of this sector (Gorton and 
Winton, 1998). Using the event method Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) 
identify a set of indicators which determine the crisis status of a banking system. They 
are the ratio of non-performing assets to total assets in the banking system exceeding 10 
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percent; the cost of the rescue operation
28
 of a particular country was at least 2 percent 
of its GDP; banking sector problems resulted in a large scale nationalisation of banks; 
extensive bank runs took place.  
In Vietnam, where the predominant assets in banks are loans, the rate of NPLs to total 
outstanding loans can be used to replace the above-mentioned indicators. The true NPLs 
in Vietnam are difficult to identify due to conflicting outcomes from different related 
institutions
29
. Moreover, Vietnam is applying out of date accounting standards
30
 in 
calculating NPLs which are considerably lower than that computed using ISAs. A report 
by the National Assembly Economic Commission declared that the rate of NPLs during 
2010−2012 was between 10 to 12 percent (see Table 2.10). On the other hand, 
according to experts from international financial intermediates (IMF, WB) the rate of 
NPLs computed by the ISA is three to four times higher. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28
The rescue operation funded by budgetary resources entails a number of measures to stabilise the 
banking system, for instance lending from central banks to ensure the liquidity of banks or 
recapitalisation of the banking sector (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998). 
29
The Fitch report ―2013 Outlook: Vietnamese Banks‖ presented three very different assessments of 
NPLs. These are from the banks, the SBV, and Fitch. 
30
The new standards which seem to be closer to ISAs were supposed to be implemented but were 
postponed because they would immediately double or even triple the NPLs of banks, and quickly classify 
them as bankrupt. To keep the banking system in a ―stable‖ condition the outdated standards are still in 
effect (IMF, 2014). 
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10Table 2.10: Overdue and bad loans of Vietnam‘s banking system, 2010-2011 
 
Indicators 2010 2011 
Overdue Loans/Total Loans (%) 7.77 11.09 
Of which (in percentage) 
      SOCBs 10.43 13.36 
    JSBs 3.73 6.43 
    JVBs, FBs 4.66 5.76 
    Finance and Leasing Firms 21.06 40.85 
NPLs/Total Loans (%) 2.29 3.72 
Of which (in percentage) 
      SOCBs 2.95 2.16 
    JSBs 2.3 1.87 
    JVBs, FBs 1.86 1.2 
    Finance and Leasing Firms 34.5 11.38 
Source: Adapted from NFSC Report 2012, page 10 
It is important to highlight the reasons which led to the high NPL rates. Pincus (2008) 
identified three immediate sources of vulnerability in the Vietnamese banking system. 
First, during the period 2005−2008 it was very easy to open JSBs or to transform rural 
to urban banks. The experiences from Argentina, Chile, and Indonesia show that when 
the government is not sufficiently selective in the awarding of bank licences then the 
result is the rapid growth of credit by inexperienced bankers, which are high risk 
takersand fail to diversify their bank assets. In reality, many small JSBs have used the 
bulk of their credit to purchase property and stocks. The NPLs rate is extremely high at 
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about 60 percent in some banks. The solution put forward by the SBV is to put these 
banks under special supervision and force them to restructure or even merge together
31
.   
Second, Vietnam allowed industry groups in both the state and private sectors to 
participate in and open banks. It repeated the mistakes of other countries such as Japan, 
Indonesia, and Chile when conglomerates employed banks as a source for funding their 
industrial and commercial projects. Subsequently, the allocation of credit became 
distorted when financial resources were not channelled to the most efficient projects. 
Third, Vietnam lacks a rigorous framework of regulation, supervision and enforcement 
to ensure a sustainable and consistent development of the banking system. Banking 
sector weaknesses that have persisted for a long time need to be effectively addressed 
by the SBV. Moreover, bad banks after having been identified and accused are not 
subsequently punished stringently and immediately. Therefore, the accumulation of 
negative behaviours in banks such as intra-lending, over-lending to the stock and 
property markets and moral hazard problems brings the banks to the verge of 
insolvency.  
  
                                                 
31
See ―The Scheme for Bank Restructuring Period 2011-2015‖ of the Vietnamese Government issued in 
March 2012. 
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11Table 2.11: A summary of key policy changes by the Government since WTO 
accession 
Changes 
Type of 
Changes
32
 
Source of Changes Time 
Allowing foreign banks to operate in 
Vietnam (in the form of 100% foreign-
invested banks) 
 
Liberalisation Commitments from 
WTO accession  
From  
April 2007 
Allowing foreign banks to participate in 
domestic banks with capital (up to 30%) 
Liberalisation Commitments from 
WTO accession  
2007 
SOCBs Privatisation  Liberalisation Decision 112 of the 
Government that 
requires SOCBs to be 
equitised 
May 2006 
Transforming rural banks to urban banks Deregulation Decree 141 imposed 
minimum bank capital 
that encouraged rural 
banks to transform into 
urban banks. The SBV 
loosened its standards 
for new urban bank 
entry. 
November 
2006 
Allowing state business groups (SBGs) to 
participate in the banking sector 
Deregulation The IXth and Xth 
Vietnam Communist 
Party Congress allowed 
the formation of several 
pilot SBGs involving a 
multi-business model 
along the lines of the 
Korean chaebol (WB, 
2012) 
2005−2010 
Source: Summarised and compiled by the author 
  
                                                 
32
 The policy changes are divided into two categories. The first incorporates changes relating to 
enhancing the participation of both the domestic and foreign private sector in the banking system 
(liberalisation changes). The second consists of those which allowed simpler and less stringent 
regulations for new bank entries (deregulation changes).  
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12Table 2.12: A summary of differences in the business environment across different 
forms of bank ownership 
Aspects SOCBs JSBs FJVBs 
Bank solvency Solvency guarantee 
provided by the state 
No guarantee  No guarantee 
Accessibility to 
resources 
Having privileges in terms 
of accessing financial or 
land resources  
Having no such privileges Having no such 
privileges 
Scope of 
operation 
Over the whole country Over the whole country Mostly focused in big 
cities such as Ho Chi 
Minh and Hanoi 
Restrictions on 
operation 
No restrictions and all types 
of banking services can be 
provided 
No restriction and all 
types of banking services 
can be provided 
Restrictions on banking 
services in Vietnamese 
dong has been gradually 
removed from the onset 
of WTO entry 
Source: Summarised and compiled by the author 
2.4 Summary 
One important pillar of the Vietnamese strategy to transform the economy from a 
centrally planned to market economy from 1986 is through banking sector reform. The 
eventual objective of this reform is to build up a modern and efficient banking system 
which provides full and convenient services to consumers, producers as well as 
government. The transition in this sector has been conducted gradually and cautiously. 
Two barriers have limited the effectiveness of the reform plans; they are structural 
weaknesses and institutional irrationality. Structural weaknesses have been exposed 
through the persistent but inefficient presence of the state sector. SOEs have dominated 
the bulk of total credit from the banking sector and abused financial leverage. 
Inefficiently using financial resources and privileged access to banking credit resulted in 
a high level of NPLs. The government has tried to reduce the adverse effects of SOEs 
on the banking sector by their SOEs reform program, which accelerated from 1998. The 
program decreased significantly the number of SOEs and equitised most of the 
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remainder. Consequently, the operation of SOEs became more efficient and the rate of 
NPLs in the following period tended to decline. Nonetheless, in the post-WTO 
accession period (2007-present) a number of unsuitable policies have been issued which 
have contributed to widening the size of the state sector and made the banking system 
unstable. First, the government has permitted some large SOEs to transform their 
organisational model to that of business groups. These groups quickly established a 
series of subsidiaries which needed a substantial amount of credit with numerous 
privileges from government. Second, these groups and some large SOEs were allowed 
to expand their business into the banking sector through capital participation in 
operating banks or opening new banks. As a result it is not surprising that intra-lending 
became very popular for the banks which were partly owned by state enterprises. The 
existence of a large but inefficient state sector has negatively influenced the banking 
sector, an issue to be explored in more detail in Chapter 6.  
The second very important factor that has affected efficiency in the banking sector is 
institutional irrationality. The decisions of government, SBV, or MOF (Ministry of 
Finance) are affected by the SEDPs of the Communist Party and interest groups 
(Pincus, 2008; Beresford, 2008). The consequence of this is that the SBV cannot 
conduct its roles as an independent regulator and supervisor of the banking sector, and 
the capability and efficiency of the SBV is undermined. Another irrationality of the 
SBV is that it cannot comprehensively control banks‘ activities. The overheating growth 
of financial markets such as the stock and real estate markets from 2007 attracted a 
significant amount of credit from banks. However, the function of regulating and 
supervising these markets has been allocated to the MOF. Weak cooperation between 
the SBV and MOF to control the capital flow from the banking sector into financial 
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markets resulted in an increase of speculative behaviour as well as moral hazard 
problems (NFSC report). Eventually, this has resulted in a low level of credibility from 
the market and the public and its faith in the government in general, and the SBV in 
particular, to conduct monetary policy. The limited information which the public has is 
always different from various sources of information. For political purposes this is 
because the SBV possibly intends to provide biased information, and is even not willing 
to provide some important information to the public who wish to have it. Policy actions 
have been inconsistent due to the gap between what the government announces and 
what they do. In other words, when the public has weak credibility of the SBV and 
government policy the banking sector is very vulnerable to external shocks.  
This chapter has provided an overview of the Vietnamese banking sector and possible 
factors influencing the efficiency and stability of commercial banks in this country. It is 
necessary to put the situation of the banking sector in Vietnam in context. The next 
chapter reviews research on bank efficiency in the literature drawing upon the 
experiences of a number of countries. 
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Chapter 3: Literature Review on Banking Efficiency 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews methods used in previous studies to measure and analyse bank 
efficiency as well as the impact of financial liberalisation policies on bank efficiency. 
Both parametric and nonparametric methods used to measure bank efficiency are 
reviewed in this chapter. The scope of these studies includes not only those for a single 
country but also those for cross-country cases including countries at different stages of 
development (Maudos et al, 2002; Bonin et al., 2005a; 2005b; Kraft et al., 2006; 
Denizer et al., 2007; Jiang et al., 2009; Berger et al., 2009; Chortareas et al., 2013). Of 
particular interest are those for transition economies specifically, of which Vietnam is 
one. A consensus from relevant studies is that liberalising the banking sector will 
improve banking sector performance in terms of technical efficiency (Levine, 2001; 
Hermes and Nhung, 2010; Chortareas et al., 2013). For transition economies an 
important finding is that a high efficiency level can be achieved rapidly if transitional 
banking systems transform to foreign dominated ones (Bonin and Schnabel, 2011).   
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 summarises methods used in the 
literature to estimate bank efficiency including parametric and non-parametric types. 
Moreover, methods used to analyse the impact of environmental variables on bank 
efficiency are also discussed. Section 3.3 reviews studies on the impact of financial 
liberalisation on bank efficiency in a single-country or cross-country context. Section 
3.4 provides an overview of bank efficiency in transition countries when these countries 
have changed the banking sector from one dominated by government ownership to one 
dominated by foreign ownership. Section 3.5 critically analyses previous studies on 
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bank efficiency and productivity in Vietnam, identifying gaps in this literature that this 
study will address. Finally, section 3.6 provides a summary of the major conclusions 
from this chapter. 
3.2 Techniques related to Measuring and Analysing Banking Efficiency 
3.2.1 Techniques for Measuring Banking Efficiency 
Over the past several decades there has been substantial research effort on measuring 
the efficiency of financial institutions, and especially commercial banks (Berger and 
Humphrey, 1997; Fethi and Pasiouras, 2010). Measuring and evaluating the 
performance of banks is aimed at classifying those banks that are performing well and 
those that are performing badly (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). Based on the 
classification of ―best practice‖ and ―worst practice‖ banks, bankers can improve 
managerial performance by encouraging the former practices as well as discouraging 
the latter.  
This section concentrates on the derivation of frontier efficiency which can assist in 
measuring how close a commercial bank is to a ―best practice‖ frontier. There are two 
types of production frontiers; they are nonparametric and parametric frontiers.  
Nonparametric frontiers  
The nonparametric approach is based on linear programming techniques which do not 
require specification of production functions
33
. Most research using this approach 
applies the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Free Disposal Hull (FDH) methods. 
                                                 
33
The parametric approach uses regression techniques to estimate efficient frontiers, so that production 
functions need to be specified.  
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DEA is a linear programming technique for building efficient frontiers and measuring 
efficiency relative to these frontiers. The DEA technique involves forming a piecewise 
linear frontier that links a set of these best practice observations
34
.  FDH is a special 
case of DEA proposed by Deprins, Simar and Tulkens (1984), where the efficiency 
frontier is built by connecting a set of DEA vertices and free disposal hull points interior 
to these vertices (see Figure 3.1).  
4Figure 3.1: A comparison between DEA and FDH 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Deprins et al.(2006), page 3116 
Note: A decision making unit (DMU) sample consists of five observations (b, c, e, f, g) with an output 
orientation, two outputs and one input and variable return to scale conditions. The efficient DEA frontier 
is constructed by a-b-c-d, while it is a-b-e-f-g-c-d in the case of FDH.   
Fethi and Pasiouras (2010) reviewed a total of 196 studies and found that DEA is the 
most commonly used operational research technique in assessing bank performance. 
They identify a number of advantages from using DEA. First, DEA works well with 
small-sized samples so that it can be applied in any country. In most countries the 
number of operating banks is relatively small, ranging from tens to hundreds of banks 
except for the U.S.A which has thousands of banks. Second, DEA does not require any 
assumptions on the nature of the relationship between inputs and outputs and the 
                                                 
34
A more detailed discussion of the DEA approach will be conducted in Chapter 4.  
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distribution function of inefficiency in order to determine the frontier. Consequently, 
DEA is simple and convenient for users.  
Nonetheless, DEA also has a number of limitations (Coelli et al., 2005). DEA does not 
identify the measurement error and other noise which may influence the shape and 
position of the efficiency frontier. The exclusion or inclusion of only one input or output 
will lead to biased results. Moreover, treating inputs/outputs as homogenous 
commodities while they are heterogeneous may bias the result. In the DEA model only 
inputs and outputs are included while other managerial factors influencing the level of 
outputs generated from given inputs or the level of inputs used to produce a given 
output level are neglected. Thus, not accounting for environmental variables may give 
misleading indications of relative managerial competence. 
According to Assaf et al., (2013), NPLs need to be included in a mix-production 
process to ensure the unbiasedness of results. The exclusion of bad loans in an 
efficiency measuring process would lead to biased outcomes because the more efficient 
banks can produce a higher proportion of undesirable outputs. There are a number of 
techniques that enable the incorporation of bad loans into DEA models. First, 
directional distance functions are based on the idea that a reduction of bad outputs is 
feasible only if good outputs are simultaneously reduced, given a fixed level of inputs. 
Second, slack-based measurement of inefficiency based on slacks including input 
excesses and output short-falls along with the computational scheme for defining 
efficiency. These two types of efficiency measurement can be combined with the 
network approach and dynamic approach in order to comprehensively measure bank 
efficiency including NPLs as a bad output (Fujii et al., 2014; Avkiran, 2015).However, 
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inclusion of bad loans in DEA models is impossible to conduct in this thesis due to 
unavailability of relevant data. 
Parametric Frontier 
The parametric approach uses estimation techniques to build an efficient production 
frontier based upon an assumed production functional form. According to Berger and 
Humphrey (1997), there are three approaches to building parametric frontiers: the 
Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA); the Distribution Free Approach (DFA); and the 
Thick Frontier Approach (TFA). These approaches are similar at specifying the form of 
the production function. There are various forms that the production function can take: 
Cobb-Douglas, constant elasticity of substitution (CES) and translog. Nonetheless, they 
are different when it comes to assumptions about the distribution of random errors and 
inefficiency. The random error and inefficiency in the cases of SFA and DFA are 
assumed to be distributed following one of many types of distribution functions: half-
normal, nonnegative, symmetric, or exponential functions. In contrast, there are no such 
assumptions in the case of TFA. 
The DFA also specifies a functional form for the frontier; however, it separates 
inefficiency from the random error. This approach draws no strong assumptions on the 
distributional function of inefficiency or random errors. It supposes that efficiency is 
stable and the mean of the random error is equal to zero over time. Inefficiency can 
follow either a nonnegative or symmetric distribution form.  
The TFA approach assumes a given specification of the functional form and that 
deviations from predicted performance values between the highest and lowest 
performance quartiles of observations indicate random error; and the deviations of 
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predicted performance between the highest and lowest quartiles represent inefficiency. 
This approach does not make assumptions about the distributional form of either the 
random error or inefficiency.  
The advantages of using the parametric method are that it includes identification of 
measurement errors and random effects in the model, allowing estimation of confidence 
intervals as well as statistical inference of the efficiency scores. Nevertheless, this 
method also manifests several disadvantages. For example, it imposes a specification 
for the production function which may result in function misspecification errors. Since 
the method is based on estimation techniques it requires a large number of 
observations
35
 to make the estimated results reliable (Simar and Wilson, 1998; Coelli et 
al., 2005); hence the scope of this method is narrowed substantially and particularly for 
the case of small sample size.    
3.2.2 Approaches to Analysing the Effect of Environmental Variables on Banking 
Efficiency 
According to Fried et al. (1999) there are three approaches to analysing the effects of 
environmental variables on technical efficiency.  They are the frontier separation 
approach, the all-in-one approach and the two-stage approach. 
The Frontier Separation Approach 
Charneset al. (1981) was the first to use the frontier separation approach, specifically to 
analyse the effect of environment variables on managerial efficiency in U.S schools. 
Based on a single categorical variable that characterises the different environment 
                                                 
35
 SFA can be applied for measuring bank efficiency with large-size samples (for example: banks in U.S, 
or Europe). 
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conditions (e.g., ownership, gender), the data set is stratified into sub-samples. 
Nonparametric frontiers are solved for each sub-sample as well as for all observed data 
points. The effect of environment variables can be observed through comparing the 
efficiency scores of sub-samples and the pooled data.  
Nevertheless, when the data set is divided into smaller sub-samples the efficiency scores 
tend to increase; consequently, the discriminatory power of the analysis is reduced. 
Furthermore, this approach has a problem in that it requires the environmental variables 
to be categorical ones.  
The All-in-One Approach 
In this approach all the external operating variables can be directly incorporated into a 
linear programming formulation along with traditional inputs and outputs. This 
approach allows an environmental variable not to be restricted to being a categorical 
one. The influential direction of the environmental variables needs to be prior identified 
before being included in the linear program (Fried et al., 1999; Coelliet al., 2005). If the 
variable is believed to be positive to the efficiency scores then it should be seen as a 
non-discretionary output. In contrast, it would be included as a non-discretionary input. 
However, the prior classification of environmental variables to be inputs or outputs is 
unsuitable if the objective is to investigate whether the effect of the variables is 
favourable or unfavourable.  
The Two-Stage Approach 
Regression of efficiency scores against a set of environmental variables are mostly 
based on the two-stage method. In the first stage the method involves calculating the 
efficiency scores with traditional inputs and outputs based upon an assumed production 
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functional form. In the second stage efficiency scores obtained from the previous stage 
are regressed upon a set of environmental variables. The influential direction of these 
variables on efficiency is determined by the signs of the coefficients.  
Coelliet al. (2005) recommend utilising multivariate analysis in most cases due to its 
advantages against univariate analysis. The advantages are:  
- More than one variable can be accommodated; 
- Both categorical and continuous variables can be accommodated; 
- Assumptions on the direction of variables are not necessary; 
- One can test hypotheses on the significance of variables on efficiency; 
- The method is simple and transparent. 
However, there is a disadvantage with the two-stage method. If the input and output 
variables used in the first stage are highly correlated with the environmental variables, 
then in the second stage the estimates are likely to be biased.  
In the DEA context there are three regression methods that have been used in the second 
stage. Two of these are ordinary least square (OLS) and Tobit; however, both methods 
also experience a bound problem. OLS could predict efficiency scores greater or smaller 
than the bound - unity (Coelliet al, 2005). Tobit allows regressing one-value efficiency 
scores on explanatory variables, but in fact they cannot equal one when the true efficient 
frontier is unobservable. A more serious problem is that both OLS and Tobit methods 
generate serially correlated efficiency scores.
36
 Hence, statistical inferences resulting 
from these two regression methods are invalid (Xue and Harker, 1992; Hirschberg and 
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 The best practice DMUs in the sample are given efficient values of one and the inefficient others obtain 
their efficiency scores by comparing their performance relative to the best observations. Subsequently, 
DEA estimates are dependent and serially correlated. 
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Lloyd, 2002). Moreover, Simar and Wilson (2007) suppose that no studies employing 
either Tobit or OLS regression describe a data generating process (DGP). Therefore, the 
coefficients obtained in the second stage are not reliable. To overcome these problems 
Simar and Wilson (2007) propose a third method, the so-called truncated regression in 
two algorithms. The Monte Carlo simulation procedure reveals a preference for 
Algorithm 2
37
 which helps correct for bias of the estimated coefficients (Delis et al., 
2011). Simar and Wilson (2007) start the procedure with a simple truncated regression, 
the estimates of which are corrected in a number of bootstrapping
38
 steps.  
3.2.3 Selection of Inputs and Outputs for an Analysis of Bank Efficiency 
In order to measure bank efficiency, input and output variables need to be specified. 
There have been a number of approaches to choosing input and output variables in the 
context of measuring bank efficiency (Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Worthington, 2000; 
Das and Ghosh, 2006; Arjomandi et al., 2011; 2012). First and foremost, banks are 
financial intermediaries which link lenders to borrowers (Intermediation approach). 
To mobilise deposits from households and firms, banks hire staff and invest in fixed 
assets such as offices, software, hardware and other equipment. On the other hand, 
banks need staff, fixed assets and deposits to lend to firms and individuals which 
eventually generate loans. Furthermore, through the stock market, banks provide capital 
by purchasing securities which are issued by firms. Banks also finance themselves in 
the form of investments in associated companies. In general, in the context of the 
intermediation approach, the input variables consist of labour cost, value of fixed assets, 
                                                 
37
The algorithm will be explained in detail in Chapter 4. 
38
Efron (1979) introduced the concept of ―Bootstrap‖, which works satisfactorily on a variety of 
estimation problems. The bootstrap is a statistical technique for making inferences of certain estimates. 
Based on an original sample, a bootstrap generates a magnitude of pseudo samples (bootstrap samples) 
which will build the empirical distribution function of the given statistics.   
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and deposits. The output variables include loans, securities and investment. However, 
there is still controversy over whether a deposit should be classified as an input or 
output variable (Das and Ghosh, 2006). 
A variation of the intermediation approach is the value-added approach. Asset and 
liability items that have a significant impact on value added are used as outputs. 
Application of the value-added approach requires identifying the major categories of 
deposits (demand, time and savings) and loans (for real estate, business, and 
instalments) as outputs. Purchased funds such as large certificates of deposits, foreign 
deposits, and other liabilities for borrowed money are treated as inputs (Berger et al., 
1987). Using the value-added approach, Das and Ghosh (2006) use employee expenses, 
capital related operating expenses, and interest expenses as inputs producing outputs 
such as deposits (demand, saving, and fixed deposits), investments, and loans. Lozano-
Vivas et al. (2002) applied the value-added approach to estimate efficiency of ten 
European banking industries using loans, deposits, and other earning assets as outputs 
and two inputs including personnel expenses and non-interest expenses.    
An important responsibility of banks is to provide retail banking services to their 
customers, which include demand and time deposits, instalment loans, mortgage loans, 
business loans, and securities. The production approach is based on this responsibility 
and facilitates the estimation of banking efficiency scores. Physical variables (such as 
number of employers, number of computers) are used to estimate banking efficiency. 
The volume of services provided can be measured by the number of accounts, number 
of transactions, average number of instalment loans outstanding, or activity items 
(cheques, deposits, and transit items) (Benston, 1965). Inputs also include wages per 
employee and number of banking offices. Due to the fact that bank branches are where 
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retail banking activities occur and the clients are served, the production approach is 
most frequently used to estimate the efficiency of bank branches (Berger et al., 1997). 
Banks can be seen as a specific type of enterprise earning profit through intermediating 
between lenders and borrowers and providing banking services (Leightner and Lovell, 
1998). Banks receive revenues (or incomes) from services provided to customers. There 
are two types of revenues which are interest and non-interest incomes. Equivalently, 
there are two types of expenses including interest and non-interest expenses. The 
approach to using these variables based on the function of banks as profit earners is 
called the operating approach. A study on Malaysian banking efficiency in the post-
EAFC period and conducted by Sufian (2009) employs the operating approach. The 
inputs are interest and non-interest income, and the outputs are interest and non-interest 
expenses. Das and Ghosh (2006) used interest expenses, employee expenses, and capital 
related operating expenses as the inputs and interest income, non-interest income as 
outputs in analysing the efficiency of Indian banks during the post-reform period.  
According to Berger and Humphrey (1997) the two dominant approaches for selecting 
inputs and outputs are the production approach and intermediation approach. 
Nonetheless, neither of these two approaches is perfect, as neither of these approaches 
can capture the dual roles of banks as providers of transaction/processing services as 
well as being financial intermediaries.  
Sathye (2003) found that the intermediation approach is frequently used in DEA studies. 
Moreover, this approach is commonly used together with other approaches such as the 
value-added approach, or operating approach. Das and Ghosh (2006) employ 
simultaneously the intermediation, value-added, and operating approaches in one study. 
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Banker et al. (2010) estimate Korean banking productivity using both the 
intermediation and operating approaches.   
There is no consensus on the results from estimated efficiency scores using the different 
approaches. Berger et al. (1997) compare the production and intermediation approaches 
by applying the same data base of bank branches. The result is that the correlation index 
between the technical efficiency scores obtained from the two approaches is relatively 
low at 0.40. In another study the estimates of technical efficiency were consistently 
higher under the value-added approach than that of the intermediation and operating 
approaches (Das and Ghosh, 2006).  
3.3 Impact of Financial Liberalisation on Banking Efficiency in a Global Context 
The world has experienced a continuous and wide integration process of national 
economies in general and financial sectors in particular (Coleman and Underhill, 2012; 
Balassa, 2013). Since the 1990s governments in newly emerging market and transition 
countries have intensified policies towards liberalising their financial sectors (Hermes 
and Vu, 2010). The aim of financial liberalisation is to eliminate government control 
and intervention in the financial system of an economy. As a result the financial system 
becomes more competitive and efficient, but also subject to greater probability of a 
financial crisis (Radelet and Sachs, 2000; Claessens and Laeven, 2003; Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2008). Nevertheless, financial liberalisation itself cannot guarantee financial 
sector efficiency and soundness without the necessary supervisory framework in place. 
Lessons from the East Asia Financial Crisis in several Asian countries such as Thailand, 
Indonesia and Korea indicate that financial freedom can lead to rapid credit growth, 
rising bad debt, asset price bubbles and eventually the onset of financial crises 
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(Radeletand and Sachs, 2000). Hence, financial liberalisation needs to be conducted in 
parallel with strengthening the supervisory and regulatory framework. 
The term  financial liberalisation covers a number  of measures:  autonomy of the 
Central Bank from government; free capital flows with the exception of  short term 
capital flows ; elimination of interest rate or exchange rate controls; abandonment of 
policy lending to priority sectors; and removal of restrictions on bank ownership 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; Levine, 2001; Chinn and Ito, 2008). In the case 
of newly emerging market and transition economies where governments have 
stringently controlled financial systems further measures of financial liberalisation 
include opening markets for foreign entry and private investors and privatising state 
owned banks (Abarbanell and Bonin 1997; Zoli, 2001; Bonin and Wachtel, 2003).  
According to Berger and Humphrey (1997) the primary goal of financial liberalisation 
and deregulation is to improve the efficiency of banks or intermediaries as well as their 
financial sustainability. Nevertheless, the outcomes are different depending on 
macroeconomic instability and in some cases banking crises triggered by overly 
ambitious financial deregulation (Denizer et al., 2007). The rest of this section will be 
used to review the impact of financial liberalisation on banking efficiency in different 
economies and by stage of economic development (emerging, developing and 
developed).  
Global financial liberalisation experience 
Most empirical studies find that liberalisation of the banking sector improves efficiency 
in a wide range of countries, from developing and transition countries to developed 
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countries (Boubakri et al., 2005; Hermes and Nhung, 2010; Chortareas et al., 2013).
39
 
For example, Ataullah et al. (2004) used DEA with two input-output specifications to 
compare the technical efficiency of commercial banks in India and Pakistan during a 
period of financial liberalisation from 1988 to 1998. Numerous measures were 
conducted to deregulate the banking system including a gradual deregulation of interest 
rates, reduction of reserve requirements, entry of non-bank financial institutions, 
allowing the entry of private banks (domestic and foreign); gradual abandonment of 
state-directed credit policies. They found that these measures positively impacted the 
overall technical efficiency of the banking sector, especially after 1995. Chen et al. 
(2005) and Kumbhakar & Wang (2007) investigated the efficiency and productivity of 
Chinese banks in the 1990s before accession to the WTO in 2001. The 1990s witnessed 
reform in the banking sector when the central government deregulated interest rates, 
eliminated local government intervention in SOCB lending and allowed entry by 
privately owned banks (only domestic investors).  These policies generated pressure on 
the SOCBs to innovating their activities and services and become more commercially 
oriented. This resulted in a modest improvement in banking efficiency and productivity. 
After the collapse of centrally planned economies in Central and Eastern Europe at the 
end of the 1980s and early 1990s, a number of these transition economies implemented 
a ―big-bang‖ reform in the banking sector by privatising state owned banks and 
permitting the entry of foreign banks. Due to political issues Croatia initiated banking 
reform and liberalisation later than other transition countries
40
. Kraft et al. (2006) 
conducted research on the impact of banking liberalisation in this country during the 
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 For a summary on the impact of financial liberalisation on bank efficiency in a global perspective, see 
Table 3.1. 
40
Croatia only became an independent country in October 1991 
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period 1994–2000. Using the SFA approach to estimate a Fourier-flexible frontier cost 
function the authors showed that an increase in bank efficiency is not immediate with 
privatisation, but only for new foreign banks with good management and reputation
41
.  
In contrast, Hungary, as a transition economy during the period of the late 1980s and  
much of the 1990s,  started banking reform and liberalisation relatively early when the 
government accepted several foreign banks to establish business activities in the early 
1980s (Hasan and Marton, 2003). Adopting the SFA method and a translog production 
functional form, Hasan and Marton (2003) estimated the profit and cost frontiers for 
banks during the period 1993−1998. They found that foreign banks outperformed 
domestic banks in Hungary and their capital involvement with local banks facilitated an 
improvement in their efficiency. Foreign entry and privatisation with flexible 
approaches were effective liberalisation measures in order to pave the way for a 
stronger banking sector in a short period of time.  
The difference between developing and transition countries with developed countries is 
that the latter have mature institutions and a transparent business environment. These 
conditions ensure that policies focusing on financial liberalisation would be conducted 
effectively to improve banking efficiency. Sturm and William (2004) compared the 
efficiency of Australian domestic banks to that of foreign banks in the post-deregulation 
period 1988 – 2001. Both DEA and SFA methods are applied to measure efficiency. 
The DEA results found that foreign banks experienced superior scale efficiency. The 
source of productivity gain was technological progress rather than technical efficiency 
improvement as a result of new technologies transferred from foreign banks. Even in a 
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Kraft et al. (2006) measured the reputation of foreign banks by the asset size of their holding 
corporation and  number of operating years . 
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liberal banking sector such as that in Hong Kong, an even more liberal policy can 
improve banking efficiency. Drake et al. (2006) using the DEA method showed that 
financial deregulation during their study period of 1995 – 2001, and involving the 
removal of remaining interest rate caps, increased the mean efficiency of Hong Kong 
banks.   
In some cases the impact of financial liberalisation was not as expected by policy 
makers. There is evidence about the negative effects of the liberalising process on 
banking efficiency. Denizer et al. (2007) measured bank efficiency in Turkey using data 
covering a 25-year period from 1970−1994. The authors suggested that the resultant 
outcomes of opening up the financial market were not as expected by policy makers 
when they assumed that more highly motivated management would facilitate more 
efficiency in resource usage. Bank efficiency scores were found to have decreased and 
varied unstably against a backdrop of a turbulent macroeconomic environment. In terms 
of developed countries, Grifell-Tatje and Lovell (1996) investigated productive 
efficiency and total factor productivity change in Spanish savings banks in the post-
deregulation period (1986−1991). This period witnessed all interest rates and service 
charges being liberalised and savings banks being permitted to open branches outside 
their traditional geographic regions. The productivity decline was caused by an 
expansion of branch networks creating costly excess capacity. Another example is 
Korea which implemented a set of financial liberalisation measures under a series of 
revisions to the General Banking Act from 1991 – 1997 (Park and Weber, 2006). Policy 
loans were abandoned, interest rates were liberalised, the exchange rate was deregulated 
and a restructure of bank ownership allowed individual shareholders a 12 percent equity 
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stake. However, these deregulations made the banks more inefficient in the years prior 
to the EAFC. 
Several studies have shown mixed results from liberalisation measures on bank 
efficiency in the case of countries during a similar study period. For example, Berger et 
al. (2009) analysed the impact of foreign entry and involvement on banking efficiency 
in China in the pre- and post-WTO
42
 accession period (1994−2003). They found that the 
Big Four
43
 group were the least efficient due primarily to poor revenue and high NPLs, 
while foreign banks were found to be the most profitable and efficient banks. In 
contrast, research conducted by Jiang et al. (2009) found that joint-stock banks were the 
most efficient while foreign owned banks and city commercial banks were the least 
efficient. However, both studies advocated the positive impact of foreign involvement 
on banking efficiency in the long-run. Such conflicting outcomes for bank efficiency 
and productivity also appeared for the case of Spain during a deregulatory period 
(1986−1991), characterised by freeing interest rates, allowing saving banks to widen 
their networks, lowering reserve requirements and phasing out investment requirements. 
Maudoset al. (2002) analysed the influence of specialisation in services provided by 
banks to explain the cost efficiency difference between bank types during the period 
1985−1996. Using DEA to estimate the production frontiers for specific bank types they 
found that the cost efficiency of saving banks experienced an appreciable improvement 
and that there was a positive correlation between the size of banks and their level of cost 
efficiency. In contrast, a decline in the productivity of Spanish banks was recorded by 
                                                 
42
China joined the WTO in December 2001 
43
 The Big Four group consists of the four largest state owned banks in China (Bank of China, China 
Construction Bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and Agricultural Bank of China), and they 
held 77.1 percent of all banking sector assets in 2003 (source: Berger et al. (2009)). 
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Grifell-Tatje and Lovell (1996); moreover, there they found no apparent link between 
bank size and performance.    
To explain such mixed results from financial liberalisation on bank efficiency, Kraft et 
al. (2006) supposed that differences in the regulatory and economic environment across 
countries are very strong so that the policies towards liberalising financial markets 
would result in different outcomes. Second, most of the studies are inconsistent when 
using just one or a few dimensions of financial liberalisation (Hermes and Vu, 2010). 
The solution to these limitations is to conduct research based on a cross-country 
comparison with data covering a set of countries at a similar stage of development such 
as developing or developed countries. Cross-country based studies all indicate a positive 
relationship between financial liberalisation and bank efficiency. For example, Casu and 
Molyneux (2003) investigated banking efficiency in leading European economies when 
the Single Market Program (SMP) was implemented in 1993. Implementation of SMP 
created the largest and most open banking market in the world through abandoning 
contemporary barriers by establishing minimum regulatory requirements across the 
European Union; accordingly, SMP could lead to a more efficient banking sector in 
Europe. It was found that there was a slight improvement of average efficiency scores 
over the period 1993−1997; nevertheless, the gap among countries grew even wider due 
to country-specific aspects relating to the adoption of banking technology. One other 
study by Chortateas et al. (2013) investigated the impact of financial freedom on bank 
performance in 27 European Union countries during 2001−2009. This was the first 
study to explicitly characterise the effects of ―financial freedom‖ indices on bank 
efficiency by controlling for banking, economic, and institutional variables. The results 
showed a clear positive association between the financial counterpart of the economic 
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freedom indices and bank efficiency scores. Moreover, a higher level of economic and 
financial liberalisation would result in a relatively higher degree of efficiency on the 
cost side.  
In the context of emerging market economies, Hermes and Vu (2010) used data 
consisting of 4000 bank-year observations from 10 countries in Latin America and 
South East Asia in the period 1991−2000. The index developed by Laeven (2003) 
included six aspects: interest rates, entry barriers, reserve requirements, credit controls, 
and privatisation and prudential regulation was employed to measure the degree of 
financial liberalisation. The results from the empirical analysis strongly supported a 
positive impact of financial freedom programs on bank efficiency. Hence, studies based 
on cross-country samples have generally found a positive relationship between financial 
liberalisation measures and bank efficiency. 
3.4 Banking Efficiency in Transition Economies 
3.4.1 An Overview of Bank Efficiency in Transition Economies 
Before 1989 the banking system of transition countries consisted of a mono bank which 
acted as both a central bank and a commercial bank, and was designed to meet the needs 
of a centrally planned economy (Koivu, 2002). The collapse of the Socialist Bloc at the 
end of the 1980s triggered a transition process which transformed centrally planned 
economies into market economies. Consequently, the mono banking system was split 
into two tiers including a central bank and a number of commercial banks.  
The importance of banking efficiency in transitional economies has been recognised in 
the literature. A number of studies have shown a close and positive relationship between 
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the level of banking efficiency and economic growth (Levine, 1997; Lucchetti et al., 
2001; Berger et al., 2004). Koivu (2002) investigated whether an efficient banking 
sector accelerates economic growth in terms of transitional countries. The study was 
conducted for 25 transitional countries during the period 1993−2000, and it provided 
support for the view that banking efficiency is very important for economic 
development. This is because an efficient banking sector allocates financial resources to 
the most profitable and productive enterprises. Gordon and Winton (1998) investigated 
the relationship between banking efficiency and banking instability. A paradox between 
the efficiency and instability of the banking sector in transition economies was 
discovered. When the banking sector operates efficiently it mobilises more deposits and 
lends more to the economy. Nonetheless, the state sector (mostly SOEs) still dominates 
many transitional economies but operating inefficiently generates high non-performing 
loans for banks. Subsequently, the banking sector would become vulnerable and 
unstable.    
It is important to highlight specific characteristics of the banking sector in transition 
countries. There is evidence to suggest that these characteristics substantially influence 
banking efficiency (Weill, 2003; Bonin et al., 2005a).  
- First, the banking sector suffered structural weaknesses when the transition 
process began. The public sector dominated the economies of transition 
countries, but was inefficient in its operation. Consequently, governments had to 
conduct reform programs so as to increase the efficiency and competitiveness of 
the economy in general and the banking sector in particular (Fries and Taci, 
2005; Chen et al., 2005). Program measures included: rehabilitating SOCBs; 
permitting the growth and development of the private sector; liberalising and 
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opening the banking sector to foreign investors; conducting banking sector 
reform in parallel with SOE reform (Hasan and Marton, 2003; Haas and 
Lelyveld, 2006; Fries et al., 2006). The results of reform have not been 
consistent across transition economies, and depend on specific country 
characteristics and approaches (models of transition, feasibility of programs, 
quality of institutions and speed of the reform process). 
- Second, financial markets in transition countries have only been developing for 
just over 20 years (from the end of the 1980s to the present); hence, they are still 
shallow and narrowly based
44
. While in modern economies there are a wide 
range of financial institutions and derivatives to support economic growth, 
commercial banks have been the major source of finance in transitional 
economies (Bonin and Wachtel, 2003; Hasan and Marton, 2003). The 
underdevelopment of capital markets and non-bank financial intermediaries has 
burdened the commercial banks with having to provide long-term financing for 
corporate investment and supporting the mortgage market. Moreover, 
macroeconomic instability, such as high inflation during the transition process, 
distorted the structure and flows of deposits. High inflation rates eroded the 
value of deposits so that depositors reduced the maturity of their deposits or 
even transferred their saving to non-productive assets (gold, strong foreign 
currency, and real estate). 
- Bonin and Wachtel (2003) suggested two pillars underpinning an efficient 
banking sector. The first is strong banks in terms of financial capability with 
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Financial markets in transition and emerging markets are said to be shallow and narrowly based because 
of the small size of their financial sectors and the dominance of the banking sector relative to non-bank 
financial intermediaries (Zoli, 2001; Hasan and Marton, 2003).  
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good corporate governance aiming to improve efficiency. Second, is a consistent 
regulatory agency which regulates and supervises all banking activities. Most 
regulatory agencies in transition countries automatically apply western-style 
regulations which have been developed for hundreds of years in the U.S or 
European economies. Meanwhile, elements necessary for conducting these 
regulations such as the quality of staff and symmetric information between the 
bankers (or clients) and regulators are weak (Mitchell, 2001). Furthermore, non-
transparency of the business environment distorts or stifles fair implementation 
(Zoli, 2001). It is certain that a regulatory and supervisory framework based on 
solid foundations contributes significantly to the efficiency and stability of 
banking systems in transition economies.  
 
The last two decades have witnessed a substantial transformation from dominant state-
owned to foreign controlled banking sectors in emerging market countries, including 
transitional ones. The transformation helps these transition economies surmount the 
above-mentioned characteristics and orient to market based banking sectors. The results 
brought about from the transforming process advocate government policies that open 
and liberalise banking sectors.  
3.4.2 The Impacts of Financial Liberalisation on Banking Efficiency in Transition 
Countries 
Studies of bank efficiency in the former transition economies in Central and Eastern 
Europe, former Soviet Union countries, or East Asia mostly focus on the impact of 
financial liberalisation in terms of bank privatisation and foreign involvement (see 
Table 3.2 for a summary). These studies have been conducted in both single-country 
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and cross-country cases. Both SFA and DEA methods have been employed to estimate 
efficiency scores.  
The intermediation approach to efficiency analysis is commonly applied because the 
most important role of banks in transition economies is to transfer savings into loans. In 
several studies the intermediation approach is used together with other approaches such 
as the production or operating approach (Jing et al., 2009; Karas et al., 2010).  
There is evidence to suggest that foreign bank entry has a positive impact on bank 
efficiency in transition countries. Studies conducted in single-country cases support 
foreign banks outperforming domestic banks. Havrylchyk (2006) investigated the 
efficiency of the Polish banking industry between 1997 and 2001 using the DEA 
method. The author found that inputs were employed more efficiently and the right mix 
of inputs was chosen in foreign banks. In line with other research conducted in other 
transition countries, foreign banks exhibited higher efficiency than domestic banks due 
to the successful performance of greenfield foreign banks. Other studies conducted in 
Russia (Karaset al., 2010), Croatia (Kraft et al., 2006) and Ukraine (Kyj and Isik, 2008) 
also found  that foreign banks had  advantages in terms of corporate governance, risk 
management, financial capability as well having a  sound reputation of utilising inputs 
optimally and more efficiently in allocating credit to firms and individuals. 
Consequently, they achieved the highest efficiency in comparison with domestic banks.      
Studies based on cross-country comparisons give more consistent results to that of 
studies with a single country focus. However, the results are mixed depending on the 
study period or the geographical scope. For example, Fang et al. (2011) estimated the 
efficiency of six South East European countries from 1998 to 2008 and found that 
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foreign owned banks were less cost efficient but more profit efficient than domestic 
banks. In contrast, Yildirim and Philippatos (2007) show that foreign banks achieved 
higher cost efficiency but lower profit efficiency in a sample consisting of 12 countries 
in Central and Eastern European countries from 1993−2000. On the other hand, Kasman 
and Yildirim (2006) showed a consistent superiority in terms of both cost efficiency and 
profit efficiency for foreign banks when measuring bank efficiency in eight Central and 
Eastern European economies during the period 1995−2002.   
There are two types of foreign banks. The first are greenfield banks, which have been 
established as new entities by foreign investors. The second type, so-called takeover or 
foreign-acquired bank, resulted from the acquisition of former domestically owned 
institutions during the privatisation process. Although these two types of foreign banks 
are totally owned and managed by foreign investors, their level of efficiency is 
dissimilar. Results from research conducted by Havrylchyk (2006) indicated that 
greenfield banks achieved higher levels of efficiency than domestic banks, and takeover 
banks failed in enhancing their efficiency. With respect to both cost and profit, foreign 
greenfield banks are the most efficient of all bank types in six transition countries in a 
study conducted by Bonin et al. (2005b). Poghosyan and Poshosyan (2010) investigated 
the influence of foreign bank entry in the banking sectors of 11 transition countries 
(1992 – 2006), and concluded that foreign greenfield banks experienced superior 
efficiency in comparison to that of domestic or foreign-acquired banks. The reasons are 
argued by the fact that greenfield banks inherited overseas customers of their parents 
banks operating in the same host countries. Moreover, the efficiency of takeover banks 
did not improve significantly at the early stage of foreign entry as a result of poor 
managerial and financial characteristics of the targeted banks. Foreign investors are not 
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only permitted to establish totally foreign-owned banks but also to participate their 
capital in domestic banks. In some transition countries foreign investors are allowed to 
be majority owners of domestic banks. However, foreign investors commonly hold a 
percentage that exceeds 50 percent of domestic bank equity (these banks are so-called 
majority foreign banks). On the other hand, transition countries in Asia such as China 
and Vietnam impose an upper bound on capital participation from foreign entities. The 
bound is generally below 50 percent of bank equity to ensure that domestic shareholders 
can take control of these banks (these banks are so-called minority foreign banks, see 
Berger et al., 2009). In both mentioned bank types private banks with foreign 
involvement have been shown to achieve higher levels of efficiency than domestic 
private banks or state-owned banks. Fries and Taci (2005) empirically examined the 
efficiency of 289 banks in 15 post-communist countries in East Europe and found that 
private banks were more efficient than state-owned banks. However, there was 
substantial dispersion amongst private bank groups. Privatised banks with majority 
foreign ownership were the most efficient. In a single country study conducted by 
Hasan and Marton (2003) in Hungary, they showed that in the short-term policies 
towards enhancing foreign involvement in domestic financial institutions facilitated the 
way for a stronger banking sector. Among foreign-involved banks a higher share of 
foreign ownership was associated with a lower degree of inefficiency. The positive 
influence of foreign involvement not only stemmed from majority foreign ownership 
but also minority foreign ownership. Berger et al. (2009) showed that for both profit 
and cost efficiency as well as for both categories of domestic banks with minority 
ownership (private and state-owned banks); minority owned foreign banks are 
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associated with higher efficiency. In addition, this result is robust after checking for 
selection effects that efficiency improved after foreign investment.  
At the early stage of transforming the banking system in transition economies, state or 
government ownership has dominated the banking sector. Nonetheless, this type of 
ownership is recognised as an encumbrance for improving the efficiency and 
profitability of banks (Zoli, 2001; Hasan&Marton, 2003; Havrylchyk, 2006). This is due 
to the fact that governments tend to orient the banks they dominate in terms of 
ownership to a policy rather than commercial orientation (La Porta et al., 2002). As a 
result, decreasing substantially or even eliminating government ownership is seen to be 
a critical policy towards improving the efficiency and productivity of the banking 
sector. Cross-country studies conducted by Fries and Taci (2005), Bonin et al. (2005a; 
2005b), Fries et al. (2006)  together advocate that private banks are superior to state-
owned banks in aspects of both cost and profit efficiency. Moreover, single-country 
studies conducted in China (Jiang et al., 2009; Berger et al., 2009) and Bulgaria 
(Tochkov and Nenovsky, 2011) also support the outperforming of private banks to 
public banks. Nonetheless, several studies have shown a reversed relationship between 
state ownership and bank efficiency. Karas et al. (2010) investigated bank performance 
in Russia and showed that there were no differences between private and public banks 
in terms of technical efficiency. Yao et al. (2009) measured Chinese bank efficiency 
and productivity during the period 1998−2005 and concluded that large privatised state-
owned banks achieved higher technical efficiency and productivity after their IPOs 
(Initial Public Offering).  
 Bonin and Schnabel (2011) describe a great transformation from government-owned to 
foreign controlled banking sector and that this is an unprecedented change in banking 
 
 
86 
 
systems to have occurred in transition economies. The shift to market-based operations 
is accompanied by an improvement in the financial environment generally, and bank 
efficiency in particular.   
3.5. Literature on Banking Efficiency in Vietnam 
To the best of the author‘s knowledge, Nguyen (2007) is the first study to investigate 
the efficiency and productivity of Vietnamese banks covering the period 2001−2003 
with a limited sample of banks (13 of about 50 commercial banks). Using a basic DEA 
method he found that the average bank cost efficiency score was a low 60.6 percent and 
the sources of this inefficiency derived from both allocative and technical components 
of cost efficiency. The Malmquist productivity index decreased during the period 
2001−2003. However, the results do not reflect the entire banking sector due to the 
short period of the study as well as the small sample size. Moreover, the period 
2001−2003 witnessed a significant change in the banking sector such as the 
recapitalisation of the SOCBs, and the merging or even revoking of the banking licenses 
of small Joint Stocks Banks (JSBs) after the East Asia Financial Crisis (EAFC). 
Nonetheless, the determinants of banking efficiency and productivity were not 
mentioned or determined in the study.  
Quang and De Borger (2008) used a bootstrap technique to construct confidence 
intervals for DEA-based efficiency and productivity of the Vietnamese banking sector 
for the period 2003-2006. The technical efficiency scores were very high at 94 and 95 
percent in 2003 and 2004, respectively; and then substantially declined to 85 percent in 
2006. Nonetheless, such a high level of efficiency is doubtful. A suitable reason is that 
the sample of banks does not include the small rural banks which were seen to be 
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inefficient in their operation. The state-owned banks were found to be more efficient 
than private banks. However, the explanation provided on this comparison in the study 
is weak with no empirical evidence provided to support it.  
Minh et al. (2013) estimated the efficiency of Vietnam‘s banking sector using a sample 
of 32 banks during the period 2001−2005. They used a super-efficiency measure 
through a slacks-based model under the assumption of variable returns to scale (VRS). 
The average efficiency score was found to be about 80 percent during this period, and it 
tended to increase. Furthermore, a set of determinants were emphasised including 
ownership type, bank size, labour quality and market share through a Tobit model 
regression. They found that state ownership negatively affected efficiency. Nonetheless, 
this result was not consistent because the SOCBs were recorded as achieving a high 
ranking during 2001−2005. A positive relationship between efficiency and bank size 
and market share was also found.  
Vu and Turnell (2010) firstly employed an SFA method to measure bank efficiency in 
the context of Vietnam. The bank sample in this study covered almost all banks and 
foreign-bank branches operating in Vietnam during the period 2000−2006. The authors 
concluded that, on average, cost efficiency was mostly unchanged and SOCBs reached a 
higher efficiency level than private banks (JSBs and foreign-bank branches). The 
authors argue that the improvement of SOCBs‘ efficiency resulted from the 
implementation of the Overall Restructuring Framework which aimed to recapitalise 
and phase out policy lending by the SOCBs. The reduction in efficiency found for 2005 
was due to implementation of new regulations on debt classification and loan-loss 
provisioning that forced banks to increase their non-interest cost. Implementation of this 
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regulation is likely to have contributed to a structural break in the data after 2005, and 
hence data homogeneity is questionable.   
Vu and Turnell (2012) provided a parametric measure of productivity change using a 
hyperbolic distance function with the same data sample as Vu and Turnell (2010). The 
results showed that the Vietnamese banking industry experienced modest productivity 
growth due to technological progress. Moreover, FBs achieved the highest productivity 
growth because they possessed advanced technology infrastructure and operated at an 
appropriate scale.  
Nalm and Vu (2013) reused the sample data of Vu and Turnell (2010) to estimate the 
efficiency and productivity of Vietnamese banks. Based on a directional distance 
function the authors measured profit efficiency and its components of technical and 
allocative efficiency. A generalised Malmquist productivity index was also derived and 
decomposed into pure technical efficiency change, scale efficiency change and 
technological change. The findings are: (1) in terms of profit efficiency average banks 
operated quite far below the frontier of the best practice banks mainly due to allocative 
inefficiency rather than technical inefficiency; (2) price efficiency and profit efficiency 
scores of SOCBs were much higher than JSBs and FBs due to their market power in 
setting prices; (3) during 2000−2006 the banking industry achieved modest productivity 
growth due to technological progress. The reused data still faced the limitation of data 
heterogeneity as mentioned above.     
Generally, pre-WTO entry studies on banking efficiency in Vietnam provided 
conflicting results on the trend of efficiency. This is possibly because the bank samples 
were different, and the data was not homogenous. Except for the study conducted by Vu 
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and Turnell (2010), the others totally ignored the effects of the restructuring plan on the 
efficiency of banks. Moreover, technological progress should be analysed in depth 
because the period 2000−2006 experienced a substantial change in banking operations 
when all banks applied the core banking system based on the internet, inter-bank 
payment system, and the Automatic Teller Machine (ATM) system.   
The post-WTO accession period witnessed a number of policies aimed at improving the 
efficiency of domestic banks under the threat from foreign bank penetration. The 
policies included: (1) equitising SOCBs; (2) permitting foreign financial institutions to 
have capital participation in domestic banks; (3) transforming 13 rural to urban banks 
and granting new bank licenses; (4) allowing SOEs and private business groups to 
engage in the banking sector. These policies are likely to have influenced banking 
efficiency and are necessary to be analysed in depth. Moreover, the booming property 
market, which essentially depended on banking credit, can be expected to have strongly 
exerted an effect on banking efficiency. Although a lot of important changes occurred 
after Vietnam joined the WTO a limited number of studies have been conducted to 
investigate their impact on banking efficiency.  
Dang-Thanh (2010) used a basic DEA model to measure the efficiency scores of banks 
in Vietnam using a sample of 22 banks in 2008. The results suggested that the mean 
technical efficiency scores under the variable returns to scale (VRS) assumption or 
constant returns to scale (CRS) assumption are close to one. However, this finding is 
not reliable because it is based on banking performance in only one year (2008). 
Additionally, this research does not mention the possible influences of policy changes in 
the post-WTO entry period. 
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Nguyen (2012) employed a similar DEA method to measure the efficiency and 
productivity of Vietnamese banks during the period 2007−2010 using a sample of 20 
banks. The author found that the efficiency scores continuously increased from 
2007−2010. Mean technical efficiency in 2008 was found to be 0.686 which is very 
different compared with that obtained by Ngo (2010). The difference can be explained 
by the different sample, and by the different sources of data. In addition, the technical 
efficiency scores of SOCBs are significantly lower than that of JSBs. Given there are 
many major policy changes during this period, those studies however did not consider 
these changes. Ngo (2012) conducted another study using macro data to analyse the 
relationship between DEA-based banking efficiency and liberalisation from 1990−2010. 
To measure liberalisation in the banking sector a KAOPEN index developed by Chinn 
and Ito (2008) was used. However, the results obtained did not support his hypothesis 
that financial liberalisation positively impacted banking efficiency in Vietnam. 
Homogeneity of the data is doubtful due to significant changes in accounting standards 
and national statistical practices during the research period.  
There have been nine studies in total on Vietnamese banking efficiency to date (see 
Table 3.3). Most of these studies have focused on measuring and analysing the technical 
efficiency and productivity of the banking sector in the pre-WTO accession period 
(2000−2006)
45
. There are a number of studies measuring technical efficiency in the 
post-WTO; however changes in policies as well as from the business environment 
influencing the banking sector have not been mentioned and analysed. This study is the 
first to evaluate the technical efficiency of Vietnam‘s commercial banks covering the 
period 2005−2012, which incorporates both the pre- and post-WTO period. In addition, 
                                                 
45
 Vietnam officially became the 150
th
 member of the WTO from January 2007. 
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it is the first study to test for a linkage between banking sector related policy changes 
and banking efficiency. 
The Vietnamese economy in general and its banking sector in particular are in a 
transition process from a planned to a complete market economy. Consequently, the 
characteristics of the banking sector
46
 in a transition economy have to be accounted for 
in analysing efficiency. Nonetheless, previous research has not adequately addressed or 
only slightly considered these characteristics. As a result the roots of the 
underperformance in the banking sector are largely ignored when analysing banking 
efficiency and productivity.  
According to Simar and Wilson (1998), efficient firms are inadequately included in the 
sample and so DEA estimates can be biased. These previous studies, however, do not 
address these issues; therefore it is likely that their estimates may suffer from these 
problems. Moreover, all regressions of technical efficiency scores on the determinants 
are inconsistent due to a serial correlation defect of the dependent variable (Xue and 
Hacker, 1999). Obviously, the results attained are not reliable and a better method that 
overcomes these restrictions should be discovered and applied in such studies.  In this 
context, this study addresses such issues to produce unbiased and more accurate results. 
Due to the issuance of new accounting standards in 2005, all studies using before-2005 
data need to be adjusted to fit new accounting standards due to the fact that the loan-loss 
provisioning cost which takes up a substantial part of total cost was excluded before 
2005. Consequently, studies using data from 2005 are much more consistent and 
accurate.   
                                                 
46
 These characteristics are referred to in Section 3.4.1.  
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To the author‘s knowledge, in the relevant literature, there have been studies on the 
impact of WTO accession on banking efficiency but only for the case of China – 
another transition country in Asia (Yao et al., 2007; Berger et al., 2009; Jiang et al., 
2009). China and Vietnam together conducted a similar gradualist approach to banking 
sector transition. Before joining the WTO their banking sectors were relatively closed to 
foreign investors. In contrast, transition countries in Europe conducted a ―big-bang‖ 
approach; and most of them definitively liberalised their banking sectors at an early 
stage of their transition so that the impact of their subsequent WTO accession was 
insignificant. Studies on banking efficiency in Vietnam in the post-WTO accession in 
comparison with that of China are important to discover the common characteristics of 
the banking sectors in these gradualist transition countries.  
3.6 Summary 
This chapter has reviewed several important aspects relating to bank efficiency in the 
literature, including a summary of methods that have been used for estimating 
efficiency, and regression techniques for regressing efficiency scores on environmental 
variables. Financial liberalisation and its impact on banking efficiency has been 
analysed in both a single-country and cross-country framework. Additionally, a review 
of the transformation process in transition countries from a government dominated 
banking sector to a foreign controlled one has also been highlighted. Lastly, previous 
studies on Vietnamese banking efficiency have also been summarised so as to identify 
the limitations, weaknesses as well as the research gap to be filled by this thesis. 
In the following chapter, conceptual framework on efficiency and methods used to 
estimate and analyse technical efficiency scores will be presented. Specifically, 
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bootstrap techniques are employed as the unique solution to overcome biased and 
dependent nature of DEA-estimated efficiency scores. 
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13Table 3.1: A Summary of Financial Liberalisation and Deregulation Impacts on Bank Efficiency 
 
Publications Countries 
or Regions 
Type of 
countries 
Perio
d 
Method - 
Approach 
Input 
Variables 
Output 
Variables 
Environmental 
Variables 
Bank specific 
variables 
Financial 
Liberalisation 
Aspects 
Findings 
Havrylchyk 
(2006) 
Poland Transition 1997
-
2001 
DEA –  
Intermediation 
Deposits 
Fixed assets 
Labour 
Loans 
Treasury 
bonds 
Off-balance 
items 
 
Dummy variables 
differ domestic-
foreign 
ownership 
Growth of 
assets 
Capitalisation 
Loans/total 
asset 
Total assets 
Foreign bank entry Foreign banks exhibit higher efficiency 
due to greenfield banks rather than 
takeover banks.  
 
 
Hermes & Vu 
(2010) 
Latin 
America 
and Asia  
Developing 
& Emerging  
1991 
- 
2000 
DEA – n.a 
 
n.a n.a 
 
Density of 
demand 
GDP growth 
Inflation rate 
CAR 
ROE 
Total 
loan/deposits 
Interest rates 
Entry barriers  
Reserve 
requirement 
Credit controls  
Privatization  
Prudential 
regulation 
Positive impact of financial liberalization 
on bank efficiency 
Ataullahet al. 
(2004) 
India and 
Pakistan 
Developing 
& Emerging  
1988 
- 
1998 
DEA – 
Intermediation 
Operating 
Operating 
expenses 
Interest 
expenses 
Operating 
expenses 
Interest 
expenses 
Loans and 
advances 
Investment 
Interest 
income 
Non-
interest 
income 
NPLs 
 
 
Bank size Interest rates  
Credit policies 
Reserve 
requirement 
Entry of private 
sector 
Public banks 
Financial liberalization improves bank 
efficiency. 
The gap of efficiency scores between two 
approaches due to NPLs. 
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Publications Countries 
or Regions 
Type of 
countries 
Perio
d 
Method - 
Approach 
Input 
Variables 
Output 
Variables 
Environmental 
Variables 
Bank specific 
variables 
Financial 
Liberalisation 
Aspects 
Findings 
privatisation 
Casu&Molyne
ux (2003) 
Specific EU 
members: 
France, 
Germany, 
Italy,  
Spain, UK 
 
Developed 1993 
–  
1997 
DEA - 
Intermediation 
Total cost 
Total deposits 
Loans  
Other 
earning 
assets 
Country specific 
variables 
 
E/A ratio 
ROEA 
Commercial 
banks or not 
Listed or not in 
stock exchange 
Merging banking 
markets of EU 
members through 
SMP (Single Market 
Program) conducted 
from  1993 
Slightly improved efficiency. 
The gap of efficiency amongst countries is 
due to country specific characters such as 
management strategies and informatics 
technology. 
Das et al. 
(2005) 
India Emerging  1997 
- 
2003 
DEA –  
Intermediation  
 
Borrowed funds 
No. of 
employees 
Fixed assets 
Equity  
Investment 
NPLs 
Fee-based 
incomes 
 Bank size 
Ownership 
structure 
List or not in 
stock exchange 
Interest rates 
Market entry 
Reserve 
requirement 
Profit efficiency improved. 
Positive impacts of asset size, ownership, 
being listed in stock market on efficiency. 
 
Williams & 
Nguyen 
(2005) 
South East 
Asia 
Developing 1990 
- 
2003 
SFA -  
Intermediation 
 
Interest  
Personnel 
expenses  
Loans 
Other 
earning 
assets 
Non-
interest 
income 
Dynamic 
governance 
indicators 
Selection 
governance 
indicators 
Exit variables 
Static 
governance 
indicators 
Bank assets 
Bank privatization 
Widening access to 
foreign institutions 
Bank privatization raised bank 
performance. 
Foreign acquisition did not result in better 
performance.  
Hasan&Marto
n (2003) 
Hungary Developed 1993 
- 
1998 
SFA – 
Intermediation 
Borrowed fund 
Labour and 
related 
expenses 
Loans 
Investment 
Fee income 
Interest 
Acquisition   A set of 
financial ratios ( 
e.g: E/A, L/A) 
Assets  
Age  
Percentage of 
Bank privatization  
Foreign bank entry 
and involvement 
with domestic banks 
 
Profit and cost efficiency improved. 
Banks with foreign involvement were less 
inefficient.  
Higher share of foreign ownership is 
associated with lower inefficiency. 
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Publications Countries 
or Regions 
Type of 
countries 
Perio
d 
Method - 
Approach 
Input 
Variables 
Output 
Variables 
Environmental 
Variables 
Bank specific 
variables 
Financial 
Liberalisation 
Aspects 
Findings 
assets owned 
by foreign 
investors 
Yao et al. 
(2008) 
China Emerging 1998 
- 
2005 
DEA – 
Operating  
Interest 
expenses 
Non-interest 
expenses 
Interest 
income 
Non-
interest 
income 
 Bank size  
Ownership  
Bank privatization  
Removing 
restrictions on 
foreign investments  
 
SOCBs achieved high technical efficiency.  
Total factor productivity of SOCBs 
increased due to technical efficiency 
when it was technical progress for JSBs.  
Das &Ghosh 
(2006) 
India Emerging 1992 
- 
2002 
DEA – 
Intermediation  
 
 
 
 
 
Value-added 
 
 
Operating 
Demand, 
Saving, Fixed 
deposits 
Capital-related 
operating cost 
Labour cost 
Capital-related 
operating cost 
Labour cost 
Interest 
expenses 
Capital-related 
operating cost 
Labour cost 
Advances 
Investment
s 
 
 
 
 
Advances  
Investment
s  
 
Interest 
income 
Non-
interest 
income 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bank size  
Ownership 
CAR 
NPLs 
Management 
quality 
Liberal entry of 
foreign banks 
Allowing functioning 
of new private 
banks 
Public banks 
privatization 
Dismantle of 
interest rate regime 
Banks with higher CAR were more 
efficient.  
Higher technical efficiency banks were 
associated with lower NPLs. 
Competitive changes positively impacted 
small and medium banks or banks with 
lower manpower deployment and high 
technology intensity. 
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Publications Countries 
or Regions 
Type of 
countries 
Perio
d 
Method - 
Approach 
Input 
Variables 
Output 
Variables 
Environmental 
Variables 
Bank specific 
variables 
Financial 
Liberalisation 
Aspects 
Findings 
Drake et al. 
(2006) 
Hong Kong Developed 1995 
– 
2001 
DEA –  
Operating  
Employees 
expenses 
Non-interest 
expenses  
Loan-loss 
provisions 
Net-
interest 
income 
Net 
commission 
income  
Other 
income 
External shocks 
(EAFC, accession 
to the PRC, 2001 
terrorist event) 
N/A Removal of interest 
rate cap  
Efficiency was impacted by external 
factors.  
Strong size-efficiency relationship. 
 
Sturm & 
Williams 
(2004) 
Australia Developed 1988 
- 
2001 
DEA, SFA –  
Intermediation  
 
 
Operating  
No. of 
employees 
Deposits 
Equity 
Interest 
expenses 
Non-interest 
expenses 
Advances 
Off-balance 
items 
Interest 
income 
Non-
interest 
income 
N/A Ownership  
Bank types 
Remove restrictions 
on foreign entry 
Scale efficiency dominated technical 
efficiency.  
Bank productivity improved. 
The main source of productivity gain was 
technological progress. 
Foreign banks experienced superior scale 
efficiency.  
Diversity of bank types was a main source 
for competition and efficiency 
Haoet al. 
(2001) 
Korea Developed 1985
-
1995 
SFA -  
Intermediation 
Labour cost 
Physical capital 
expense 
Interest 
expense 
Loans & 
securities 
Demand 
deposits 
Fee income 
Reform Age 
Bank asset 
Growth rate 
Salary-asset 
ratio 
Branches-
deposit ratio 
Employee-asset 
ratio 
Reprivatisation  
Removal of interest 
rate ceilings and 
entry restrictions 
Reduction of 
government 
directed lending 
Expanded product 
deregulation  
Reduction of 
restrictions on 
More efficient banks with faster growth 
rates, nationwide operating, extensive use 
of core deposits, more capital-intensified, 
higher foreign equity ownership. 
Less efficient banks with higher level of 
long-term private sector debt, and the 
level of real goods, exports.   
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Publications Countries 
or Regions 
Type of 
countries 
Perio
d 
Method - 
Approach 
Input 
Variables 
Output 
Variables 
Environmental 
Variables 
Bank specific 
variables 
Financial 
Liberalisation 
Aspects 
Findings 
Demand 
deposit-total 
deposit ratio 
foreign exchange 
transactions.  
 
Denizeret al. 
(2007) 
Turkey 
 
Developing 1970 
– 
1994 
DEA –  
Production 
 
 
 
Intermediation 
Own resources 
Operational 
expenses 
Interest and fee 
Own resources 
Operational 
expenses 
Deposits 
Deposits 
Non-
interest 
income 
 
 
Loans  
Banking 
income 
Inflation rate 
Growth rate  
Ownership  N/A Average technical efficiency followed a 
downward trend.  
The state owned banks performed better 
than private and foreign banks.  
Inflation and economic growth negatively 
impacted on efficiency.  
 
Chortateas 
et al. (2013) 
27 
European 
countries 
Developed 2001 
- 
2009 
DEA – 
intermediation 
Personnel 
expenses 
Fixed assets 
Interest 
expenses 
 
Loans  
Other 
earning 
assets 
Economic 
freedom 
variables 
Institutional 
variables 
Equity/asset 
ratio 
ROAE 
Total assets 
Loans/asset 
ratio 
N/A Positive relationship between economic 
freedom/institutional governance and 
banking efficiency.  
 
Grifell-Tatje& 
Lovell (1996) 
Spain Developed 1986 
-  
1991 
DEA – 
production  
No. of 
employees 
Expenditure on 
material 
Expenditure on 
building plus 
depreciation  
No. of loan 
acc. 
No. of 
checking 
acc.  
No. of 
saving acc. 
M&A Loan/deposit 
ratio 
Free interest rate 
and fee 
Branching outside 
banks’ geographic 
region 
Lower reserve 
requirement 
A decline of productivity 
Fast-branching banks had lower 
productivity 
No productivity gain following M&A 
Efficient banks with higher loan/deposit 
ratio 
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Publications Countries 
or Regions 
Type of 
countries 
Perio
d 
Method - 
Approach 
Input 
Variables 
Output 
Variables 
Environmental 
Variables 
Bank specific 
variables 
Financial 
Liberalisation 
Aspects 
Findings 
No. of 
branches 
Phasing out 
investment 
requirement 
Jiang et al.  
(2009) 
China Emerging 1995 
- 
2005 
SFA – 
intermediation  
operating 
Model 1: 
interest 
expense; non-
interest 
expense 
Model 2: 
interest 
expense; labour 
and physical 
capital 
Model 3: 
interest 
expense; 
physical capital; 
labour 
 
interest 
income; 
non-
interest 
income 
loans; 
deposits; 
non-
interest 
income 
loans, 
deposits; 
other 
earning 
assets 
 
Time trend 
GDP growth rate 
Foreign 
acquisition  
Static effect 
indicator 
E/A 
LLD/Loan 
Interbank 
fund/deposit 
Loans/Deposit 
Foreign acquisition 
SOCBs privatization 
JSBs are the most efficient and next to 
SOCBs while FBs are the least 
IPOs and foreign acquisition of SOCBs are 
affective to improve efficiency of banks.  
 
Berger et al. 
(2009) 
China Emerging 1994 
– 
2003 
SFA – 
intermediation  
 
Interest 
expense 
Physical inputs 
Loans  
Deposits  
Liquid 
assets 
Other 
earning 
assets 
 Ownership  
Bank size 
Foreign bank entry 
Minority foreign 
ownership  
SOCBs are the least efficient and the FBs 
are the most.  
Minority foreign ownership increased 
bank efficiency.    
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Publications Countries 
or Regions 
Type of 
countries 
Perio
d 
Method - 
Approach 
Input 
Variables 
Output 
Variables 
Environmental 
Variables 
Bank specific 
variables 
Financial 
Liberalisation 
Aspects 
Findings 
Kumbhakar& 
Wang (2007) 
China  Emerging 1993 
- 
2002 
SFA – 
intermediation 
Labour 
Fixed assets  
Deposits plus 
borrowed funds 
Loans net 
Other 
earning 
assets 
Deregulation  E/A 
Ownership 
Bank size 
 
Interest 
deregulation 
Elimination of local 
government 
intervention on 
SOCBs lending 
New bank entry 
 
Joint-equity banks achieved higher 
efficiency than SOCBs 
Larger banks were less efficient 
Modest improvement of banking 
productivity 
Chen et al. 
(2005) 
China  Emerging 1993 
- 
2000 
DEA -  
intermediation 
Interest 
expense  
Non-interest 
expense 
Loans 
Deposits  
Non-
interest 
income 
Deregulation  Ownership  
Bank size 
Interest 
deregulation 
Elimination of local 
government 
intervention on 
SOCBs lending 
New bank entry 
Efficiency improved in the early 
deregulated period 
Larger and small banks were more 
efficient 
 
Park & Weber 
(2006) 
Korea Developed 1992 
- 
2002 
DEA – 
intermediation  
 Operating 
Labour 
Physical capital 
Deposits 
Interest 
expense 
Non-interest 
expense 
Loans 
Securities 
Demand 
deposits 
NPLs 
Non-
interest 
income 
Interest 
income 
Fee income 
 
 
 Interest rate 
deregulation 
Policy loans 
elimination 
Foreign transaction 
deregulation 
Bank ownership 
restructuring  
More inefficient banks 
Productivity growth due to technical 
progress offsetting efficiency decline. 
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Publications Countries 
or Regions 
Type of 
countries 
Perio
d 
Method - 
Approach 
Input 
Variables 
Output 
Variables 
Environmental 
Variables 
Bank specific 
variables 
Financial 
Liberalisation 
Aspects 
Findings 
Maudoset al. 
(2002) 
Spain Developed 1985 
- 
1996 
DEA – 
intermediation 
Labour 
Physical capital 
Deposits 
Loanable 
funds 
Loaned 
funds 
 Bank size 
Bank type 
Quality of input 
Time trend 
Banking 
specification  
The efficiency improved 
Positive relationship between cost 
efficiency and bank size; and personnel 
qualification;  
Foreign bank reached highest efficiency 
level 
Kraft et al. 
(2006) 
Croatia Transition 1994 
- 
2000 
SFA – 
intermediation 
Fixed capital 
Labour 
Interest 
expense 
Loans to 
enterprises 
Loans to 
customers  
Deposits 
 Bank size  
Ownership  
Age 
Bank privatisation 
Foreign entry 
Foreign banks were the most efficient 
while the private banks were the least  
Insignificant impacts of privatisation  
Source: Compiled and summarised by the author 
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14Table 3.2: A Summary of Financial Liberalisation and Deregulation Impacts on Bank Efficiency in Transition Economies 
Publication
s 
Countries 
or Regions 
Perio
d 
Method - 
Approach 
Input 
Variables 
Output 
Variables 
Environmental 
Variables 
Bank specific 
variables 
Bank 
restructuring 
measures 
Findings 
Fang et al. 
(2011) 
6 Countries 
in South 
Eastern 
Europe 
1998 
– 
2008 
SFA – 
Intermediation 
Borrowed funds 
Fixed assets 
Loans 
Securities  
Other earning 
assets 
Country-
specific 
variables 
Equity 
NPLs 
Privatisation  
Foreign entry 
Enterprises 
reform 
 
Foreign owned banks were less cost efficient but 
more profit efficient  
Profit efficiency of foreign banks declined over 
time 
Government owned banks became more efficient 
in the later years of transition.  
Karaset al. 
(2010) 
Russia  2002 
and 
2006 
SFA – 
production 
Intermediation 
Physical capital 
Labour  
Deposits 
Physical capital 
Labour 
Total deposit 
Loans  
Loans 
Securities  
Regional 
variables 
Equity 
Risk-preference 
ratios 
Privatisation  
Foreign entry 
 
Foreign banks were more efficient than domestic 
banks  
Domestic private banks are less efficient than the 
public banks 
Adopting deposit insurance is only effective in 
improving bank efficiency for the case of lowly 
transparent regulation. 
Yildirim&Ph
iloppatos 
(2007) 
12 
countries 
Central and 
Eastern 
Europe 
1993 
– 
2000 
SFA – DFA Borrowed funds 
Labour  
Physical capital 
 
Loans  
Investments 
Deposits  
 
GDP rate  
Listed  
Concentration 
Bank size 
Risk preference 
variables  
Foreign owned  
Foreign entry Higher efficiency level was associated with large 
and well-capitalised banks.  
Lower efficiency  resulted from bad loans 
Competition made lower cost and higher profit 
efficiency.  
Market concentration is negatively linked to profit 
efficiency 
Foreign banks were more cost efficient but less 
profit efficient  
Kasman&Yil
dirim(2006) 
8 countries 
central and 
eastern 
1995 
– 
2002 
SFA – Value 
Added 
Labour 
Physical capital 
Loans 
Other earning 
Density of 
population 
Income per 
Average capital 
ratio 
Intermediation 
 
 
Foreign banks perform better than domestic banks 
in terms of cost and profit efficiency.  
 
 
103 
 
Publication
s 
Countries 
or Regions 
Perio
d 
Method - 
Approach 
Input 
Variables 
Output 
Variables 
Environmental 
Variables 
Bank specific 
variables 
Bank 
restructuring 
measures 
Findings 
Europe Purchased 
funds 
assets 
Total deposits 
capita 
Density of 
demand 
GDP rate 
M2/GDP 
Inflation 
ratio 
Concentration ratio 
 
 
Bonin et al. 
(2005a) 
11 
European 
countries  
1996 
– 
2000 
SFA – 
intermediation 
Capital  
Purchased 
funds 
Total deposits 
Liquid assets 
Total loans 
investments 
 
 Bank size 
Ownership 
Year  
Countries  
ROA 
Foreign 
involvement  
Foreign ownership had a positive effect on bank 
efficiency  
Government-owned banks were less efficient than 
domestic private banks 
Bonin et al. 
(2005b) 
 6 
European 
countries  
1994 
– 
2002 
SFA – 
intermediation 
 Total deposits  
Total loans 
Total liquid 
assets 
Investments 
Bank 
privatisation  
Foreign bank 
entry 
Bank ownership 
 
Domestic and 
foreign sector 
involvement 
Government-owned banks were the least efficient 
and foreign greenfield banks were the most.  
The positive impact of a strategic foreign investor  
Voucher-privatised banks were less efficient than 
domestic banks and banks privatised by other 
methods. 
Fries et al. 
(2006) 
15 
countries in 
Eastern 
Europe 
1995 
– 
2004 
Margins, 
marginal cost 
and market-ups 
    Privatization  
Foreign bank 
entry 
Privatization of state-owned banks linked with 
greater demand for lending and deposit taking.  
Higher mark-ups in domestic banks than state-
owned banks 
Foreign banks had lower marginal costs 
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Publication
s 
Countries 
or Regions 
Perio
d 
Method - 
Approach 
Input 
Variables 
Output 
Variables 
Environmental 
Variables 
Bank specific 
variables 
Bank 
restructuring 
measures 
Findings 
 
Poghosyan
&Poghosya
n (2010) 
11 
countries 
1992 
– 
2006 
SFA – 
Intermediation 
Labour 
Capital  
Borrowed funds 
Total earning 
assets 
  Foreign bank 
entry 
Foreign greenfield banks expressed the most 
operational efficiency.  
The performance of foreign-acquired banks 
exhibited an offsetting dynamic pattern.  
 
Grirorian&
Manole 
(2006) 
17 
countries 
1995 
- 
1998 
DEA Labour  
Fixed assets 
Interest 
expenses 
Revenue 
Net loans 
Liquidassets 
 
Macroeconom
ic variables 
Regulatory 
variables 
Institutional/le
gal 
Development 
of capital 
market 
Equity/Assets 
Market 
concentration 
Bank age 
Foreign ownership 
Capital adequacy 
 
 Large and well-capitalised banks were more 
efficient 
Foreign banks were more efficient  
Weill 
(2007) 
11 Western 
countries 
and 6 
Eastern and 
Central 
European 
countries 
1996 
– 
2000 
SFA -  Personnel 
expenses 
Other non-
interest 
expenses 
Interest paid 
Loans  
Investment 
assets 
Per capita 
income 
Rate of 
inflation 
Population 
density 
Density of 
demand 
Intermediation 
ratio 
  Existence of an efficiency gap between Western 
and CEE banks.  
A convergence of efficiency in CEE banks towards 
Western banks.  
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Publication
s 
Countries 
or Regions 
Perio
d 
Method - 
Approach 
Input 
Variables 
Output 
Variables 
Environmental 
Variables 
Bank specific 
variables 
Bank 
restructuring 
measures 
Findings 
Banking 
competition 
Fries &Taci 
(2005) 
15  
countries 
1994 
- 
2001 
SFA – 
Intermediation  
Labour 
Physical capital 
Loans 
Deposits 
GDP  
per capita 
Nominal 
interest rate 
Density of 
demand 
Share of 
majority 
foreign owned 
banks in total 
asset 
L/D 
E/A 
Index of 
banking 
reform 
NPL rate 
Ratio of non-loan 
assets/total assets 
Bank origin and 
ownership 
 
 
Country-level factors including a greater market 
share of majority foreign owned banks, lower 
nominal interest, and a higher intermediation ratio 
increased cost efficiency.  
Private banks were more cost efficient than state 
owned banks.  
Among private banks, privatized banks with 
majority foreign ownership were the most cost 
efficient.  
 
Kraft et al. 
(2006) 
Croatia 1994 
– 
2000 
SFA – 
intermediation 
Fixed capital 
Labour 
Interest 
expense 
Loans to 
enterprises 
Loans to 
customers  
Deposits 
 Bank size  
Ownership  
Age 
Bank 
privatisation 
Foreign entry 
Foreign banks were the most efficient while the 
private banks were the least efficient 
Insignificant impacts of privatisation  
Jiang et al.  China  SFA – 
intermediation  
Model 1: 
interest 
expense; non-
Interest 
income; non-
Time trend 
GDP growth 
Static effect 
indicator 
Foreign 
acquisition 
JSBs are the most efficient and next to SOCBs 
while FBs are the least efficient 
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Publication
s 
Countries 
or Regions 
Perio
d 
Method - 
Approach 
Input 
Variables 
Output 
Variables 
Environmental 
Variables 
Bank specific 
variables 
Bank 
restructuring 
measures 
Findings 
(2009) Operating interest 
expense 
Model 2: 
interest 
expense; labour 
and physical 
capital 
Model 3: 
interest 
expense; 
physical capital; 
labour 
 
interest income 
Loans; deposits; 
non-interest 
income 
Loans, deposits; 
other earning 
assets 
 
rate 
Foreign 
acquisition  
E/A 
LLD/Loan 
Interbank 
fund/deposit 
Loans/Deposit 
SOCBs 
privatization 
IPOs and foreign acquisition of SOCBs are effective 
to improve bank efficiency.  
 
Berger et 
al. (2009) 
China 1994
-
2003 
SFA – 
intermediation  
 
Interest 
expense 
Physical inputs 
Loans  
Deposits  
Liquid assets 
Other earning 
assets 
 Ownership  
Bank size 
Foreign bank 
entry 
Minority 
foreign 
ownership  
SOCBs are the least efficient and the FBs are the 
most efficient.  
Minority foreign ownership increased bank 
efficiency.    
Kumbhakar
& Wang 
(2007) 
China  1993
-
2002 
SFA – 
intermediation 
Labour 
Fixed assets  
Deposits plus 
borrowed funds 
Loans net 
Other earning 
assets 
Deregulation  E/A 
Ownership 
Bank size 
 
Interest 
deregulation 
Elimination of 
local 
government 
intervention on 
SOCBs lending 
New bank entry 
 
Joint-equity banks achieved higher efficiency than 
SOCBs 
Larger banks were less efficient 
Modest improvement of banking productivity 
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Publication
s 
Countries 
or Regions 
Perio
d 
Method - 
Approach 
Input 
Variables 
Output 
Variables 
Environmental 
Variables 
Bank specific 
variables 
Bank 
restructuring 
measures 
Findings 
Chen et al. 
(2005) 
China  1993
-
2000 
DEA -  
intermediation 
Interest 
expense  
Non-interest 
expense 
Loans 
Deposits  
Non-interest 
income 
Deregulation  Ownership  
Bank size 
Interest 
deregulation 
Elimination of 
local 
government 
intervention on 
SOCBs lending 
New bank entry 
Efficiency improved in the early deregulated 
period 
Larger and small banks were more efficient 
 
Hasan&Ma
rton (2003) 
Hungary 1993 
– 
1998 
SFA – 
Intermediation 
Borrowed funds 
Labour and 
related 
expenses 
Loans 
Investment 
Fee income 
Interest 
Acquisition   A set of financial 
ratios ( e.g: E/A, 
L/A) 
Assets  
Age  
Percentage of asset 
owned by foreign 
investors 
Bank 
privatization  
Foreign bank 
entry and 
involvement 
with domestic 
banks 
 
Profit and cost efficiency improved. 
Banks with foreign involvement were less 
inefficient.  
Higher share of foreign ownership is associated 
with lower inefficiency. 
Havrylchyk 
(2006) 
Poland 1997
-
2001 
DEA –  
Intermediation 
Deposits 
Fixed assets 
Labour 
Loans 
Treasury bonds 
Off-balance 
sheet items 
 
Dummy 
variables differ 
domestic-
foreign 
ownership 
Growth of assets 
Capitalisation 
Loans/total asset 
Total assets 
Foreign bank 
entry 
Foreign banks exhibit higher efficiency due to the 
greenfield banks rather than takeover banks.  
 
 
Source: Compiled and summarised by the author 
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15Table 3.3: A Summary of Studies on the Efficiency and Productivity of the Vietnamese Banking Sector 
 
Publications or 
Unpublished 
papers 
Efficiency Analysis  
Productivity  
Changes  
Assumption 
Statistical  
Inferences 
No of  
firms 
Sample  
Period 
Input 
Variables  
Output 
Variables 
Environme
nt 
 Variables 
Findings 
Nguyen. VH 
(2007) 
DEA Malmquist VRS No 13 2001-2003 
Labour  
Fixed assets 
Deposits 
Interest 
income 
Non-interest 
income 
N/A 
Average technical efficiency score 
is low and the sources of 
inefficiency are derived from both 
allocative and technical problems. 
The productivity Malmquist index 
slightly decreased 
 
Nguyen. XQ 
(2008) 
Bootstrapped DEA 
(Atkinson & Wilson, 
1995) 
Malmquist CRS No 15 2003-2006 
Labour 
Assets 
Deposits 
Operating cost 
Loans and 
advances  
Investment 
N/A 
The technical efficiency scores 
were very high. 
The state-owned banks are found to 
be more efficient than private 
banks. 
 
Nguyen et al, 
(2013) 
SMB with super-
efficiency 
DEA  
(Output orientation) 
N/A VRS 
Yes 
(Tobit model) 
32 2001-2005 
Received 
interest 
Other operating 
income 
Personal 
expense 
Net total 
assets 
Ownership 
Bank size 
Labour 
Quality 
State ownership negatively affected 
efficiency. 
A positive relationship between 
efficiency and bank size, market 
share were also found. 
The technical efficiency scores 
increased. 
 
Vu &Turnell 
(2010) 
SFA  
(Bayesian estimation)  
N/A VRS Yes 54 2000-2006 
Labour, Fixed 
assets and 
Deposits plus 
balances with 
other  
banks 
Customer 
loans 
Other assets 
Off-balance 
sheet assets 
N/A 
Cost efficiency mostly unchanged 
and SOCBs reached higher 
efficiency than private banks. 
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Publications or 
Unpublished 
papers 
Efficiency Analysis  
Productivity  
Changes  
Assumption 
Statistical  
Inferences 
No of  
firms 
Sample  
Period 
Input 
Variables  
Output 
Variables 
Environme
nt 
 Variables 
Findings 
Vu &Turnell 
(2012) 
Hyperbolic SFA  
(Bayesian estimation)  
Malmquist VRS Yes 54 2000-2006 
Customer loans 
Other earning 
assets 
Off balance 
sheet items 
No. of full-
time 
employees 
Fixed assets 
Deposits plus 
borrowed 
funds 
N/A 
Banks experienced modest 
productivity growth. 
FBs achieved highest productivity 
growth. 
Nalm&Vu (2012) 
DEA with directional 
distance function 
(output orientation) 
Malmquist VRS No 54 2000-2006 
Customer loans 
Other earning 
assets 
Off balance 
sheet items 
No. of full-
time 
employees 
Fixed assets 
Deposits plus 
borrowed 
funds 
N/A 
Average banks operated quite far 
below the frontier. 
Price and profit efficiency scores of 
SOCBs were highest. 
Banking industry achieved modest 
productivity growth due to 
technological progress. 
Ngo (2010) 
DEA  
(input orientation)  
N/A VRS No 22 2008 
Wage, 
 Interest 
expense,  
Other expense 
Total assets,  
Interest 
income,  
Other income 
N/A 
Technical efficiency scores 
are close to optimal efficiency. 
 
Nguyen. HV 
(2012) 
DEA Malmquist VRS No 20 2007-2010 
Labour 
expenses 
Fixed assets 
Saving deposits 
Interest 
income 
Non-interest 
income 
N/A 
The efficiency scores continuously 
increased. 
Technical efficiency scores of 
SOCBs are significantly lower than 
that of JSBs. 
Ngo (2012) Two stage DEA N/A VRS 
Yes 
(Tobit model) 
N/A 
1990-2010 
(macro 
data) 
 Deposits 
Credits 
Gross 
domestic 
capital 
Liquidities 
KAOPEN 
CRISIS 
Negative relationship between 
banking efficiency and 
liberalisation. 
Source: Compiled and summarised by the author 
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
The objective of this thesis is to investigate the performance of Vietnamese commercial 
banks and identify possible impacts of the country‘s entry into the WTO on bank 
performance. Hence, it is important to identify reliable measures of bank performance 
aimed at identifying which banks or bank groups have performed better than others. In 
the literature on banking operations two methods have been used to quantify bank 
performance: the financial ratio method and the production frontier method (Das and 
Ghosh, 2006; Hughes and Mester, 2008). The financial ratio method is based on 
financial profitability using indexes such as return on assets (ROA), return on equity 
(ROE) and net interest margin (NIM) to measure the extent to which output (as 
measured by profit, revenue and cost) is generated from one unit of input (as measured 
by total assets, number of employees and deposits). However, this method has a number 
of disadvantages:  
(1) it is strongly influenced by accounting practices within each bank
47
; and  
(2) it is a unilateral measure because only one input and one output variable are 
considered for each ratio.  
Moreover, using different financial ratios to compare the performance of different banks 
may bring about conflicting results. For example, bank A may be better than bank B 
when using ROA but the result could be reversed in the case of NIM. Consequently, the 
                                                 
47
 The frontier-based method is less influenced by accounting practices within individual banks because 
this method is based on accounting data for the whole banking system (Hughes and Mester, 2008). 
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production frontier method, which employs many inputs and many outputs to measure 
bank performance, is preferable and is the approach used in this study.  
There are two methods widely used to estimate production frontiers: stochastic frontier 
analysis (SFA) and data envelopment analysis (DEA) (Kenjegalieva et al., 2009; Fethi 
and Pasiouras, 2010). The SFA approach assumes a given form of the production 
function showing the relationship between inputs and output before estimation of the 
parameters is conducted (Coelli et al., 2005; Kumbhakar and Wang, 2007). Then the 
estimated production functions are used to measure the efficiency scores of firms. The 
other method, DEA, which is based on linear programming, is used in the literature to 
build a piecewise production frontier that acts as a benchmark for measuring relative 
efficiency. In this thesis, DEA is employed mainly because this method can be utilised 
with a small sample size and allows for multiple outputs while only one output is 
allowed in SFA models
48
 (Coelli et al., 2005). In the banking sector, banks provide 
numerous services to customers and generate many outputs and therefore DEA can be 
seen to be the more suitable method.   
Vietnam is an interesting case study as it is one of the few transition economies where 
the banking sector is still dominated by state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs). In 
contrast, transforming to a competitive and privately-controlled banking sector has been 
implemented in most other transition countries (Bonin and Schnabel, 2011). This 
difference in approaches to reform financial sectors can be explained by the different 
policies adopted. If governments conduct consistent reform measures to construct a 
                                                 
48
Due to the fact that SFA is based on regression techniques and so only one output can be employed as 
the dependent variable while a set of inputs play the role of independent variables. This issue can be 
solved by using specific statistical techniques, for example, Ruggiero (1998) utilised canonical correlation 
analysis to measure technical efficiency for multi output production correspondences. 
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competitive and fair
49
 business environment for banks, private banks with profit-based 
incentives can be expected to perform better than their publicly owned counterparts and 
play a more substantial role in the banking sector. By contrast, governments desiring to 
maintain control and exert influence over the banking sector for political purposes 
would implement supportive measures for SOCBs and discriminate against domestic 
and foreign private banks (Karas et al., 2010; Vernikov, 2012). The consequence of this 
is that a level and homogenous business environment for SOCB and private bank 
groups is not present. It is, therefore, necessary to take the heterogeneity of the business 
environment into account when measuring and analysing bank performance, and this is 
obviously required in the case of Vietnam. Thus, in this study, a meta-frontier analysis, 
as proposed by Battese and Rao (2002), Battese et al. (2004) and O‘Donnell et al. 
(2008) is adopted which is a production frontier approach that can separate bank groups 
by ownership to measure their efficiency and allow environmental variables to be 
regressed against each group‘s efficiency. 
Using a meta-frontier approach is more advantageous than using a conventional single 
frontier approach. This is due to the fact that the latter sees all firms as having the same 
technology set and that they are homogeneous across different groups. However, this is 
not the case in the context of Vietnam where the business environment is heterogeneous 
due to the discriminatory policies implemented by the state. Furthermore, only a meta-
frontier approach can examine which group of firms is technically more advanced 
relative to the others via utilising the so-called technology gap ratio criteria. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 provides a definition of, and 
conditions necessary to use, a meta-frontier analysis approach; Section 4.3 explains how 
                                                 
49
 The term ―fair‖ as used here refers to ―non-discrimination‖ between different bank ownership types. 
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the DEA efficiency scores of individual firms (banks) and firm (bank) groups used in 
this study are estimated and regressed against a set of explanatory variables. In addition, 
the bootstrap-based method is introduced in this section as a good tool to overcome the 
biased nature of DEA estimates as highlighted in Chapter 3; Section 4.4 introduces the 
Li (1996) test which will be used to investigate the equality of efficiency distributions; 
Section 4.5 presents a measure of total factor productivity, the so-called Aggregate 
Malmquist Productivity Index (AMPI), which is constructed based on an extension of 
the concept of aggregate technical efficiency; and finally, Section 4.6 summarises the 
key findings from this chapter.      
4.2 A proposed methodology – Meta-frontier analysis 
O‘Donnell et al. (2008) states that ―firms in different industries, regions and/or 
countries face different production opportunities. Technically, they make choices from 
different sets of feasible input–output combinations. These so-called technology sets 
differ because of differences in available stocks of physical, human and financial capital 
(e.g., type of machinery, size and quality of the labour force, access to foreign 
exchange), economic infrastructure (e.g., number of ports, access to markets), resource 
endowments (e.g., quality of soils, climate, energy resources) and any other 
characteristics of the physical, social and economic environment in which production 
takes place.‖ The authors highlight the impact of the operating environment on firm 
efficiency and conclude that ―such differences have led efficiency researchers to 
estimate separate production frontiers for different groups of firms‖ (O‘Donnell et al., 
2008, p.231-232). 
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The efficiency of firms within such groups can be measured by comparing them to the 
best practice performance firms which construct each group‘s frontier. Nonetheless, 
there is still a question of how best to measure the relative efficiency of firms across 
groups. Based on the concept of a meta-production function
50
, a meta-frontier is 
estimated by enveloping all group frontiers. Thus, the technical efficiency of firms 
belonging to different groups can be compared by using the distances of these firms 
from the meta-frontier.  
 
As mentioned in Section 4.1, Vietnamese banks that have different ownership forms 
operate in different business environments due to discriminatory government policies. 
The discriminatory policies applied to particular bank groups can result in differences of 
production technology as the mechanism producing outputs from relevant inputs 
(O‘Donnell et al., 2008). For example, under given inputs such as labour and fixed 
assets, public banks can attract more saving deposits than their private counterparts 
because the former is believed to be more credible due to the guarantee of solvency by 
the state. Hence, a meta-frontier analysis that allows for different technology sets in 
measuring the efficiency of different groups is employed in this thesis to measure and 
analyse bank performance in and across different bank ownership groups.  
4.2.1 The meta-frontier 
In general terms, this research considers an industry consisting of n firms. Each firm 
employs p inputs to produce q outputs. Let     
 
 denote a (1×p) vector of inputs and 
                                                 
50
Hayami and Ruttan (1970) conceptualised the meta-production function as the envelope of commonly 
conceived neoclassical production functions. 
 
 
 
115 
 
    
 
  denote a (1×q) vector of outputs. Under a given technology, following 
O‘Donnell et al. (2008) the production set of the industry can be defined by: 
  *(   )    
    
                 +      (4.1) 
The production set is built using two components: boundary and interior. The 
production boundary (or meta-frontier) is identified by the best practice firms or 
efficient firms. It is convenient to represent technology using the output-oriented
51
 
distance function and the technical efficiency of firm k as being equal to:  
  
 (     )     *   (       ⁄ )   + (    )    (4.2) 
If the value of the distance function is equal to unity (  
 (     )   ), firms are 
located on the boundary and considered technically efficient. If the value is not equal to 
unity they are inside the production interior (  
 (     )   ) and are relatively 
inefficient. 
4.2.2 Group frontiers 
The industry can be classified into L groups operating under L different group-specific 
technologies. These sub-technologies can be characterised by the following group-
specific production sets and group output distance functions: 
   {(   )    
    
                                                   
     }                                                                                     (4.3) 
                                                 
51
 Whether to use the input or output orientation depends on a firm‘s objectives (Coelli et al., 2005). In 
the context of the Vietnamese banking sector in the post-WTO period, banks rapidly expanded their 
services and customer base under the expansionary monetary policy of the SBV to stimulate economic 
growth (Pincus, 2009; WB, 2009; WB, 2012). Banks focused on maximising their outputs (loans) rather 
than minimising inputs (which are labour and fixed assets). Thus, in this thesis, output-oriented models 
are adopted.   
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and 
  
   (     )     *   (       ⁄ )    +                   (4.4) 
The boundaries of the group-specific production sets are referred to as group frontiers. 
The meta-production set of the industry envelops all L group production sets      
       and the group-specific production sets are subsets of the unrestricted meta-
production set.  
In this thesis, according to ownership, there are three group-specific frontiers belonging 
to state-owned banks, private and foreign banks. 
4.2.3 Meta-technology ratios 
The gap between the group frontier and the meta-frontier (the technology gap) at a 
particular input/output combination (     ) can be identified by the meta-technology 
ratio (MTR): 
   (     )  
  
 (     )
  
  (     )
       (4.5) 
where  
   (     ) and   
 (     )are distance functions identified as the distances to 
the group frontier and the meta-frontier respectively.  
The MTR of the group is identified to measure how close the group frontier is to the 
meta-frontier by averaging all individual MTRs of firms within each group.  
Equation 4.5 is also equivalent to: 
  
 (     )    
   (     )     (     )            (4.6) 
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Equation 4.6 can be explained as the relative efficiency of an individual firm to the 
meta-frontier (  
 (     )) which can be decomposed into two components: one 
component measures the distance from input-output points to the group frontier 
(  
   (     )) representing the state of knowledge and the physical, social and 
economic environment that characterises groups, and the other measures the gap from 
the group frontier to the meta-frontier (   (     )).  
From a Vietnamese banking perspective, Equation 4.6 is useful to assess the possible 
payoffs from policies of the Vietnamese Government on the operating environment of 
bank groups classified by ownership through the group MTR. The larger the value of 
this ratio the closer the distance from the group frontier to the meta-frontier, indicating 
that the group operates in a better physical, social and economic environment than the 
others. 
4.3 DEA technical efficiency 
4.3.1 Measuring technical efficiency 
Charnes et al. (1978) developed the so-called Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
method to measure the technical efficiency of firms. This method uses a linear 
programming technique to maximise a ratio of the weighted average output index to a 
weighted average input index for each firm with constraints which bound the same 
ratios of all firms to not exceed unity. They assume that all firms operate at optimal size 
and the technology has constant returns to scale. However, there are market limitations, 
such as imperfect competition and government regulations on the operation of firms, 
that inhibit them from achieving optimal size. Thus, the assumption of constant returns 
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to scale seems to be inappropriate in many circumstances. Banker et al. (1984) proposes 
an alternative assumption of variable returns to scale by adding a convexity constraint. 
Under the latter assumption the overall efficiency of firms can be established by two 
components. The first is pure technical efficiency component reflecting the ability of 
managers to utilise the firm‘s resources at a given scale, while the second efficiency 
component (so-called scale efficiency) measures the gap between the firm‘s temporary 
scale and the optimal scale. 
Under the assumption of free disposability of inputs and outputs and variable returns to 
scale
52
, the DEA estimate of the production set can be defined as:  
 ̂  {(   )    
    
  ∑     
  
     
           ∑     
  
     
    
       ∑           
 
   } (4.7) 
Farrell‘s measure of technical efficiency ( ) is the reciprocal of the distance function 
(Simar and Wilson, 2007). The DEA output-oriented estimator of   can be written in 
terms of the linear program as:  
 ̂   (     ̂)     {    ∑     
  
      
           ∑     
  
     
    
         ∑           
 
   }  (4.8) 
                                                 
52
The constant returns to scale assumption is only appropriate when all firms are operating at their 
optimal scale (Charnes et al., 1978). In the banking sector, banks are strongly impacted by regulations 
imposed by central banks such as regulations on capital adequacy and loan-loss provisioning. 
Furthermore, in the case of Vietnam, private banks are discriminated against compared to state-owned 
banks, causing an unfair and imperfect business environment amongst different bank groups. 
Consequently, Vietnamese banks may not perform at their optimal scale. Hence, this research chooses the 
assumption of variable returns to scale when measuring the technical efficiency of banks in the 
Vietnamese banking system. 
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Equation 4.8 can be used to estimate the technical efficiency scores of Vietnamese 
banks. The estimation for each individual bank will be conducted by scaling the 
distances to the meta-frontier and the group frontier.  
Bootstrapping in DEA 
While DEA has a number of advantages, such as being able to be applied to small 
sample sizes and using multiple outputs, it does not allow for random errors and, due to 
its non-parametric nature, it cannot be used to test for the statistical significance of 
estimates of technical efficiency scores. Furthermore, estimates of distances to 
production frontiers can be underestimated due to an inherent problem with mainstream 
DEA analysis, which is that not all efficient firms within the population are included in 
the sample (Coelli et al., 2005; Simar and Wilson, 1998; 1999; 2007). In a graphical 
context, estimated frontiers are downward-biased in comparison with the true frontiers. 
Consequently, estimators of technical efficiency scores based on the estimated frontiers 
can be biased. So far, bootstrap methods seem to be the only viable alternative that can 
overcome the downward-biased nature of DEA estimates and to make inferences on 
 (   ) (Simar and Wilson, 2015).  
Simar (1992) was the first to suggest applying bootstrap techniques in the production 
frontier framework for parametric, nonparametric and semi-parametric approaches 
(cited in Xue and Harker, 1999; Casu and Molyneux, 2003; Simar and Wilson, 2015). 
Bootstrapping is based on the idea that, through resampling, the data generating process 
is repeatedly simulated to make an arbitrary number of simulated samples. These 
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samples can then be utilised to generate simulated estimates
53
. The known bootstrap 
distribution of the resulting estimates will mimic the unknown sampling distribution of 
the original estimator (Simar and Wilson, 1998). Based on the simulated estimates we 
can derive bias-corrected estimators as well as confidence intervals for the true technical 
efficiency.      
In the next part of this chapter, two bootstrap methods will be presented. First, sub-
sampling bootstrapping will be applied to find confidence intervals for group technical 
efficiency. Second, parametric bootstrapping will be used to determine the statistical 
properties of coefficients in a double-bootstrap two-stage DEA procedure. 
4.3.2 Measuring group technical efficiency 
Many studies have applied the simple average method to estimate and compare group 
efficiency scores and, based on this, they may conclude that one group is more efficient 
than others (Das and Ghosh, 2006; Ataullah and Le, 2006; Denizer et al., 2007; Sufian 
and Habibullah, 2011). Their conclusion, however, introduces two issues. First, they 
ignore the relative importance of particular firms in each group as all firms are deemed 
to be the same. Second, they use point estimates for group efficiency scores to compare 
between different groups. Hence, it is possible to make inference errors (Simar and 
Zelenyuk, 2007).  
The first issue will be addressed by the weighted average method if the weight of each 
firm in each group is appropriately identified. Based on the theory of economic 
optimisation, Färe and Zelenyuk (2003) propose that industry efficiency is the average 
                                                 
53
 In this thesis linear programming is used to generate bootstrap efficiency scores from simulated 
input/output data. 
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of the efficiency of individual firms with the weight equal to their cost or revenue shares 
in the industry.
54
 Their theorem is that ―an industry maximum revenue is the sum of its 
firms‘ maximal revenues‖ (Färe and Zelenyuk, 2003, p.615). This theorem is adapted in 
the context of groups by Simar and Zelenyuk (2007) and becomes ―the maximal 
revenue of the groups of firms is equal to the sum of the maximal revenue of all its 
member firms‖ (Simar and Zelenyuk, 2007, p.1371). The new theorem can be used to 
acquire several important results for efficiency aggregating. The first is that the revenue 
efficiency of a group is equal to the weighted sum of individual firm revenue efficiency 
where the weight is the revenue share of firms in the group. The second is that the 
aggregate technical efficiency of a group is equal to the weighted sum of the firm 
technical efficiency (where the weight is that of revenue shares).  
As mentioned above, bootstrap methods can be used to make a statistical inference of a 
firm‘s technical efficiency. Accordingly, the second issue can also be circumvented if 
these methods are applied in the context of groups and can provide confidence intervals 
for aggregate technical efficiency. The following presents the algorithm proposed by 
Simar and Zelenyuk (2007) to measure bias-corrected aggregate efficiency scores of 
groups using subsampling bootstrapping in a DEA context. Kneip et al. (2003) offer the 
subsampling bootstrap technique
55
 for DEA which has proven to be consistent, simple 
and faster to compute than others.   
This thesis first utilises the method of aggregating technical efficiency by Simar and 
Zelenyuk (2007) to measure and compare the performance of different bank ownership 
                                                 
54
 This thesis applies revenue shares.  
55
 Subsampling bootstrapping is a bootstrap technique of generating subsamples by replacement from an 
original sample (for any subsamples that have a smaller size than the original sample).  
 
 
122 
 
types (state-owned banks, private banks and foreign and joint venture banks) in a 
particular country.  
Algorithm of subsampling bootstrap of aggregates of DEA efficiency scores: 
Step 1: 
(i) Apply Equation 4.8 to the original sample    *( 
    )        + in order to 
obtain estimates of the true efficiency scores * (     )          +, and denote these 
estimates as { ̂         }.  
(ii) Partition the original sample into L distinct groups    *( 
        )   
      +and { ̂
            }   *     +representing the corresponding groups 
within the sample. Obtain estimates of the aggregate efficiency scores, ̂ ̅, for each 
group   *     +.  
 ̂ ̅  ∑  ̂        
  
            (4.9) 
where     
    
 ∑    
  
   
           and 
p is the price vector. 
If price information is unavailable, then use:  
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M is the number of directions of vector y. 
Step 2: 
Obtain the bootstrap sequence      
  {(  
       
    )         } by subsampling with 
replacement from the corresponding group   where    is the size of the subsample and 
     . 
Step 3: 
Establish a bootstrapped sample   
 by incorporating all bootstrap sequences obtained 
from step 2, and use this bootstrap sample to estimate bootstrap technical efficiency 
scores by DEA, call them ̂ 
    
, for                 . 
Step 4: 
Compute the bootstrap estimates of the aggregate efficiency scores by: 
 ̂ 
  ̅̅ ̅̅  ∑  ̂ 
       
      
   ,  (4.11) 
where  
     
   
   
 ∑   
     
   
          
If price information is unavailable, then use:  
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where  
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M is the number of directions of vector y. 
Step 5:  
Repeat step 3 to step 4 B times (       ) so we have B bootstrap estimates of the 
aggregate efficiency scores for each group l (       ).  
Using the B bootstrap estimates from step 4 . ̂ 
  ̅̅ ̅̅ / and aggregate efficiency scores from 
step 2 . ̂ ̅/, we can compute the bias of aggregate efficiency scores and bias-corrected 
aggregate efficiency scores . ̆ ̅/ as below:  
    . ̂  ̅̅ ̅̅ /   . ̂  ̅̅ ̅̅ /   ̂ ̅ (4.13) 
By substituting  . ̂  ̅̅ ̅̅ /  
 
 
∑  ̂ 
  ̅̅ ̅̅ 
   , we get: 
 ̆ ̅   ̂ ̅      . ̂  ̅̅ ̅̅ /    ̂ ̅  
 
 
∑  ̂ 
  ̅̅ ̅̅ 
                 (4.14) 
To compute the confidence interval for the aggregate efficiency scores of groups (  ̅) at 
  degree of significance, we sort in ascending order the list of . ̂ 
  ̅̅ ̅̅   ̂ ̅/         
and truncate by deleting ((   )     ) of the B elements at each end of the sorted list. 
If the first left element of the sorted truncated list is   ̂  and the first right element is 
  ̂  then we have:  
 .  ̂   ̂ 
  ̅̅ ̅̅   ̂ ̅    ̂ /              (4.15) 
According to Simar and Wilson (2000; 2007), where the bootstrap constructed intervals 
automatically account for bias and the bootstrap is consistent, then:  
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 ̂  ̅̅ ̅̅   ̂ ̅  ̂ ̅    ̅          (4.16) 
From Equations 4.15 and 4.16, we have:  
 .  ̂   ̂ ̅    ̅    ̂ /     or 
 . ̂ ̅   ̂    ̅   ̂ ̅   ̂ /      
With a significance level of   the confidence interval of the true aggregate efficiency 
scores of groups is:  
. ̂ ̅   ̂   ̂ ̅   ̂ /               (4.17) 
Finally, the standard error of DEA aggregate efficiency scores of groups . ̂ ̅/ can be 
computed as:  
  . ̂ 
  ̅̅ ̅̅ /  6
 
   
∑ ( ̂ 
  ̅̅ ̅̅   . ̂  ̅̅ ̅̅ /)
 
 
   7
  ⁄
                   (4.18) 
Test for equality of two groups’ aggregate efficiency scores 
In reality, it is important to compare the aggregate efficiency scores of two groups of a 
sample divided by exogenous criteria. This thesis applies the bootstrap-based test of 
Simar and Zelenyuk (2007) to investigate the equality of aggregate efficiency scores 
between: private and state-owned banks; foreign/joint venture and private banks; and 
foreign/joint venture and state-owned banks in Vietnam. In brief, there are two groups 
(group A and Z) used to compare aggregate efficiency scores. We can postulate:  
      ̅̅̅̅    ̅̅ ̅against      ̅̅̅̅    ̅̅ ̅             (4.19) 
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Due to the multiplicative nature of efficiency, Simar and Zelenyuk (2007) propose 
estimating the ratio of the group A aggregate efficiency score over the group Z 
aggregate efficiency score:       
  ̅̅ ̅̅
  ̅̅ ̅̅
 and the DEA estimate is computed as   ̂    
 ̂ ̅̅ ̅̅
 ̂ ̅̅ ̅̅
. While we cannot use this point estimate to provide any decisions on the equality of 
the two groups‘ aggregate efficiency scores due to inference errors, we can use the 
bootstrap confidence interval for testing. For elaborating a bootstrap confidence interval 
at   degree of significance, we can compute the bootstrap       by using the results 
from step 4, as below: 
  ̂     
  
 ̂ 
  ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
 ̂ 
  ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅                        (4.20) 
Based on the obtained bootstrap       list and the valuesof   ̂   , bootstrap bias-
corrected estimates of       are computed as: 
  ̃         ̂      ̂     
              (4.21) 
Based on the values of   ̃      the lower and upper bound (confidence interval) of        
at   degree of significance can be identified. The obtained   ̃      list is sorted in 
ascending order and then truncated by deleting ((   )     ) of the B elements at 
each end of the sorted list. The lower bound of       is the first left element of the 
truncated sorted list and the upper bound is the first right element. After identifying the 
confidence interval at             significance for       , we can then conclude which 
hypothesis is rejected using the rule: 
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Reject Ho if the confidence interval for RDA,Z does not overlap unity and do not reject 
otherwise. In particular, if the confidence interval lies above unity then we can conclude 
that   ̅̅̅̅    ̅̅ ̅. 
The Simar and Zelenyuk (2007) test is limited to industries consisting of two groups but 
the number of groups in this study is three. Hence, the test is further developed by 
dividing the groups into three pairs (JSB versus SOCB; JSB versus FJVB; and SOCB 
versus FJVB) and conducting three comparisons of efficiency in the unique computing 
process
56
. 
4.3.3 Regressing environmental variables on technical efficiency 
After estimating the efficiency scores of the firms one critical question arises: how to 
explain the variations of DEA scores. In the literature, regression analysis has been 
widely used to analyse DEA efficiency scores by specifying a regression model in 
which the variation of firms‘ estimates are explained by a set of environmental 
variables, such as type of ownership, size, location and age of firms (Das and Ghosh, 
2006; Simar and Wilson, 2007). One can generalise the abovementioned approach by 
means of a two-stage DEA procedure as follows:  
Stage 1:  
Estimate efficiency scores by means of DEA based upon given inputs and outputs.  
Stage 2:  
                                                 
56
 The process is performed using the author‘s modified Matlab codes based on the codes of Simar and 
Zelenyuk (2007) that apply for a two-group industry.  
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Regress the DEA estimates against a group of explanatory variables by a given 
regression method (e.g., OLS, Tobit or truncated regression). The results received will 
be used to analyse the relationship between the efficiency scores and the explanatory 
variables. However, there are some serious problems related to the OLS and Tobit 
methods (Simar and Wilson, 2007). The first is that all DEA estimates based on a finite 
sample are downward-biased (Simar and Wilson, 1998; Kneipet al., 1998; 2008). This 
is because ―best practice‖ observations in the sample are employed to construct the 
production frontier rather than true efficient but unobservable observations. 
Consequently, coefficients derived from the second stage can also be biased. Secondly, 
the DEA methodology ensures that efficiency scores are inherently dependent because 
of the calculation process which requires the involvement of all other firms to estimate 
the efficiency score of a firm (Xue and Harker, 1999). Bootstrapping is a unique way to 
simultaneously solve these two problems. Through bootstrapping, bias-corrected 
efficiency scores have been proven to be consistent with the true ones (Kneipet al, 
1998; 2008). By employing bias-corrected efficiency scores instead of the DEA 
estimates at the regression stage, the coefficients generated are consistent. Bias-
corrected efficiency scores are randomly generated in a bootstrap procedure so that they 
are independent and more accurate (Simar and Wilson, 2015). Even when problems 
relating to estimated DEA efficiency scores are disentangled, there is some doubt about 
what is being estimated in the two-stage approach since no data generating process
57
 is 
described. Simar and Wilson (2007) propose an algorithm based on a double bootstrap 
procedure which enables a consistent inference in the second stage of regression. Before 
Simar and Wilson (2007), there were no studies describing the underlying data 
                                                 
57
 Based on assumptions given by the authors, a data generating process describes how data, including 
inputs, outputs and environmental variables, are generated and how they interact. 
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generating process. The procedure developed by Simar and Wilson (2007) using double 
resampling residual bootstraps with truncated regression in the second stage overcomes 
the above limitations. The procedure is characterised by the following assumptions: 
Let     
 
 denote a (   ) vector of inputs,     
 
  denote a (   )  vector of 
outputs, and     
  denote a (   ) vector of environmental variables. The analysis is 
confronted with a set of observations    *(        )+   
 . 
Assumption 1: The sample observations          in    are realisations of identical, 
independently distributed random variables with a probability density function f(x,y,z) 
which has support over       
 , where       
   
 is a production set defined by 
  *(   )                + 
Due to the radial nature of DEA efficiency scores it is appropriate to present y in terms 
of its polar coordinates when expressing the modulus from the boundary of the 
production set . For an arbitrary point(     ), and    [         ], we can define 
its modulus   and angles   as:  
    8
      (          ⁄ )           
 
 ⁄                                     
                    (4.22) 
for          .  
The modulus is given by  (  )  √      which is related to the output-oriented Farrell 
efficiency by  (       )  
 ( (       )  )
 (  )
 
This is because   is fixed so that we can characterise    by (     ) where    
[             ]and      (       ). 
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The joint density  (     ) is equal to  (       ), and can be decomposed by a series 
of conditional densities:  
 (       )   (       ) (   ) ( )               (4.23) 
Assumption 2:The conditioning in  (     ) operates through the following mechanism:  
    (    )       (4.24) 
where  is a smooth continuous function,   is a vector of parameters and    is a 
continuous iid random variable independent of   . 
Assumption 3:     is distrubted  (    
 ) with left-truncation at    (    ) for each i. 
Assumption 4:  is closed and convex. 
Assumption 5:(   )   if        .  
Assumption 6:for  ̃     ̃   , if (   )    then ( ̃  )    and (   ̃)   . 
Assumption 7:for all (   )    such that (        ) and (      )for    , 
f(x,y/z) is strictly positive, and f(x,y/z) is continuous in any direction toward the interior 
of   for all z. 
Assumption 8: for all (x,y) in the interior of  ,  (     ) is differentiable in both its 
arguments. 
Assumptions 1 – 3 identify the environmental variables in the data generating process. 
Assumptions 4-6 are based on the microeconomic theory of the firm. The last two 
assumptions relate to the continuity of the density function. All eight assumptions 
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define a semi-parametric data generating process which yields data for the observed 
sample. 
Taking all mentioned assumptions as the theoretical framework, Simar and Wilson 
(2007) propose a double-bootstrap algorithm to overcome the problems arising from 
serial correlation and the bias of DEA estimates. The algorithm is described below. 
Double-bootstrap algorithm: 
Step 1:  
Use the original data in    *     +   
  to compute  ̂   ̂(       ̂)         by 
DEA. 
Step 2:  
Use the method of maximum likelihood to obtain an estimate  ̂ of   as well as an 
estimate  ̂       in the truncated regression of  ̂  on    using m<n observations when 
 ̂   . 
Step 3:  
Loop over the next four steps (i-iv) L1 times to obtain n sets of bootstrap estimates 
   * ̂  
 +   
  :  
(i) For each         draw    from the  (   ̂ 
 ) distribution with left-truncation at 
(     ̂). 
(ii) Again for each        , compute   
     ̂    . 
(iii) Set   
       
     ̂    
  for all        . 
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(iv) Compute ̂ 
   (     )  ̂
          where  ̂  is obtained from step 3 (iii). 
Step 4:  
For each         compute the bias-corrected estimator  ̂̂  using the bootstrap 
estimates in    obtained in step 3 (iv) and the original estimate  ̂ . 
Step 5:  
Use the method of maximum likelihood to estimate the truncated regression of  ̂̂ on   , 
yielding estimate  ̂̂  ̂̂. 
Step 6:  
Loop over the next three steps (i-iii) L2 times to obtain a set of bootstrap estimates 
  *( ̂   ̂ 
 ) +   
  : 
(i) For each         draw     from the  (   ̂̂) distribution with left-truncation at 
(     ̂̂). 
(ii) Again for each        , compute   
      ̂̂    . 
(iii) Use the method of maximum likelihood to estimate the truncated regression of 
  
  on   , yielding estimate ( ̂̂
   ̂̂ ). 
Step 7:  
Use the bootstrap values in   and the original estimate  ̂̂  ̂̂ to construct estimated 
confidence intervals for each element of   and  . 
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Using steps 3 and 4, estimate the bootstrap technical efficiency scores  ̂   
         , 
and based on the bootstrap estimates compute the bias .    ( ̂   
 )/and the bias-
corrected efficiency scores . ̂̂ /as: 
    ( ̂   
 )  
 
 
∑  ̂   
  
     ̂              (4.25) 
 ̂̂    ̂       ( ̂   
 )    ̂  
 
 
∑  ̂   
  
    (4.26) 
Employing the bootstrap values obtained in step 6 and bias-corrected values  ̂̂  ̂̂ we can 
construct the confidence intervals of         at   level of significance. First, we sort 
the bias of bootstrap coefficients, which is equal to . ̂̂ 
   ̂̂ / in an ascending order list 
and then truncate by deleting ((   )     ) of the B elements at each end of the 
sorted list. Denoting    
  and    
  as the first left and first right values of the sorted 
truncated list we then have:  
 0   
  . ̂̂ 
   ̂̂ /     
 1             (4.27) 
andSimar and Wilson (2007) prove that . ̂̂ 
   ̂̂ / approximates . ̂̂    / as     , 
so that  0   
  . ̂̂    /     
 1   0   
  . ̂̂ 
   ̂̂ /     
 1      
The confidence interval of    at   level of significance can be identified as: 
0 ̂̂    
   ̂̂    
 1.                           (4.28) 
The same computational process can be applied to standard error   . 
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The simulation requires repeating bootstrap-sampling processes many times in order to 
generate bootstrap samples. A critical question emerges of how many replications are 
sufficient. In regards to the number of bootstrap replications used to compute the bias-
corrected estimates  ̂̂ , Simar and Wilson (2007) found that 100 replications are 
typically sufficient. Nonetheless, more information is needed for the bootstrapping 
process to estimate confidence intervals so that the number of replications is much 
bigger. Hall (1986) suggests 1000 replications for estimating confidence intervals. 
Following the works of Simar and Wilson (1998; 1999; 2007), in this thesis, 2000 
replications are applied for both bootstrapping processes.  
Combining double-bootstrap two-stage DEA with meta-frontier analysis 
Ownership is frequently used as an explanatory variable in the literature to explain bank 
performance, along with other variables such as bank age and bank asset and 
profitability ratios (ROE, ROA, NIM). All earlier studies have considered ownership as 
an ex-post factor in regression models (see, for example, Kraft et al., 2006; Das and 
Ghosh, 2006; Sturm and Williams, 2004; Denizer et al., 2007; Kumbhakar and Wang, 
2007; Berger et al., 2009; Azofra and Santamaria, 2011; Barry et al., 2011; Bertay et 
al., 2014; Strobel et al., 2014). These studies analyse the effect of ownership on bank 
performance using a two-stage process: first, all banks are pooled to measure their 
efficiency; and then bank efficiency is regressed on a set of environmental variables 
including ownership. Consequently, the impact of a particular variable on bank 
performance is similar regardless of ownership. This approach, however, seems to be 
inconsistent if bank ownership types respond differently to the same variable. The 
reason for this inconsistency is that bank groups under different ownership models may 
operate in environments which differentiate them by regulations, strategy, management 
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objectives and capability of accessing the production frontier. As mentioned in Section 
4.1, Vietnamese banks are heterogeneous by ownership so that their performance may 
react diversely to the same policy changes or bank characteristics. Thus, it is reasonable 
to separate banks by ownership before measuring and regressing bank efficiency against 
a set of environmental variables. This can be implemented by combining the double-
bootstrap two-stage DEA with meta-frontier analysis through a three step procedure 
suggested by the author of this thesis as below: 
(1) Applying the double-bootstrap two-stage DEA for each group we can obtain DEA 
estimates and bias-corrected technical efficiency scores. The coefficients are also 
obtained reflecting the impact of environmental variables on efficiency within each 
group. 
(2) A similar procedure is also implemented with the whole sample and equivalent 
results are also obtained.  
(3) Using Equation 4.5 the meta-technology ratio (MTR) is calculated.  
The aforementioned approach, seeing ownership as an ex ante factor, is adopted for the 
first time in this thesis in the context of the Vietnamese banking sector. Accordingly, 
each explanatory variable will be assessed for its influence on bank efficiency using the 
double-bootstrap two-stage DEA method in both the meta-frontier and group-frontier 
models. 
4.4 Li test for equality of efficiency densities 
Kneip et al. (1998) and Simar and Zelenyuk (2003) suppose that, under the same 
production set (or technology), all firms are able to access the meta-frontier but have 
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different accessibilities. They explain this issue by identifying different conditions faced 
by firms including regulation regime, ownership structure, business environment and 
various institutions, pertinent to different groups within the population. Under these 
different conditions a problem to consider is that one firm or one firm group may 
achieve the production frontier more easily than the others. In terms of the statistical 
framework, this problem is similar to the issue covered by Simar and Zelenyuk ―the 
different marginal densities that generate technical (in)efficiency might be different 
across subgroups, even when they have a common best practice technology‖ (Simar and 
Zelenyuk, 2006, p.501). Consequently, investigating whether there is different 
accessibility to the frontier amongst various groups is equivalent to testing the 
hypothesis that their efficiency densities are different. Simar and Zelenyuk (2006) adapt 
the Li test to test this hypothesis.
58
 
This study is the first to employ the bootstrap-Simar-Zelenyuk-adapted Li test to 
investigate the disparity of efficiency distributions between public, foreign and private 
banks in a particular country, in this case Vietnam. The three bank groups are organised 
into pairs to compare their efficiency densities. A brief description of the test is as 
follows:  
There are two random samples *             +and {             }, coming 
from potentially different distributions characterised at a point x
o
 by the density 
functions   ( 
 ) and   ( 
 ) respectively. Our interest is to test the equality of the 
densities of the two samples A and Z. The hypotheses are as below:  
                                                 
58
There are several tests used to identify the equality of two unknown densities; however, the Li test is 
asymptotically more powerful and computationally simpler. For more detail see Mammen (1992), 
Anderson et al. (1994), Li(1996, 1999), and Fan and Ullah (1999). 
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      ( 
 )    ( 
 )  (The densities of two groups A and Z are equal) 
        ( 
 )    ( 
 ) (The densities of two groups A and Z are unequal)  
To test the above hypotheses, Li (1996) proposes estimating the Integrated Square 
Difference (ISD): 
    ∫,  ( )    ( )-
    ∫,  
 ( )    
 ( )     ( )  ( )-               
  ∫   ( )   ( )  ∫   ( )   ( )  ∫  ( )   ( )  ∫  ( )   ( ) (4.29) 
Equation 4.29 satisfies the property that       and       if and only if    is true 
(  ( 
 )    ( 
 )). A consistent and asymptotically normal estimator of Equation 
(4.29) is obtained by replacing the unknown distribution functions(  ( )      ( ))by 
empirical distribution functions (     and      ). 
    ( )  
 
  
∑  (      ) 
  
   l=A, Z (4.30) 
I(X) is an indicator function in which I(X) =1 if the statement X is true, and zero 
otherwise.  
The unknown densities (  ( )     ( ))in Equation 4.29 are replaced with the 
nonparametric kernel density estimation  ̂    and ̂    : 
 ̂   ( )  
 
    
∑  .
      
  
/  
  
   l=A, Z   (4.31) 
where    (  ) is a smoothing parameter, such that      and        as 
    ; and  
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K is an appropriate kernel density function (in this research a Gaussian density 
function is applied).  
In the case where       (     ) and the ―diagonal‖ term is removed, Equation 4.29 
becomes: 
, , , ,
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1 1
( 1) ( 1)
A A Z Z
A Z
nd n n n nA i A k Z i Z k
n n h
i k i k
A A Z Z
i k i k
x x x x
ISD K K
hn n h hn n h   
 

    
     
    

   
, , , ,
1 1 1 1
1 1
( 1) ( 1)
A Z Z An n n nA i Z k Z i A k
i k i k
Z A A Z
i k
x x x x
K K
hn n h hn n h   


    
     
    

   
  (4.32)
 
It is possible to show that this estimator is asymptotically normal (Li, 1996), i.e: 
1/2
,
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and: 
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 (4.34) 
where   
  
  ⁄ ; and  
we assume that      as      where   (   )is a constant. 
The true efficiency scores, whose densities we want to compare, are unobservable but 
we can get estimates of these scores by DEA. However, the DEA estimates are 
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downward-biased and dependent (Simar and Wilson, 1998; Xue and Harker, 1999). 
Bootstrapping is the unique technique to overcome these limitations (Simar and Wilson, 
2015). Li (1999) postulates a bootstrap procedure based on a resampling process from a 
sample which is proven to be consistent and demonstrates superior properties. Simar 
and Zelenyuk (2006) follow the Li (1999) bootstrap procedure in a DEA context.  
Bootstrap-based p-values for the Li test can be obtained from:  
Bootstrap p-value =
 
 
∑  ( ̂    
          ̂    
  ) (4.35) 
where I is an indicator function yielding 1 if  ̂    
      ̂    
   is true and 0 
otherwise;  
B is the number of bootstrap replications;  
 ̂    
  is the Li-test statistic given above; and  
 ̂    
    
is its bootstrap analogue.  
One difficulty when applying the Li test is the bound problem which is observed as 
―spurious mass at unity‖ due to the construction, and at least one observation will be on 
the estimated frontier. Simar and Zelenyuk (2006) provide two approaches to solve this 
problem. The first one is based on computation and bootstrapping the Li statistic using 
the sample of DEA estimates without those being equal to unity. However, using this 
method would reduce the sample size. The second uses the sample of DEA estimates 
where those equal to unity are ―smoothed‖ away from the boundary by adding a small 
noise (  ). 
Technical efficiency scores are identified as:  
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 ̃  8
 ̂        ̂   
 ̂                 
 (4.36) 
where:          .     2   
 
         3/   and 
  is the            (e.g., 5%) of the empirical distribution of  
{ ̂   ̂           }. 
Simar and Zelenyuk (2006) propose a bootstrap algorithm for the Li test as below: 
Step 1: 
Consider an original sample which can be divided into two groups (A and Z groups) and 
compare the efficiency densities of these two groups. Estimate  ̂ (     ) using DEA 
for each observation k of the original sample    *( 
    )        + 
Step 2: 
Exclude efficiency scores equal to unity from the sample by applying the smoothing 
approach where the original estimates of efficiency scores are smoothed using Equation 
4.35. Split the smoothed estimates of  ̂ (   ) into two subsamples for group A and Z, 
thus obtaining the smoothed efficiency scores of each group:  
{ ̃            } (Subsample A1)  
and 
{ ̃            } (Subsample A2) 
Step 3: 
Use the subsample efficiency scores to estimate the Li test statistic ( ̂    
  ) using 
Equation 4.33 with subsamples A1 and A2. 
Step 4: 
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Resample
59
 from the largest of subsamples A1 and A2 to obtain the bootstrap analogues 
of A1 and A2 and call them:  
{ ̃             } (Subsample A3)  
and 
{ ̃             } (Subsample A4) 
Step 5: 
Repeat steps 2 and 3 to estimate the bootstrap Li test statistic ( ̂    
    ) using bootstrap 
subsamples A3 and A4. 
Step 6: 
Repeat steps 4 and 5 B times to obtain B bootstrap estimates of the Li test statistic.  
The next section provides an application of the concept of aggregate technical efficiency 
to build an extension of the Malmquist productivity index. 
4.5 Aggregate Malmquist Productivity Index (AMPI) 
The objective of the abovementioned DEA models is to measure the efficiency of firms 
and, furthermore, to analyse the disparity of efficiency based on explanatory variables. 
Thus, these DEA models, by concentrating only on efficiency, are unable to identify the 
performance of firms over time. This is due to the fact that changes in firm performance 
(productivity) originate from two sources:  
efficiency change - the capability of firms to catch up with best-practice peers 
under the reference technology (the same production frontier); and  
                                                 
59
 To conduct a resampling process from an original sample, see Li(1999). 
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technological change - the progress or regress of technology (forward or 
backward movement of the production frontier) over time. 
(Färe et al., 1994). 
The most popular approach to measure productivity change is based on the Malmquist 
Productivity Index (MPI) (Zelenyuk, 2006). Caves et al. (1982a; 1982b) first introduced 
the MPI which is constructed by measuring distance functions of the observed output 
and input vectors in periodss to t, relative to a reference technology. The MPI can be 
output or input oriented depending on the orientation of distance functions. In this 
thesis, the MPI is output oriented.
60
 
Most empirical research utilises averages of MPIs to present overall trends of 
productivity changes and equally weighted geometric means are used for this purpose. 
The limitation of such means, however, is that all firms are treated similarly; 
consequently, the relative importance of each firm is ignored despite the fact that the 
impact of different firms on the productivity of a group or an industry cannot be the 
same. Recently, methods of aggregating firm efficiency have developed to calculate 
aggregate technical efficiency of a group or an industry based on the theory of economic 
optimisation which can be used as a tool to overcome the above limitation. These 
methods account for the relative importance of individual firms by using their revenue 
or cost weights. According to Zelenyuk (2006), the work of Färe and Zelenyuk (2003), 
as mentioned in Subsection 4.3.2, on aggregating the technical efficiency of individual 
firms within an industry or a group of firms can be extended to aggregating MPI. For 
aggregating MPI, aggregate technical efficiency, measured by using the data of a period 
                                                 
60
Output-oriented MPI is used because the distance functions applied in this study are output oriented (see 
Subsection 4.2.1). 
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can be extended intertemporally to identify a change of technology over the studied 
duration. It is worth noting that technology is a substantial factor influencing the 
productivity of a firm or an industry. The rest of this section will go in depth to describe 
MPI, methods to aggregate MPI and how to decompose AMPI into efficiency and 
technical changes for a particular group or industry. 
Output-oriented Malmquist Productivity Index 
We assume that at each time period,        , the production technology transforms 
inputs presented by vector     
 
 into outputs,      
 
. The production technology at 
time   can be described as: 
   *(     )    
    
                   + (4.37) 
Following Shephard (1970), an output-oriented distance function can be defined at time 
  for firm   as:  
   
 (  
    
 )     {   (  
    
   ⁄ )    } (4.38) 
Our objective is to compare the change of productivity between two periods  and    . 
Thus, the distance functions with respect to two technologies in the two time periods 
need to be defined to observe the movement of the production frontier over time. One 
may define the distance function of input-output combinations at time   (  
    
 ) with 
respect to time     technology as:  
     
 (  
    
 )     {   (  
    
   ⁄ )      } (4.39) 
Similarly, the input-output combinations at time     with respect to time   technology 
can be identified as: 
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 (    
      
 )     {   (    
      
   ⁄ )    } (4.40) 
According to Caves et al. (1982a; 1982b), for a particular firm  the definition of MPI is 
based on either the technology of time   or     as below: 
   
   
 (    
      
 )
   
 (  
    
 )
and     
     
 (    
      
 )
     
 (  
    
 )
 (4.41) 
The value of    
 (  
    
 ) is either smaller than or equal to unity.    
 (    
      
 )is 
either smaller than or equal to unity in the case where the input-output combination 
(    
      
 ) locates inside the production set     and the value is bigger than unity 
when the combination locates outside   . Hence, the value of    as a fraction with the 
numerator and denominator respectively denoted as    
 (    
      
 ) and    
 (  
    
 ) 
can be smaller, bigger or equal to unity. The same explanation can be applied to    . 
Färe et al. (1994) state that the MPI change can be specified as the geometric mean of 
the two above indexes in order to avoid choosing an arbitrary benchmark. The change 
of MPI is defined as: 
   [(
   
 (    
      
 )
   
 (  
    
 )
) (
     
 (    
      
 )
     
 (  
    
 )
)]
 
 ⁄
 (4.42) 
To be the geometric mean of   and     , the value of    can be smaller, bigger or 
equal to unity. Based on the value of   , the change of MPI can be explained 
differently. If      then the MPI has changed positively between the two periods 
( and    ) and the conclusion is negative when    . The productivity is seen to be 
unchanged if    . 
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The MPI change can be decomposed in order to take into account the changes of its 
components consisting of technology and efficiency. Equation 4.42 can be rewritten as: 
   
     
 (    
      
 )
   
 (  
    
 )⏟   
                  (    )
[(
   
 (  
    
 )
     
 (  
    
 )
) (
   
 (    
      
 )
     
 (    
      
 )
)]
 
 ⁄
⏟       
                 (    )
 (4.43) 
The ratio outside the square brackets measuring the change of the output-oriented 
measure of technical efficiency between two periods   and     identifies how well a 
firm approaches the production frontier. EFCH can be smaller, bigger or equal to unity 
referring to firm efficiency decline, improvement or stagnation respectively. The second 
component, the geometric mean of the two ratios inside the square brackets, captures 
the shift of technology between the two periods. TECH can also be smaller, bigger or 
equal to unity indicating the firm‘s technology regression, progression or stagnation 
over time.  
All the above discussion relates to how to measure and identify sources of MPI change 
for a specific firm. Thus, it is necessary to go further to measure the MPI and its 
component changes for a group of firms or an industry. A traditional method is to 
average the productivity indexes and components of all firms within a group or an 
industry by using the equally-weighted geometric mean. The limitation of this method is 
that it ignores the relative importance of individual firms in contributing to 
group/industry performance. As mentioned above, Färe and Zelenyuk (2003) developed 
a method for aggregating the technical efficiency of firms to construct a similar measure 
for groups/industries by using the theory of economic optimisation. This method can be 
further developed to incorporate the intertemporal analysis of efficiency, and so the 
movement of the production frontier (change of technology) of a group of firms or 
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industry can be observed between periods. The development of the aggregate 
MPI(AMPI) and decomposing it into aggregate component changes is outlined by 
Zelenyuk (2006). 
The inter-temporal extension of Farrell‘s aggregate technical efficiency of a group or an 
industry is identified as: 
  ̅( )  ∑ [   
 (  
    
 )]
   
      
                       (4.44) 
where  ̅( ) is the Farrell aggregate technical efficiency of a group or an 
industry at time   and measured by the technology at time  ;  
   
 (  
    
 ) is the Shephard technical efficiency of firm   at time  , measured 
by the technology at time  ; and  
  
 is the revenue share of firm   at time  . 
Based on Equations 4.44 and 4.42, AMPI can be defined as: 
  ̅̅ ̅̅  [.
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AMPI can be decomposed into aggregate efficiency change (AEFCH) and aggregate 
technical change (ATECH) using Equation 4.43 as below. 
  ̅̅ ̅̅  .
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In detail, AEFCH and ATECH can be defined as: 
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 (4.47) 
and 
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 (4.48) 
In this thesis, APMI is applied for the first time to measure changes in productivity of a 
banking sector. In particular, the productivity of the Vietnamese banking sector in 
aggregate and for each bank group (private, state-owned and foreign banks) are 
measured and the sources of these changes, including that of efficiency and technology 
factors, are also analysed. 
4.6 Hicks−Moorsteen productivity index 
Despite the fact that the Malmquist productivity index is the most popular measure of 
productivity change used in the literature (Nguyen and Simioni 2015) it is  
multiplicatively incomplete (O‘Donnell, 2012a, b) and, consequently, cannot be 
decomposed into exhaustive measures of technical change and efficiency change. 
Furthermore, under the non-constant returns to scale condition the Malmquist index is 
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not able to measure productivity change precisely. It contains bias which is systemic 
and depends on the magnitude of scale economies (Coelli and Rao 2005). Ray and Desli 
(1997) and Wheelock and Wilson (1999) argue that when a firm‘s location (from one 
period to another) remains unchanged, and the changes in scale efficiency are only 
related to a shift in the variable returns to scale (VRS) estimate of technology, there will 
be no resulting technical change under CRS. Hence, the resulting CRS estimate of 
technology may be statistically inconsistent. Consequently, Wheelock and Wilson 
(1999) state that the popular decomposition of the Malmquist index conducted by Färe 
et al. (1994) is also problematic. 
O‘Donnell (2012a, b) has proven that productivity indices, including Laspeyres, 
Paasche, Fisher and Hicks−Moorsteen, are multiplicatively complete. The 
Hicks−Moorsteen index is chosen in this thesis as it does not require the availability of 
prices compared with the other mentioned indices. 
For the purpose of this thesis, recent developments in the TFP index measurement and 
TFP index decomposition, as proposed by O‘Donnell (2012a, b), are used. In the latter a 
general class of multiplicatively-complete TFP indexes is introduced. The TFP index is 
defined as the ratio of an aggregate output to an aggregate input, and the change in TFP 
can then be expressed as the ratio of an output quantity index to an input quantity index, 
i.e. a measure of output growth divided by a measure of input growth. This means that, 
for firm n in period t, TFP is given by: 
      
   
   
 
where ntY  and ntX are, respectively, the aggregate output and aggregate input of the n
th
 
firm in period t. This Hicks−Moorsteen index is in fact a ratio of Malmquist output and 
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input quantity indices, which is based on the works of Hicks (1961) and Moorsteen 
(1961): 
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In Equation (4.49), ( , )
o
D x y and ( , )ID x y are output and input distance functions, 
respectively, defined as  ( , ) min 0 : ( , / )T TOD x y x y P    , and 
 ( , ) max 0: ( / , )T TID x y x y P    , where 
TP is the period T production possibilities set. 
These distance functions can be calculated using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
models developed by O‘Donnell (2012a). 
The output-oriented decomposition of a multiplicatively complete TFP index for firm n 
in period t can be rewritten as: 
          
                                                  (4.50) 
where  
*
t
TFP is the maximum TFP possible using any technically feasible inputs and 
outputs; ntOTE  (output-oriented technical efficiency) measures the difference between 
observed TFP and the maximum TFP that is possible while holding the input-output 
mix and input level fixed;        (output-oriented scale-mix efficiency) measures the 
change in productivity when restrictions on the output scale and output mix of the firm 
are relaxed. 
There are two ways to decompose the       . First,         can be decomposed into 
output-oriented mix efficiency (     ) and residual output-oriented scale efficiency 
(      ). The      is a measure of the increase of TFP that can be gained now by 
holding inputs fixed and relaxing restrictions on the output mix. The        is a 
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measure of the difference between TFP at a technically and mix efficient point and TFP 
at the point of maximum attainable productivity. Second,        can be decomposed 
into output-oriented scale efficiency (     ) and residual mix efficiency (     ). The 
     measures the gain in TFP a firm can achieve by moving along the mix-invariant 
production frontier to the mix-invariant optimal scale point. The        measures the 
productivity gain when the technically and scale efficient firm achieves the mix-variant 
optimal scale point by changing its output mix.  
Now the equation (4.50) can be rewritten as: 
          
                                                                        (4.51) 
or 
          
                                                                           (4.52) 
Decompositions of TFP change  
O‘Donnell (2012a, b) showed that the TFP index that compares the productivity of the 
firm in period   and      can be decomposed into a measure of technical change and 
various measures of efficiency change. 
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The term included in the first parentheses on the right-hand side of equations (4.53) and 
(4.54) represents technical changes, measuring the difference between the maximum 
TFP possible using any technology feasible at times t and t+1. Hence, the sector 
experiences technical improvement or decline, depending on whether 
      
 
    
  is greater or 
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less than one. Unlike in the decomposition of the Malmquist index of Färe et al. (1994), 
the technical change contains a mixed effect, and, characteristically, varies from firm to 
firm. The three other ratios on the extreme right-hand side of equations (4.53) and 
(4.54) are various components of efficiency changes and are referred to as measures of 
technical-efficiency change, mix-efficiency change, and scale-efficiency change. The 
DPIN software written by O‘Donnell (2011) is used to estimate different measures of 
efficiency and TFP components. 
4.7 Summary 
The DEA method proposed by Farrell (1957) and subsequently further developed by 
Charnes et al. (1978) is a popular method to estimate efficiency scores. DEA can not 
only measure the efficiency scores of individual firms but also firm groups through 
aggregation. This aggregate efficiency measure based on microeconomic theory will be 
used to estimate and compare the efficiency of state-owned, foreign and private bank 
groups in this thesis. Furthermore, the difference in bank group efficiency will be 
investigated through the Li test. Lastly, a double-bootstrap two-stage DEA is utilised to 
identify the possible relationship between bank efficiency and explanatory variables. 
Extending the concept of aggregate technical efficiency to incorporate inter-temporal 
analysis, we can measure total factor productivity indexes and component changes of 
the banking industry and bank groups over time.  
One advantage of the methods and tests presented in this chapter is that most of them 
apply bootstrap techniques. As mentioned previously, DEA estimators can be 
downward-biased and inherently dependent so that the bootstrap technique is not just a 
good technique but also a unique technique to overcome these limitations. 
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Computational processes relating to DEA scores, aggregate DEA scores, regression 
analysis and test statistics used in this thesis are conducted using Matlab - the most 
common mathematical software
61
.  
This chapter contributes to the theory of bank efficiency in several ways. First, it shows 
how to apply the method of aggregating technical efficiency in a banking system to 
measure and compare bank efficiency and productivity. Second, this chapter has 
emphasised that the business environment in which banks operate can be different and 
that, consequently, this leads to different levels of access to the frontier across various 
types of bank ownership. The Li test is also employed as anoriginal measure for 
detecting and analysing this difference. Third, by combining a meta-frontier analysis 
with a double-bootstrap two-stage DEA, this study has suggested a new approach to 
analyse the impact of variables on bank efficiency in separate groups operating under 
different technologies. This thesis is the first to employ ownership as an ex ante rather 
than an ex post factor, which is how ownership has traditionally been used in all earlier 
studies when examining the influence of environmental variables on bank efficiency. 
The abovementioned approach has originated from the fact that different bank 
ownership forms can result in a divergence of technology sets utilised by bank groups 
and can result in different responses to the same explanatory variables (e.g, credit policy 
or loan to asset ratios).  
The next chapter will describe the data to be used for the empirical analyses conducted 
in this thesis in terms of data sources and data statistical description. In addition, DEA 
                                                 
61
 The codes in Matlab were provided by Associate Professor Valentin Zelenyuk, University of 
Queensland, Australia.   
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models and environmental variables utilised to measure and analyse efficiency scores 
will be specified drawing upon the literature review conducted in Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 5: Data and analysis of Vietnamese banking efficiency 
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the data sources, specify the explanatory 
variables used in the regression models and conduct an empirical analysis of the 
technical efficiency of the Vietnamese banking sector in the years 2005–2012 
encompassing the pre- and post-WTO entry periods.  
The DEA method is applied to measure, compare and explain the technical efficiency 
and productivity of Vietnamese banks. To add value to the results obtained by other 
relevant studies (e.g., Vu and Turnell, 2010; Minh et al., 2013; Nguyen et al., 2014), 
this study employs the aggregate technical efficiency method, accounting for the 
relative importance
62
 of individual banks, to measure the performance of three bank 
groups - state-owned banks, private banks and foreign banks - as well as the entire 
industry. To examine the difference of banking sector efficiency between the pre- and 
post-WTO periods, the Li (1996) test on the efficiency distribution and the Simar and 
Zelenyuk (2007) test of efficiency difference are also used. These two tests also allow 
us to examine efficiency differences between the different bank groups. 
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 5.2 describes the data sources, sample, and 
specification of inputs, outputs and variables used in the DEA models for analysis of 
banking efficiency; Section 5.3 compares bank efficiency between the pre- and post-
WTO entry periods using the Li (1996; 1999) and Simar and Zelenyuk (2007) tests; 
these two tests are also employed in Section 5.4 where the performance of bank groups 
                                                 
62
 The relative importance is quantified by the outcome shares when calculating the aggregate efficiency 
scores of groups (see Section 4.3.2). 
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are measured and compared; and lastly, a summary reviewing the chapter‘s contents is 
included in Section 5.5.   
5.2 Data and model specification 
5.2.1 Data source 
 
Panel data is collected from the financial statements of individual commercial banks in 
Vietnam covering the years 2005–2012, including their balance sheets and income 
reports. Other relevant information, including the structure of bank equity, new bank 
entries and bank mergers, is collected from the annual reports of the SBV, the SBV 
official website and reports of the NFSC. In addition, working papers from academic 
institutions such as the ASH Institute for Democratic Governance and Innovation 
(Harvard Kennedy School) and development reports from international financial 
organisations, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, are also 
used as useful sources of data on equity owned by foreigners and macroeconomic 
indicators including the inflation rate and exchange rate.    
As mentioned in Section 2.3, only data from 2005 onward ensures homogeneity because 
of the first implementation of regulations on loan classification and loan-loss 
provisioning. The studied period covers the pre- and post-WTO era to observe the 
impact of policy changes, stipulated as part of Vietnam‘s entry to the WTO, on bank 
efficiency. With a two-digit inflation rate (about 11-12%), the balance sheets of banks 
significantly deteriorated during the period 2005–2012. Hence, the data is also 
converted into real terms. 
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5.2.2 Sample 
As mentioned in Chapter 2 there are four types of banks in Vietnam: state-owned 
commercial banks (SOCBs), joint stock domestic banks (JSBs), joint venture banks 
(JVBs) and foreign banks (FBs) (see Table 5.1). Most of the SOCBs are privatised but 
are predominantly owned by the state with the SBV being the representative entity. 
Foreign investors are allowed to take part in the privatisation process although they are 
limited by the maximal equity proportion that can be owned (30%). This mechanism 
ensures the Vietnamese government maintains control over these public banks. JVBs 
are established by a SOCB with one or more foreign counterparts. JSBs are established 
by stock joining from individuals, private companies and SOEs, or even SOCBs and 
other JSBs. As with SOCBs, JSBs can call for overseas investments. From April 2007, 
foreign investors can establish 100% foreign invested banks in Vietnam. 
16Table 5.1: The equity structure of banks according to ownership 
 
 Types of ownership 
Types of banks State ownership Private ownership Foreign ownership 
SOCBs (+)50% (-)50% (-)30% 
JSBs 0% (+)70% (-)30% 
JVBs 0% (-)50% (+)50% 
FBs 0% 0% 100% 
Note: the sign ―(+)‖ means ―at least equal to‖ and the sign ―(-)‖ means ―maximum equal to‖. 
Source: Based on the Vietnamese law on credit institutions issued in 2010 by the National Assembly of 
Vietnam, pages 5-6, downloaded from the website of the Vietnam Ministry of Justice, 
http://moj.gov.vn/vbpq/Lists/Vn%20bn%20php%20lut/View_Detail.aspx?ItemID=25814 
 
Table 5.2 reports on the number of banks categorised by ownership type. The number of 
SOCBs was stable over the study period at five, while in the case of JSBs it changed 
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with new bank entries and bank mergers. There was no significant change for JVBs 
during this period. FBs started operating in Vietnam from 2009 and subsequent to this 
their number remained stable until 2012. In this study the annual data of banks is pooled 
together and in this way a bank-year panel data consisting of 232 observations is 
generated.  
17Table 5.2: Number of banks by ownership category 
 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
State-Owned 
Commercial Banks 
5(5) 5(5) 5(5) 5(5) 5(5) 5(5) 5(5) 5(5) 
Joint Stock Banks 33(11) 34(14) 33(19) 36(24) 37(25) 37(25) 37(25) 34(24) 
Joint Venture Banks 4(1) 5(1) 5(2) 5(2) 5(2) 4(2) 4(3) 4(3) 
Foreign Banks  0 0 0 0 5(1) 5(2) 5(3) 5(3) 
Total 42(17) 44(20) 43(26) 46(31) 52(33) 51(34) 51(36) 48(35) 
Note: the numbers in brackets are the number of banks used in this study.  
Source: State Bank of Vietnam, annual reports from 2005 to 2012 
 
Table 5.3 shows the market share of total bank assets by ownership type in Vietnam 
during the period 2005–2012. SOCBs dominated the banking system; however, the 
market share of this bank type sharply decreased from approximately 85% of the total 
sample in 2005 to about 52% in 2012. This period also witnessed a dramatic growth in 
JSBs from about 15% of total bank assets in 2005 to 38% in 2012. Domestic banks, 
consisting of SOCBs and JSBs, together make up the bulk of bank market assets, 
equivalent to slightly above 90% in 2012. JVBs and FBs with foreign-majority 
ownership contributed to less than 10% of total bank assets. This is due to the 
government and SBV‘s implementation of discriminatory policies which constrained 
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the development of JVBs and FBs, especially in the pre-WTO entry period. This 
situation improved after WTO accession but full equitable treatment of foreign investors 
was only implemented from 2011. 
18Table 5.3: Market share of assets by ownership 
 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
State-owned 
commercial banks 
0.8475 0.7788 0.6538 0.6481 0.5788 0.5090 0.4848 0.5161 0.6271 
Joint stock banks 0.1469 0.2153 0.3052 0.3096 0.3595 0.4038 0.4196 0.3840 0.3180 
 JSB transformed 
 from rural banks  
0 0 0.0330 0.0347 0.0524 0.0612 0.0659 0.0672 0.0393 
Joint-venture banks 0.0056 0.0059 0.0080 0.0076 0.0068 0.0083 0.0096 0.0088 0.0076 
Foreign banks 0 0 0 0 0.0025 0.0177 0.0201 0.0239 0.0080 
Source: Calculated by the author using data obtained from financial statements and income reports of 
banks 
 
5.2.3 Input/output specification in the DEA model 
 
It is widely accepted that, despite substantial research efforts, there is a lack of 
agreement in identifying the relevant outputs and inputs to be used for a DEA analysis 
of banking sector efficiency (Kenjegalieva et al., 2009). According to Bergendhal 
(1998), commercial banks target five basic goals: profit maximisation, risk 
management, service provision, intermediation and utility provision to customers. 
Grigorian and Manole (2006) simplify these goals by pooling them into two functions: a 
profit maximisation function which incorporates the first two goals (profit maximisation 
and risk management) and a service provision function (combining service provision, 
intermediation and utility provision). Das and Ghosh (2006) summarise related studies 
and propose three basic approaches to banking inputs and outputs. The first is the 
production approach which considers banks as providers of services to customers. The 
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second is the intermediation approach in which banks are viewed as intermediating 
funds between savers and investors. The last approach is the operating approach that 
sees banks as profit-earning entities.  
In the context of Vietnam‘s emerging market economy where the capital market is still 
shallow, the banking sector has been playing a key role as the main source of funding 
for both businesses and households. Thus, the intermediation approach is a reasonable 
and logical choice for this study and this is chosen as this study‘s main focus.  
In the post-WTO period, banks experienced a significant increase in their capital, assets 
and scope of operations. Banks have opened many new branches in cities and 
provinces; accordingly, they have recruited more staff and built new offices. As a result, 
labour expenditure and fixed assets have become important inputs. One crucial 
characteristic of the Vietnamese banking sector is the high level of cash transactions in 
the economy, so more branches would lead to more mobilised deposits
63
. The 
development of a stock market in the post-WTO period has generated new channels for 
banks to invest their money other than the traditional channel of loans. New laws for 
commercial banks issued in 2006 permitting banks to widen their activities to include 
insurance, gold trading, stock trading and housing services has stimulated banks to 
increase their investments. Consequently, there has been a shift from the ―loans and 
advances‖ item to ―trading securities‖ and ―investments‖ items (or other non-traditional 
assets) in banks‘ balance sheets. Therefore, under the intermediation approach, this 
                                                 
63
In the literature, there is controversy relating to classifying deposits as an input or an output (Berger and 
Humphrey, 1997; Das and Ghosh, 2006). Deposits can be treated as inputs because ―they are paid for in 
part by interest payments and the funds raised provide institutions with the raw material of investible 
funds‖ (Berger and Humphrey, 1997, page 198). Therefore, considering deposits as an input is 
appropriate under the intermediation approach. On the other hand, deposits are related to liquidity, 
safekeeping and payment services provided to depositors. Thus, deposits also have an output character 
(Berger and Humphrey, 1997). In this case, deposits can be considered as an output under the production 
approach.   
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study uses three inputs - labour expenses, fixed assets and deposits - while outputs are 
total loans and other earning assets. 
In addition to the intermediation approach the operating approach is generally important 
in measuring bank efficiency due to the ultimate objective of banks – profit. Hence, this 
approach is also used in this study with the aim of providing an insight into the profit-
making performance of banks. There is a consensus in selecting the variables for this 
approach: interest expenses and non-interest expenses are inputs, and interest income 
and non-interest income are outputs (Ataullah et al., 2004; Yao et al., 2007; Sturm and 
Williams, 2004; Jiang et al., 2009). 
Table 5.4 statistically describes inputs and outputs using the minimum and maximum 
values, and mean and standard deviation. As can be seen in Table 5.4, the period 2005–
2012 witnessed substantial data volatility. For example, the mean value of labour 
expenditure by banks surged from USD 16,962,208 in 2005 to USD 38,187,814 in 
2012. This significantly increasing trend can be explained by the fact that the 
Vietnamese banking sector experienced rapid growth, especially after accession to the 
WTO in 2007. The country‘s loose and expansionary monetary policy, which had been 
in force for a long period of time, was simultaneously intensified by considerable 
capital inflows from overseas
64
. Moreover, a number of rural banks were allowed by the 
SBV to transform into urban banks. Before the transformation process these rural banks 
were very small and mostly focused their operations on lending to SMEs and farmers in 
remote areas.   
                                                 
64
 To keep the Vietnamese dong from appreciating relative to foreign currency the SBV bought foreign 
cash inflows. It injected dong into the economy which led to considerable excess liquidity in the banking 
system. 
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19Table 5.4: A statistical description of inputs and outputs (in USD ‗000) 
 
  
Intermediation approach Operating approach 
Inputs Outputs Inputs Outputs 
Labour 
expense  
Fixed 
assets Deposits Total loans 
Other 
earning 
assets 
Interest 
expenses 
Non-
interest 
expenses 
Interest 
income 
Non-
interest 
income  
2005                   
Min 472 889 86,471 78,557 4,971 7849 1,020 11,066 434 
Mean 16,962 27,285 2,158,788 1,699,346 310,367 99,964 46,031 175,391 21,689 
Max 128,862 160,830 10,344,649 10,439,365 1,514,331 584,910 330,197 1,078,029 117,283 
SD 32,252 41,260 3,217,455 2,863,038 456,035 157,612 84,622 286,564 34,140 
2006                   
Min 906 1,930 185,941 120,993 7,426 8,482 1,434 15,952 773 
Mean 17,464 26,780 2,372,667 1,625,835 343,388 124,340 45,425 195,472 23,939 
Max 136,788 119,547 12,449,253 10,804,420 1,886,676 778,110 345,561 1,317,765 120,058 
SD 32,563 33,499 3,565,868 2,760,620 518,803 201,568 82,851 327,006 33,388 
2007                   
Min 882 728 77,326 70,939 110 4,787 1,337 8,997 92 
Mean 21,112 23,984 2,414,387 1,686,255 448,987 124,607 43,064 196,027 29,441 
Max 229,445 133,624 14,677,419 13,106,006 2,214,939 899,388 429,729 1,524,802 156,153 
SD 47,085 31,783 3,582,181 2,953,540 668,442 211,234 88,138 343,956 42,747 
2008                   
Min 696 736 63,018 45,164 140 3,506 1,960 8,251 820 
Mean 22,437 65,899 1,993,125 1,392,298 381,562 168,640 44,306 238,837 28,898 
Max 223,748 1,221,472 14,873,673 12,903,348 1,939,929 1,338,582 435,826 1,970,727 250,143 
SD 46,105 217,415 3,319,914 2,721,690 612,580 278,357 87,806 410,508 52,001 
2009                   
Min 1,123 659 59,101 73,609 250 139 847 1,620 121 
Mean 25,247 29,090 2,267,800 1,719,343 367,952 134,503 48,322 203,192 35,035 
Max 201,686 182,777 16,434,509 15,222,658 1,693,497 1,305,016 436,150 1,777,177 281,047 
SD 45,812 40,207 3,471,632 3,141,105 516,165 249,220 86,022 354,527 61,191 
2010                   
Min 1,253 1,026 135,467 92,198 420 7,884 3,074 13,948 948 
Mean 29,184 33,344 2,878,871 1,962,458 542,675 185,521 59,410 274,059 37,416 
Max 248,328 195,099 15,770,193 15,544,701 2,365,860 1,407,692 481,616 2,027,658 220,755 
SD 51,243 42,393 3,802,658 3,323,996 584,948 285,361 98,524 420,337 55,839 
2011                   
Min 1,587 873 24,128 16,412 662 970 3,929 9,208 750 
Mean 33,816 33,443 2,707,653 1,852,551 456,248 254,230 67,681 367,049 27,599 
Max 304,669 174,999 14,152,298 14,167,712 2,232,099 1,571,890 569,566 2,400,203 181,478 
SD 57,957 40,182 3541761 3,178,886 522,773 347,594 112,298 521,512 45,300 
2012                   
Min 1,504 605 45,726 51,977 758 2,247 3,891 10,250 1,020 
Mean 38,188 37,568 2,775,906 2,086,002 507,850 229,123 54,050 288,301 24,350 
Max 328,012 153,078 13,505,858 13,567,112 2,415,730 1,330,244 288,202 1,466,945 148,059 
SD 61,713 46,909 3,740,133 3,298,030 640,115 304,977 63,275 348,385 36,174 
2005-12                   
Min 472 605 24,128 16,412 110 139 847 1,620 92 
Mean 26,989 35,683 2,483,038 1,774,023 432,927 174,878 52,272 253,101 29,236 
Max 328,012 1,221,472 16,434,509 15,544,701 2,415,730 1,571,890 569,566 2,400,203 281,047 
SD 49,598 87,555 3,517,096 3,036,787 571,518 273,474 88,806 393,261 47,057 
 
 
162 
 
Note: The figures presented are discounted by the inflation rate for the benchmark year 2005, and 
converted to US dollars using the exchange rate between the Vietnamese dong and USD on 31/12/2015.   
Source: Calculated by the author using data obtained from financial statements and income reports of 
banks 
 
5.2.4 Specification of the regression model 
 
Once technical efficiency scores have been measured it is then important to identify the 
possible impact of environmental variables on bank performance through regression 
analysis. It is apparent that the efficiency score is the dependent variable. However, 
defining the independent variables is more complicated and depends on the specific 
nature of the study. In this study, environmental variables are classified into three 
categories: 1) bank-specific variables; 2) the time trend variable; and 3) variables 
indicating new policies that might impact on the banking sector. It is worth noting that 
each variable will appear in the meta-frontier DEA model that pools all bank groups 
(state-owned, private domestic and foreign/joint venture bank groups) and the group-
frontier DEA model that includes banks of a specific group. 
5.2.4.1 Bank-specific variables 
Loan to asset ratio (LA) 
During the period 2005–2012 Vietnam experienced a credit boom with an average 
annual credit growth rate of 35% (in nominal terms). This lending generates traditional 
assets including loans and advances and, in order to understand how this activity 
impacts upon bank efficiency, the loan to asset ratio is employed following on from the 
works of Hasan and Marton (2003), Havrylchyk (2006), Yildirim and Philoppatos 
(2007) and Chortareas et al. (2013). 
Equity to asset ratio (EA) 
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The equity to asset ratio (EA) is used as a proxy for financial soundness (Fries and Taci, 
2005; Grigorian and Manole, 2006; Kumbhakar and Wang, 2007; Jiang et al., 2009). A 
higher ratio relates to stronger capacity to protect banks against risks that could lead to 
an equity loss.  
Return on assets (ROA) 
Return on assets (ROA) is included in the model as a proxy for the profitability of banks 
(Das and Ghosh, 2006; Hermes and Nhung, 2010; Glass et al., 2014). A positive 
association between the profitability of banks and their efficiency is assumed.
65
 
Time trend (T) 
To control for the effect of time a time trend variable (T) is introduced which takes the 
value 1 for 2005, 2 for 2006 and so on to capture the evolving nature of efficiency. The 
time variable and its effect on bank efficiency have been investigated in the literature. 
For example, Williams and Nguyen (2005) utilise a time variable when examining the 
impact of bank governance on bank performance in the context of Southeast Asian 
countries encompassing the pre- and post-EAFC periods. Lensink et al. (2008) employ 
a time variable in SFA models when investigating whether the efficiency of foreign 
banks depended on the institutional quality of the host and home country.
66
 
                                                 
65
ROE was also considered but ROA provided more significant results. Both ROE and ROA are regularly 
used in the literature. 
66
When adding a dummy variable capturing the impact of WTO membership the model runs badly and 
this is the result of co-linearity between the WTO dummy and the other dummies that proxy for new 
policy reforms adapted after the WTO event. As an alternative, the Li test and Simar and Zelenyuk tests 
are used to investigate the difference of bank performance between the pre- and post-WTO entry periods 
(see Section 5.3). 
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5.2.4.2 Policy-change related variables 
The following variables are chosen to show the association between Vietnam‘s policy 
changes in the context of the banking sector and banks‘ performance in the post-WTO 
period. 
FSI: dummy variable for foreign strategic involvement in domestic banks 
Foreign investors can become shareholders of SOCBs and JSBs by purchasing their 
equity. However, the proportion of equity sold to foreign investors cannot exceed 30% 
of the total. To measure the impact of foreign strategic involvement, a dummy variable, 
FSI, is utilised to indicate banks with foreign involvement, following the approach of 
Hasan and Marton (2003) and Bonin et al. (2005a, 2005b). From a Vietnamese 
perspective, a positive relationship between foreign involvement and domestic bank 
performance is also assumed due to the advantages of overseas investors, for example 
access to advanced banking technology or stronger financial capabilities.  
P: dummy variable for equitised SOCBs 
In the post-WTO period it was planned that SOCBs would be privatised but this process 
had to ensure that the government continued to hold a dominant portion of banks‘ 
capital. A dummy variable, P, is used for those SOCBs which were partially privatised 
and zero for those not involved in this process. Following agent-principal theory, state 
ownership can negatively influence the performance of banks in terms of profit 
maximising or providing intermediate services and conversely state-owned banks 
become more efficient after being privatised (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Altunbas et 
al., 2001; La Porta et al., 2002). This is because the participation of private shareholders 
in parallel with the state makes SOCBs more accountable and requires much stronger 
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commercial-based incentives. The SOCBs‘ model of management changes from an 
administrative unit, in which a director assigned by the government plays the role of 
both manager and state-owner representative, into a modern corporation with the 
separation of the decision making unit (board of directors) and ownership 
(shareholders). 
RU: dummy variable for JSBs transformed from rural to urban banks 
A number of rural JSBs were permitted to transfer to urban banks. It was expected that 
these transformed banks would increase their scope of operation and consequently 
improve their efficiency; however, poor management and weak capital capability 
represented substantial challenges in comparison with other JSBs (WB, 2012; VELP, 
2012). The dummy variable RU is employed to distinguish such transformed JSBs from 
others in the same group.  
BG: dummy variable for JSBs with SOEs or private business groups being the 
shareholders 
A number of SOEs and private business groups were allowed by the government to 
participate in the banking sector and become holding companies of JSBs. Subsequently, 
a complex relationship, so-called cross-ownership, between these SOEs (non-bank 
business groups) and JSBs was established. Being major shareholders, SOEs can 
influence the decision making processes of these banks and channel bank credit to 
projects that are of relevance to them. Thus, cross-ownership can obstruct contestability 
and facilitate collusion between banks and SOEs/private business groups (Kraft et al., 
2006). In this case it is assumed that cross-ownership can impact the efficiency of JSBs. 
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A dummy variable (BG) is included in the model indicating those JSBs that have at 
least 20% of their total equity owned by one or more SOEs.     
20Table 5.5: A summary of the employed regression variables 
 
Variable  Description 
Policy change variables    
 Selected for business 
group participation in 
JSBs 
BG Dummy indicating JSBs that have experienced equity 
participation by SOEs/private business groups.  
 Selected for SOCB 
equitisation 
P Dummy indicating SOCBs that have experienced equitisation 
between 2005 and 2012. 
 Banks with foreign 
capital participation  
FSI Dummy indicating a bank that sold a minor proportion of its 
equity (not exceeding 30%) to foreign investors.  
 Rural-urban 
transformed banks  
RU Dummy indicating JSBs which transformed from rural to 
urban banks.  
Bank specific variables   
 Loans to assets ratio LA The ratio of loans to assets measures the risk preference of 
a bank. 
 Equity to assets ratio EA The ratio of equity to assets measures the financial 
soundness of a bank.  
 ROA ROA Return on assets measures the profitability of a bank.  
Time trend variable T Trend variables (2005=1, 2006=2, … , 2012=8). 
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21Table 5.6: Statistical description of environmental and bank-specific variables 
 
Indicators Mean SD Min Max 
BGs 0.3491 0.4777 0 1.0000 
P 0.1034 0.3052 0 1.0000 
FSI 0.2284 0.4207 0 1.0000 
RU 02112 0.4090 0 1.0000 
LA 0.5213 0.1504 0.1293 0.9442 
EA 0.4374 0.0998 0.0107 0.8006 
ROA 0.0159 0.0104 0.0001 0.0769 
T 5.0000 2.1622 1.0000 8.0000 
Source: Author‘s calculation  
5.3 A comparison of technical efficiency between the pre- and post-WTO periods 
The total of 232 bank-year observations for the period from 2005 to 2012 are divided 
into two subsamples. There are 31 observations belonging to the pre-WTO subsample 
(2005–2006) and 195 observations for the post-WTO subsample (2007–2012). It is 
important to measure and compare bank performance between the pre- and post-WTO 
era because this can assist policy makers to identify the impact of reform measures in 
the post-WTO period on bank operations. To compare bank performance within and 
across these periods, the method for aggregating technical efficiency suggested by 
Simar and Zelenyuk (2007) is used, allowing for comparison of the efficiency of two 
groups by taking into consideration the relative importance of individual banks based on 
their size in each group, unlike conventional approaches which give equal importance 
(weighting) to all banks. The Simar and Zelenyuk (2007) method is based on bootstrap 
techniques that overcome the biased nature of DEA estimates. This method allows 
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recognising the efficiency levels of the pre- and post-WTO periods and testing the 
efficiency difference between the two periods. The results are provided in Table 5.7.  
Agg.Eff. and M.Eff. represent the aggregate and mean efficiency of the banking sector 
in the 2005–2012 period respectively. The bootstrap values of Agg.Eff. and M.Eff. are 
found to be 1.2068 and 1.4604 under the intermediation approach and 1.1728 and 
1.4187 under the operating approach (Table 5.7)
67
. These results reveal that: 
1) the mean and aggregate efficiency models provide considerably different 
results. The aggregate efficiency values under both approaches are substantially 
smaller than the mean values and this confirms the impact of output size on the 
efficiency of groups; and 
2) inefficiencies under both the intermediation and operating approaches are 
greater than unity and those under the intermediation approach are larger than 
those under the operating approach, indicating that there is room for Vietnamese 
banks to improve their technical efficiencies in terms of both providing 
intermediation services and in achieving the profit maximising standard. 
On average, using point estimates of efficiency, banks can increase the volume of 
intermediation services by 20.68%
68
 using the bias-corrected aggregate measure or 
46.04% in terms of the bias-corrected mean criterion. Using confidence intervals of 
efficiency, at a significance level of 5%, intermediation activities can be extended 
further than the contemporary volume at a pace between 15.83% and 23.95% in terms 
                                                 
67
 The Farrell output-oriented measure of technical efficiency is utilised; thus, the higher value scores 
mean that the related banks are less efficient. 
68
This increasing rate is compared with the contemporary level of output. Another way in which to 
interpret efficiency scores is by transforming the Farrell (1957) type of efficiency as used in this thesis to 
the Shephard (1970) type of efficiency. Accordingly, the latter type is equal to the reciprocal form of the 
former type. For example, if the score is 1.2068 using the Farrell type of efficiency it would be 0.8286 
when applying the Shephard type of efficiency and this figure means that the potential output of banks 
can increase by 17.14% with the same level of inputs. The Shephard type way of presenting efficiency 
scores can be applied for any similar cases.    
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of the aggregate measure or between 37.72% and 52.69% using the mean measure. 
Similarly, interest and non-interest incomes, at a significance level of 5%, can increase 
between 12.80% and 20.31% or between 33.34% and 48.86% if the bootstrap aggregate 
and mean criterions are used respectively. 
The AER (aggregate efficiency ratio), presented in Table 5.7, is the ratio of the pre-
WTO to the post-WTO aggregate efficiency score. Table 5.7 shows that at the 10% and 
5% levels of significance, the confidence interval (CI) of AER includes unity (the CIs of 
the pre- and post-WTO periods overlap) under both the intermediation and operating 
approaches and thus the hypothesis H0 (  ̅̅̅̅    ̅̅ ̅)
69
, that the efficiency scores for the 
pre- and post-WTO era are the same in terms of both providing intermediation services 
and also maximising profit, cannot be rejected. The same conclusion can be made using 
the MER (mean efficiency ratio), the ratio of pre-WTO to post-WTO mean efficiency 
scores (see Table 5.7), on the equality of efficiency scores in the pre- and post-WTO 
eras regardless of the input/output approach employed. 
In theory, financial liberalisation is expected to improve bank efficiency by eliminating 
government control and encouraging the rule of free and fair markets that, in turn, 
pressure banks to improve the overall quality of their management and risk management 
and to allocate their scarce financial resources more efficiently (Lensink et al., 2008). In 
the literature, empirical studies using single-country data have provided mixed results, 
indicating that the impact of financial liberalisation can have both positive and negative 
effects on bank performance (Hermes and Nhung, 2010). Negative and unexpected 
outcomes can be explained by macroeconomic instabilities or even financial crises 
occurring during and/or after the liberalisation programs that distort the incentive 
                                                 
69
 For more detail on this hypothesis see Subsection 4.3.2. 
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structure of the banks and make the allocation of resources to achieve efficiency a more 
difficult task (Denizer et al., 2007). The equality of Vietnamese bank efficiency scores 
in the pre- and post-WTO period cannot be rejected, implying that no significant 
improvement in bank performance has occurred, contradicting the previously mentioned 
empirical literature. In addition, this result is unique when compared to previous studies 
which demonstrate either a positive (e.g, Maudos et al., 2007; Berger et al., 2009) or a 
negative impact (e.g, Hao et al., 2001; Denizer et al., 2007), but in this case the impact 
is insignificant. From 2007 onward, Vietnam has conducted a number of reform 
measures and the impact of these on bank efficiency has again been both positive and 
negative.
70
 It is assumed that the influence of positive measures is balanced by the 
negative measures resulting in an overall insignificant change to efficiency levels in the 
post-WTO period.  
                                                 
70
 The studied period (2005–2012) also witnessed the GFC but the impact of this crisis on Vietnamese 
bank efficiency was insignificant (see Nguyen et al., 2014). The Simar and Zelenyuk (2007) and Li 
(1996) tests can also be utilised to examine the impact of the GFC on Vietnamese bank performance. The 
period is divided into two sub-periods, 2005–2007 and 2008–2012. The results are the same as those of 
Nguyen et al., pointing to the insignificant impact of the GFC. For more detail see Appendix A.    
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22Table 5.7: A comparison of technical efficiency between the pre- and post-WTO periods 
 
 
Notes: Agg.Eff. Pre-WTO and Agg.Eff. Post-WTOarethe aggregate efficiency scores of banks in the pre- and post-WTO era respectively. Agg.Eff is the aggregate efficiency 
score of the whole sample (both pre- and post-WTO era). M.Eff. Pre-WTO and M.Eff. Post-WTOare mean efficiency scores of banks in the pre- and post-WTO era 
respectively. M.Eff is the mean efficiency scores for the whole sample. AER is the ratio of the aggregate efficiency score of banks pre-WTO to the post-WTO period. MER is 
the ratio of the mean efficiency score of banks pre-WTO to that post-WTO. For each degree of significance, there are two columns indicating the upper and lower bounds of 
the estimators. 
 
  
Intermediation Approach Operating Approach 
DEA  
Estimation 
Standard 
Error 
Bias 
Correction 
Estimation 
Confidence Interval Bounds DEA  
Estimation 
Standard 
Error 
Bias 
Correction 
Estimation 
Confidence Interval Bounds 
90% 95% 90% 95% 
Agg.Eff. Pre-WTO 1.1326 0.0508 1.1889 1.0794 1.2472 1.0588 1.2521 1.1528 0.0500 1.2173 1.1171 1.2769 1.0912 1.2819 
Agg.Eff. Post-WTO 1.1356 0.0238 1.2076 1.1629 1.2401 1.1506 1.2443 1.1097 0.0215 1.1661 1.1257 1.1948 1.1140 1.1977 
Agg.Eff. 1.1352 0.0210 1.2068 1.1674 1.2362 1.1583 1.2395 1.1149 0.0199 1.1728 1.1373 1.2003 1.1280 1.2031 
M.Eff. Pre-WTO 1.2851 0.0771 1.4144 1.2742 1.5125 1.2354 1.5260 1.3447 0.0638 1.4998 1.3895 1.5978 1.3635 1.6109 
M.Eff. Post-WTO 1.3074 0.0403 1.4701 1.3988 1.5312 1.3815 1.5402 1.2736 0.0410 1.4075 1.3356 1.4679 1.3196 1.4743 
M.Eff. 1.3038 0.0384 1.4604 1.3917 1.5180 1.3772 1.5269 1.2850 0.0403 1.4187 1.3468 1.4801 1.3334 1.4886 
AER 0.9973 0.0528 0.9823 0.8786 1.0525 0.8502 1.0630 1.0389 0.0501 1.0441 0.9494 1.1101 0.9143 1.1202 
MER 0.9716 0.0703 0.9328 0.8061 1.0291 0.7761 1.0428 1.0567 0.0518 1.0693 0.9768 1.1462 0.9554 1.1588 
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Figure 5.1below demonstrates how the average efficiency of each group and the whole 
banking industry has changed over time. Panel A and B present the movement of group 
and industry efficiency under the intermediation and operating approach, respectively. 
Using the intermediation approach the chart does not show a clear increasing/decreasing 
trend of group efficiency and it seems that there is no significant change during the 
2005−2012 period. This result is also in line with results obtained using the Simar and 
Zelenyuk (2007) test in that there is no change of efficiency between the pre- and post-
WTO entry periods. Under the operating approach efficiency scores of groups tend to 
slightly decrease, demonstrating a fact that the banking sector may perform better (see 
Panel B, Figure 5.1). 
5Figure 5.1: Trend lines of group efficiency 
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The differences and similarities of bank efficiency between the two periods is further 
investigated by employing the Li test which allows testing of how different bank groups 
access the production frontier. Table 5.8 presents the Li (1996) test results on efficiency 
densities of the Vietnamese banks. Under both the intermediation and operating 
approaches the p-values of the two approaches are 0.4075 and 0.6425 respectively, 
suggesting that the null hypothesis of equality between the two distribution functions 
cannot be rejected. The results imply that the capability of banks to access optimal 
performance has generally not been different in the pre- and post-WTO accession 
periods. Therefore, one may argue that reform measures implemented from 2007 
onwards (the post-WTO period), including privatisation of SOCBs and allowing 
business groups and foreign investors to take part in the banking sector, have not 
brought about an obvious change in the capability of banks to access the production 
frontier (Vo and Nguyen, 2009; Pincus, 2009).  
23Table 5.8: Li test on the technical efficiency density of banks 
in the pre- versus post-WTO era 
 
  H0 (f is density) Li test [p-value] Decision on H0 
Intermediation approach f1(pre-WTO) = f1(post-WTO) -0.7454 [0.4075] Do not reject H0 
Operating approach f2(pre-WTO) = f2(post-WTO) -0.4756 [0.6425] Do not reject H0 
Note: H0: densities of the two bank groups are equal 
Figure 5.2 simulates the efficiency densities of bank groups in the two periods using the 
two input/output approaches (intermediation in Panel 1 and operating in Panel 2). The 
horizontal axis presents the technical efficiency scores of individual banks where 
efficient banks obtain unity while inefficient banks obtain values larger than unity. The 
vertical axis presents the densities of technical efficiency scores of individual banks. 
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The density curves for pre-WTO entry efficiency and post-WTO entry efficiency are 
shown in Figure 5.2. Under these two approaches the shape of the two curves is similar.    
6Figure 5.2: Kernel estimation densities of individual efficiency scores 
 
Note: the dashed line represents the pre-WTO efficiency scores and the solid line represents the post-
WTO efficiency scores. 
These findings on the statistical similarity of bank performance during the pre- and 
post-WTO periods do not indicate either a positive or negative change in relation to 
bank efficiency. However, bank groups classified by ownership criterion may have 
reacted differently to the reform measures. Therefore, in the next section the impact of 
reform measures as well as bank-specific variables on bank efficiency are further 
investigated. 
5.4 A comparison of aggregate technical efficiency amongst bank groups in 
accordance with ownership 
5.4.1 Simar and Zelenyuk (2007) test on the performance of bank groups 
 
-  
Panel 1 
-  
Panel 2 
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To compare bank efficiency across the three previously mentioned groups, the whole 
sample of 232 bank-year observations is divided into three subsamples: 40 observations 
of the total are public banks, 167 observations are private banks, and the remainder (25 
observations) are foreign and joint-venture banks. These bank groups are organised into 
three pairs (SOCBs and JSBs; SOCBs and FJVBs; JSBs and FJVBs). The production 
frontier of the banking sector has been estimated and, accordingly, the ratios of 
aggregate and mean technical efficiency of each of the two groups are measured and 
compared using the test outlined in Simar and Zelenyuk (2007).  
Table 5.9 shows that the ratios of aggregate and mean technical efficiency of JSBs to 
SOCBs are respectively 1.3471 and 1.3482 under the intermediation approach while 
they are 1.2313 and 1.2483 under the operating approach. All these ratios are larger than 
unity and significant at 1%. As the aggregate and mean technical efficiency scores of 
the JSB group are larger than those of the SOCBs, it can be concluded that the JSB 
group is less efficient than the SOCB group. The ratios of aggregate and mean technical 
efficiency of SOCBs over FJVBs are 0.8419 (significant at 5%) and 0.8750 (significant 
at 5%) under the intermediation approach and 0.9186 (insignificant) and 0.7931 
(significant at 1%) under the operating approach. The ratios, in this case, are all under 
unity and demonstrate that the efficiency scores of the SOCBs are smaller than those of 
the FJVBs. This supports SOCBs outperforming their foreign rivals. Therefore, one can 
conclude that there is evidence that the SOCB group is the most efficient in comparison 
to JSBs and FJVBs under both input/output options.  
This result is contrary to agent-principle theory which usually indicates the 
outperformance of private banks over publicly owned banks. Due to the agency problem 
arising from the separation of ownership and control, it is difficult to identify the actual 
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owners of state-owned banks, nominally the tax payers. It is the government, rather than 
the tax payers, that usually plays the role of owner of state-owned banks, and it controls 
and orients the objectives of these banks to serve its policies rather than to benefit tax 
payers. This result contradicts mainstream empirical research which has supported this 
theory in investigating both single and cross-country datasets and also considering 
various input/output mixes using the intermediation, operating, production and value-
added approaches (Bonin et al., 2005a; 2005b; Fries and Taci, 2005; Berger et al., 2009; 
Corrnett et al., 2010; Fang et al., 2010). It is in line however with Kraft et al. 
(2006),Denizer et al. (2007) and Karas et al. (2010)with similar analyses conducted in 
other transition and newly emerging market economies, in which they conclude that 
deficiencies in the business environment are the cause. They identify several issues. 
First, state owned banks obtain guarantees of solvency from the government and, 
therefore, they can make loans and receive deposits more easily than their private rivals. 
Additionally, private banks struggle with lack of access to capital, have poor 
governance and risk management, and have to deal with cross-ownership by industrial 
groups which increases the possibility of insider trading, resulting in a deterioration of 
assets. The business environment in which Vietnamese banks operate, as mentioned in 
Chapter 2, is similar. State-owned banks are majority owned by the central bank; hence, 
there is guaranteed solvency and privileges from the State such as access to capital. In 
contrast, low transparency and a weak regulation and supervision framework have 
undermined the performance of domestic private banks in Vietnam. Cross-ownership is 
popular in most JSBs and their investments in real estate and stock markets have not 
been well controlled, resulting in a high NPL rate. Foreign banks, although allowed to 
operate in Vietnam from 2007 as a commitment to the WTO, nonetheless have only 
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been treated with the same rights as domestic banks from 2011. This discrimination 
explains the constraints foreign banks in Vietnam have faced in expanding their services 
and customer base and why they are revealed to be less efficient than SOCBs.   
In the case of comparing JSBs with FJVBs, the ratios presenting the efficiency of JSBs 
over FJVBs, using both the mean and aggregate criterions, are significantly larger than 
unity under the intermediation approach. For example, at the 5% level of significance 
the ratio based on aggregate efficiency scores is 1.1447. These results indicate that the 
FJVB group is more efficient than the JSB group in terms of providing intermediation 
services. The result is similar when the operating approach is employed. While the ratio 
based on the aggregation method indicates an outperformance by the FJVBs over the 
JSBs, the ratio based on the mean criterion is insignificantly smaller than unity at 
0.9983 showing that there is, in fact, no major discrepancy between the two groups.  
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24Table 5.9: Simar and Zelenyuk (2007) tests on the differences in efficiency between SOCBs, JSBs and FJVBs 
 
  
 
Intermediation approach         Operating approach           
Bias-
corrected 
estimation 
Confidence interval Bias-
corrected 
estimation 
Confidence interval 
90% 95% 99% 90% 95% 99% 
JSBs versus SOCBs 
AER JSBs/SOCBs ***1.3471 1.2686 1.4130 1.2500 1.4246 1.2143 1.4426 ***1.2313 1.1639 1.2869 1.1469 1.2937 1.1185 1.3056 
MER JSBs/SOCBs ***1.3482 1.2569 1.4320 1.2307 1.4479 1.1838 1.4825 ***1.2438 1.1504 1.3270 1.1292 1.3448 1.0905 1.3623 
JSBs versus FJVBs 
            
AER JSBs/FJVBs **1.1447 1.0294 1.2820 1.0117 1.3160 0.9660 1.3585 **1.1333 1.0414 1.2434 1.0252 1.2649 0.9948 1.3058 
MER JSBs/FJVBs ***1.1909 1.0803 1.2975 1.0603 1.3201 1.0163 1.3675 0.9983 0.8894 1.1071 0.8707 1.1297 0.8272 1.1745 
SOCBs versus FJVBs 
            
AER SOCBs/FJVBs **0.8419 0.7727 0.9537 0.7638 0.9738 0.7468 1.0126 0.9186 0.8603 1.0112 0.8538 1.0292 0.8379 1.0622 
MER SOCBs/FJVBs **0.8750 0.7933 0.9584 0.7790 0.9774 0.7393 1.0115 ***0.7931 0.6878 0.9022 0.6676 0.9199 0.6327 0.9482 
Notes: AER JSBs/SOCBs and MER JSBs/SOCBs are ratios of the aggregate and mean technical efficiency scores of JSBs over those of SOCBs respectively. 
The same logic can be used for the other pairs of bank groups. At each degree of significance there are two columns indicating the upper and lower bounds of 
the ratios. The ratios are significantly larger or smaller than unity at a significance degree if both its equivalent upper and lower bounds are larger or smaller than 
unity. The coefficients marked with ** or *** are significant at the 5% or 1% levels respectively. 
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It is worth noting that through ranking efficiency the relative performance of individual 
banks in a particular year can be compared in order to identify which are the most or 
least efficient. Table 5.10 below presents an efficiency ranking of Vietnamese banks 
in2012.Using the intermediation approach to inputs/outputs the state-owned and foreign 
owned bank groups are the most efficient. These include VCB (Joint Stock Commercial 
Bank for Foreign Trade of Vietnam), ICB (Vietnam Bank for Industry and Trade), 
BIDV (Bank for Investment and Development of Vietnam), Agribank (Vietnam Bank 
for Agriculture and Rural Development), HSBC (Hongkong and Shanghai Banking 
Corporation); HLB (Hong Leong Bank); Shinhan (Shinhan Commercial Bank); and 
VTB (Viet Thai Joint Venture Bank).The most inefficient banks are the JSBs, for 
example, SEA (Southeast Asia Commercial Joint Stock Bank). Under the operating 
approach the top ranked banks are a JSB (Southern Commercial Joint Stock Bank - 
PNA); two SOCBs (Bank for Investment and Development of Vietnam– BIDV and 
Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development Bank - Agribank) and one 
foreign bank (Shinhan bank). The lowest ranked positions mostly belong to the private 
banks group. Specifically, of the five least performing banks, four belong to the JSB 
group while the remaining one is a joint venture bank.   
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25Table 5.10: Efficiency Ranking of Vietnamese banks in 2012 
Intermediation approach   Operating approach 
Rank eff. Scores 
Bank 
name 
Bank  
type  
Rank eff. Scores 
Bank 
name 
Bank  
type 
1 1.0000 VCB SOCBs 
 
1 1.0000 PNA JSBs 
1 1.0000 ICB SOCBs 
 
1 1.0000 BIDV SOCBs 
1 1.0000 BIDV SOCBs 
 
1 1.0000 Agribank SOCBs 
1 1.0000 Agribank SOCBs 
 
1 1.0000 Shinhan FJVBs 
1 1.0000 HSBC FJVBs 
 
2 1.0039 ICB SOCBs 
1 1.0000 HLB FJVBs 
 
3 1.0156 HSBC FJVBs 
1 1.0000 Shinhan FJVBs 
 
4 1.0396 VCB SOCBs 
1 1.0000 VTB FJVBs 
 
5 1.0894 MB JSBs 
2 1.0204 MB JSBs 
 
6 1.1957 ACB JSBs 
3 1.0449 MDB JSBs 
 
7 1.2015 SACB JSBs 
4 1.0807 TCB JSBs 
 
8 1.2028 SEA JSBs 
5 1.0921 MRB JSBs 
 
9 1.2282 LVB JSBs 
6 1.1095 VIB JSBs 
 
10 1.2284 Exim JSBs 
7 1.1231 VPB JSBs 
 
11 1.2726 SGB JSBs 
8 1.1887 HDB JSBs 
 
12 1.2775 KLB JSBs 
9 1.1959 PGB JSBs 
 
13 1.2802 EAB JSBs 
10 1.2258 EAB JSBs 
 
14 1.2925 TCB JSBs 
11 1.2567 BVB JSBs 
 
15 1.2961 IVB FJVBs 
12 1.2612 IVB JSBs 
 
16 1.3169 VIB JSBs 
13 1.2783 SGB JSBs 
 
17 1.3415 DAB JSBs 
14 1.2972 VID FJVBs 
 
18 1.3595 HLB FJVBs 
15 1.3059 SACB JSBs 
 
19 1.3636 ABB JSBs 
16 1.3389 LVB JSBs 
 
20 1.3729 PGB JSBs 
17 1.3478 ACB JSBs 
 
21 1.3743 VPB JSBs 
18 1.4158 MHB JSBs 
 
22 1.3861 SHB JSBs 
19 1.4287 WB JSBs 
 
23 1.3863 MDB JSBs 
20 1.4408 Exim JSBs 
 
24 1.3898 BVB JSBs 
21 1.4451 NVB JSBs 
 
25 1.4049 HDB JSBs 
22 1.4526 NAMA JSBs 
 
26 1.417 WB JSBs 
23 1.4624 SHB JSBs 
 
27 1.4284 VID FJVBs 
24 1.4657 DAB JSBs 
 
28 1.4405 MRB JSBs 
25 1.4931 PNA JSBs 
 
29 1.4437 MHB JSBs 
26 1.4953 KLB JSBs 
 
30 1.4567 NAMA JSBs 
27 1.6341 ABB JSBs 
 
31 1.5196 NVB JSBs 
28 1.9046 SEA JSBs   32 1.8572 VTB FJVBs 
Notes: ABB: An Binh Commercial Joint Stock Bank; ACB: Asia Commercial Joint Stock Bank; 
Agribank: Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development Bank; BIDV: Bank for Investment and 
Development of Vietnam; BVB: Bao Viet Commercial Joint Stock Bank; DAB: Dai A Commercial Joint 
Stock Bank; EAB: East Asia Commercial Joint Stock Bank; EXIM: Vietnam Export and  Import 
Commercial Bank; HDB: Housing Development Commercial Joint Stock Bank; HLB: Hong Leong Bank; 
HSBC: Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation; ICB: Vietnam Bank for Industry and Trade; IVB: 
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International Vietnam Bank; KLB: Kien Long Commercial Joint Stock Bank; LVB: Lien Viet Bank; MB: 
Military Commercial Joint Stock Bank; MDB: Mekong Development Bank; MHB: Mekong Housing 
Bank; MRB: The Maritime Commercial Joint Stock Bank; NAMA: Nam A Commercial Joint Stock 
Bank; NVB: Nam Viet Commercial Joint Stock Bank; PGB: Petrolimex Group Commercial Joint Stock 
Bank; PNA: Southern Commercial Joint Stock Bank; SACB: Saigon Thuong Tin Commercial Joint Stock 
Bank; SEA: Southeast Asia Commercial Joint Stock Bank; SGB: Saigon Commercial Bank; SHB: 
Saigon-Hanoi Commercial Joint Stock Bank; Shinhan: Shinhan Commercial Bank; TCB: Viet Nam 
Technological and Commercial Joint Stock Bank; VCB: Joint Stock Commercial Bank for Foreign Trade 
of Vietnam; VID: Vid Public Joint Venture Bank; VPB: Vietnam Prosperity Commercial Joint Stock 
Bank; VTB: Viet Thai Joint Venture Bank: VIB: Vietnam International Commercial Joint Stock Bank: 
WB: Western Commercial Joint Stock Bank. 
 
5.4.2 Li test on the performance of bank groups 
To provide another insight on the differences in bank group performance the Li (1996) 
test is used to investigate whether accessibility to the production frontier is divergent 
across bank groups. Table 5.10 presents Li test results on the three pairs of bank groups 
under both the intermediation and operating approaches. 
The result for the first pair, being JSBs and SOCBs, shows that the two groups access 
the production frontier differently. The Li test statistics are 13.3329 and 14.0204 under 
the intermediation and operating approaches respectively. The p-value of both 
approaches are 0.0000 suggesting that the efficiency densities for the two groups are not 
equal. The same results are obtained for the JSB/FJVB pair. The p-value of Li statistics 
are 0.0020 and 0.0030 under the intermediation and operating approaches respectively, 
supporting an inequality of efficiency densities between the JSB and FJVB groups.   
The above inequalities could have resulted from different responses and treatments in 
the business environment which could explain the disparity of the groups‘ accessibility 
to the production frontier. In the context of Vietnam, where transition to a market 
economy is still at a relatively early stage, a level playing field for private and state-
owned banks has not been established. The State, by controlling and employing the 
banking sector as a means to achieve political outcomes, has given a lot of privileges to 
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the state-owned banks. In addition, the fact that the foreign cohort accesses the frontier 
differently again to their domestic counterparts can also be explained by the diversity of 
banking activities. The domestic banks mostly focus their activities on business lending 
while the foreign cohort diversifies their operations by providing a variety of services, 
for example, business and consumption lending, financial consulting and various types 
of international settlement. 
The Li tests for the final pair (SOCB versus FJVB) provide inconsistent results. Under 
the intermediation approach accessibility to the frontier for foreign and joint venture 
banks is the same as that of state-owned banks (the p-value are 0.6345) (see Table 5.11). 
Under the operating approach the p-value is 0.0420; thus, the H0 hypothesis is rejected 
at the 5% significance level highlighting the difference of capability to access the 
frontier in terms of maximising profit between the two groups.  
26Table 5.11: Li test on the technical efficiency density of bank groups 
 
  H0(f is density) Li test Decision on H0 
JSB and SOCB 
Intermediation approach f1(JSB) = f1(SOCB)  13.3329[0.0000] Reject H0 
Operating approach f2(JSB) = f2(SOCB)  14.0204[0.0000] Reject H0 
SOCB and FJVB 
Intermediation approach f1(SOCB) = f1(FJVB)  0.2979[0.6345] Do not reject Ho 
Operating approach f2(SOCB) = f2(FJVB)  1.1117[0.0420] Reject Ho 
JSB and FJVB 
Intermediation approach f1(JSB) = f1(FJVB) 3.2348 [0.0020] Reject Ho 
Operating approach f2(JSB) = f2(FJVB) 3.1730 [0.0030] Reject Ho 
Note: H0: densities of the two bank groups are equal. 
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Figure 5.3 shows the Kernel estimation densities of individual efficiency scores of 
banks belonging to different groups under the intermediation and operating approaches. 
The three groups are organised into pairs: JSBs versus SOCBs (see panel A and B); 
SOCBs versus FJVBs (see panel C and D) and JSBs versus FJVBs (see panel E and F). 
Each panel is a Cartesian coordinate system with the horizontal axis presenting 
technical efficiency scores and the vertical axis presenting densities. The curve inside 
the panel, demonstrating possible coordinates of efficiency scores and densities, shows 
how the distribution of these scores vary. Observing all the panels, it is clear that the 
curves are asymptotic to the horizontal lines when the efficiency score increases. 
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7Figure 5.3: Kernel estimation densities of individual efficiency scores 
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JSBs versus FJVBs 
 
 
Panel E 
 
 
 
Panel F 
 
5.5 Summary 
The objective of this chapter has been to describe the data used in this study including 
the inputs, outputs and explanatory variables. The performance of Vietnamese banks 
under the impact of WTO accession in 2007 is analysed with a comparison of efficiency 
between the pre- and post-WTO periods. The study has relied on data from Vietnamese 
banks for the period 2005–2012 and a bootstrap variant of the DEA estimator has been 
used to estimate efficiency. By using bootstrap techniques this study overcomes the 
downward-biased nature of DEA estimates and the results obtained are consistent and 
unbiased. For the efficiency measurement and analysis Matlab software was utilised. 
Using the Li (1996) and Simar and Zelenyuk (2007) tests the results show that bank 
efficiency is similar between the pre- and post-WTO periods as is access to the meta-
production frontier. These tests were also used to investigate the difference between 
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bank group performances and there is evidence to suggest that state-owned banks, under 
both input/output approaches, have performed the most efficiently, ahead of their 
foreign owned rivals, while domestic private banks are the least efficient when 
compared to the other two groups. 
The next chapter will concentrate on investigating variations of bank efficiency under 
the assumption that technology sets utilised by different bank groups can diverge. 
Furthermore, the productivity of the banking sector will be examined. 
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Chapter 6: Analysis of Vietnamese bank efficiency and productivity 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates the impact of environmental variables on the technical 
efficiency of the Vietnamese banking sector and also includes an empirical analysis of 
the productivity changes in the Vietnamese banking sector during the post-WTO entry 
period. This chapter investigates the impact of financial reforms, bank characteristics 
and time trends on the performance of the Vietnamese banking sector under the 
assumption that different types of ownership can result in a divergence of technology 
sets utilised by different bank groups. By combining a meta-frontier analysis with 
double-bootstrap two-stage DEA the impact of environmental variables on bank 
efficiency across separate groups operating under different technology sets can be 
analysed. Accordingly, this chapter employs ownership as an ex ante rather than an ex 
post factor as used in all earlier studies that examined the influence of this 
environmental variable on bank efficiency. In addition, an analysis of productivity is 
conducted by using a variant of the conventional Malmquist index which is based on the 
concept of aggregate technical efficiency. The relative importance of individual banks 
(weighting) is accounted for in the index. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows: Section 6.2 provides an analysis of the 
technology gap between each bank group frontier and the meta-frontier which is also 
the production frontier of the entire banking sector; an analysis of the impact of 
environmental variables on bank efficiency by a combination of the meta-frontier 
analysis approach and the double-bootstrap two-stage DEA method is presented in 
Section 6.3;productivity changes in the banking sector over the period 2007–2012 is 
 
 
188 
 
also measured by means of aggregate Malmquist indexes in Section 6.4; and lastly, a 
summary reviewing the chapter‘s contents is included in Section 6.5. 
6.2 Technology gap analysis 
Table 6.1 reveals that the production frontier of the JSB bank group is located furthest 
from the meta-frontier when compared with the other groups based on both basic and 
double-bootstrap two-stage DEA results and under the operating and intermediation 
input/output approaches. The evidence for this is that the mean and aggregate MTRs
71
 
are relatively smaller than those of the SOCB and FJVB groups. For instance, under the 
operating approach the JSB group‘s mean MTR estimated using the bias-corrected 
technical efficiency scores (0.9000) is smaller than the SOCB and FJVB groups (0.9476 
and 0.9585). It is obvious that it is more difficult for the JSB group, as compared to the 
other bank groups, to reach the meta-frontier. Equivalently, the SOCB and FJVB bank 
groups are better able to achieve the industry level of efficiency.  
O‘Donnell et al. (2008) attribute the technology gaps of different groups in general 
(classified by characteristics of the physical, social and economic environment) to the 
specific policies and programs adopted to improve efficiency. From the perspective of 
the Vietnamese banking sector, different policies have been applied to different bank 
groups in the post-WTO era that would likely result in different potential outcomes. For 
instance, business groups are allowed to take part in private banks. Accordingly, credit 
was channelled to projects that were relevant to the interests of these business groups 
rather than the best projects available, resulting in higher NPLs. A weak supervisory 
                                                 
71
 The aggregate MTRs are calculated as the ratio of the aggregate technical efficiency scores of groups 
estimated by group frontiers over those estimated by the meta-frontier. For details on calculating 
aggregate technical efficiency, see Subsection 4.3.2. 
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and regulatory framework has exacerbated this situation. No law on cross-ownership 
has been implemented and defaults relating to insider trading have not been detected in 
time. These issues are barriers that prevent JSBs from achieving the meta-frontier and 
serve to widen the technology gap between their frontier and the meta-frontier. 
Meanwhile, SOCBs, under the privatisation process, have conducted a number of 
measures aimed at improving their performance, such as equitising and selling shares to 
private sector, calling for foreign strategic investors and upgrading their standards of 
corporate governance and risk management.   
Using mean MTRs, conflicting results were obtained when comparing the technology 
gaps of the SOCB group frontier and the FJVB group frontier to the meta-frontier. If the 
operating approach is utilised the gap in the SOCB group is bigger than that of the 
FJVB group (0.9556 versus 0.9602 using basic DEA estimates or 0.9476 versus 0.9585 
using bias-corrected estimates). This difference can be explained by the fact that foreign 
and joint venture banks are better in terms of cost and risk management (Havrylchyk, 
2006; Lensinket al., 2008). Nevertheless, this result is in contrast to the case of applying 
the intermediation approach to calculate group MTRs. Under this approach, the MTR of 
the SOCB group is 0.9539, which is larger than that of the FJVB group (0.9400) using 
the basic DEA method. The result is similar when the bias-corrected estimates are 
considered.  
The aggregate MTRs obtained by basic and bootstrap DEA methods give inconsistent 
results when comparing the ratios of the SOCB versus FJVB groups. For example, 
under the operating approach, the aggregate MTR of SOCBs is larger than that of 
FJVBs (0.9920 versus 0.9652) employing basic DEA. However, the result is reversed 
when looking at the bootstrap DEA results (0.9515 versus 0.9675). The same 
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circumstance can be observed under the intermediation approach. The aforementioned 
inconsistency can be explained by the fact that aggregate technical efficiency takes into 
account the relative importance of each bank (as measured by bank output shares, see 
Subsection 4.3.2) when calculating the aggregate MTRs of groups while mean MTRs 
consider all banks equally.   
27Table 6.1: MTRs of Vietnamese bank groups for the period 2005–2012 
  
  
Operating approach  Intermediation approach 
Mean MTRs                 Aggregate MTRs       Mean MTRs                 Aggregate MTRs 
DEA DEA* DEA
 
DEA*
  DEA DEA* DEA
 
DEA*
 
JSB 0.9056 0.9000 0.9066 0.8984  0.8993 0.8842 0.8767 0.8652 
SOCB 0.9556 0.9476 0.9920 0.9515  0.9539 0.9468 0.9927 0.9708 
FJVB 0.9602 0.9585 0.9652 0.9675  0.9400 0.9202 0.9336 0.9830 
Notes: DEA and DEA* columns present MTRs estimated by basic and double-bootstrap two-stage DEA 
methods respectively. MTR is the meta-technology ratio. JSB is the joint stock bank group; SOCB is the 
state-owned bank group and FJVB is the foreign and joint venture bank group.  
 
6.3 Analysis of the impact of environmental variables on bank efficiency 
In this section bank efficiency scores are regressed against a set of variables including 
those proxied for bank characteristics, policy changes and the time trend. Four 
regression models are used including the meta model based on the meta-frontier and 
three group models based on the group frontier. The metamodel includes all the 
variables mentioned in Table 5.5. The JSB model excludes P (privatisation dummy) as 
privatisation only impacts the SOCB group. The SOCB model excludes BG (equity 
participation by business groups dummy) and RU (rural-urban transformed JSB 
dummy) because equity participation by business groups and rural-urban transformation 
only apply to JSB group members. Privatisation and selling equity to foreign strategic 
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investors as a component of the privatising process happened at the same time so it is 
impossible to distinguish between the P and FSI (domestic banks with foreign strategic 
investors) dummies in the SOCB model. Thus, the FSI dummy is excluded. All four 
reform measures (BG, P, FSI and RU) only occurred for domestic banks, resulting in 
their exclusion from the FJVB model. Table 6.2 below presents the empirical results for 
the impact of the explanatory variables on bank efficiency for both the operating and 
intermediation approaches. 
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28Table 6.2:  Regressing environmental variables on bank technical efficiency scores estimated by meta- and different group-frontiers using 
double-bootstrap two-stage DEA.
72
 
  
Operating approach Intermediation approach 
Meta model JSB model SOCB model FJVB model Meta model JSB model SOCB model FJVB model 
Intercept 1.2575*** 1.1258*** 1.3069*** 2.4120*** 2.3684*** 2.9128*** 2.0761*** 1.2274*** 
BG 0.0907* 0.1034*** 
  
0.0023 0.0632 
  
P -0.7375*** 
 
-0.1482** 
 
-1.0477*** 
 
0.7439*** 
 
FSI -0.0670 -0.0909** 
  
-0.0204 -0.0902 
  
RU 0.1280** 0.1025*** 
  
0.2603*** 0.2465** 
  
LA 0.4851*** 0.5146*** -0.3998*** -0.8174** -1.7541*** -2.8191*** -1.0977*** -0.4798 
EA 1.5087*** 0.8785*** 4.6005*** 0.9872** -0.0939 0.7490 8.8515** -1.8494** 
ROA -10.1884*** -8.5261*** -16.4308*** -34.3488*** -2.5402 -10.4705** -76.5449*** 10.4718* 
T -0.0512*** -0.0391*** -0.0095 -0.0418 -0.0258* -0.0949*** -0.1411*** 0.0635 
Notes: BG - JSBs with equity participation from business groups, P - SOCBs after privatisation of SOCBs, FSI - domestic banks with foreign strategic investors, RU - rural-
urban transformed JSBs, LA - loan to asset ratio, EA - equity to asset ratio, ROA - return on assets ratio, T - time trend variable. The coefficients with *, ** or *** are 
significant at 10, 5 or 1% respectively.   
                                                 
72
 For more detail on the confidence intervals of these coefficients, see Table B1 to Table B4 in Appendix B. 
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6.3.1 Impact of reform measures conducted in the post–WTO period on bank 
efficiency 
Participation in the banking sector of state-owned and private business groups (BG) 
One of the reform measures in the post-WTO period is that the SBV required 
commercial banks to intensively increase their capital. To catch up with the new capital 
requirement, numerous JSBs called for equity contributions from business groups. 
Subsequently, cross-ownership between banks and these industrial groups was 
established.
73
 
Under the operating approach the BG coefficient, representing the impact of this 
relationship, is positively significant in the case of the metamodel at the 10% level and 
is significant at the 1% level in the JSB model. Joint stock banks with equity 
participation from industrial groups are less efficient than other banks not only in the 
same group but also in the other groups. In the intermediation approach case the result 
is similar but insignificant. The deterioration of JSB efficiency due to cross-ownership 
can be explained by two points. First, cross-ownership can reduce competition by 
facilitating collusion among firms that can be implemented by exchanges of practical 
information and establishing collusive strategies (see Trivieri, 2007). This obstacle to 
competitiveness can lead to an inefficient allocation of a firm‘s resources. The second 
point is that under a weak supervisory and regulatory framework, such as Vietnam has, 
cross-ownership can result in poor governance and connected lending. This is explained 
by the agency problem where companies playing a role as major bank shareholders 
pursue different incentives that result in a misallocation of loans to projects they favour 
rather than monitoring these banks efficiently and appropriately (Laeven, 1999; 
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 For a detailed discussion of cross-ownership, see Chapter 2. 
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Williams and Nguyen, 2005). Other empirical studies also highlight the 
abovementioned points. For example, Laeven (1999) shows that company-owned and 
family-owned banks in East Asian countries (Thailand, The Philippines, Malaysia and 
Korea) are the most risky and were subject to restructuring plans in the post-EAFC 
period. 
Privatisation of SOCBs (P)  
The coefficient for variable P (indicating privatisation of SOCBs) is revealed to be 
negative (-0.7375) at the 1% level of significance for the metamodel under the operating 
approach. This result demonstrates that privatised SOCBs are more efficient in terms of 
profit maximisation than other banks regardless of their ownership. However, it is 
important to know whether SOCBs, after being privatised, perform better than non-
privatised SOCBs. Using the SOCB model the value of the P coefficient is negative (-
0.1482) and significant at 5%.Accordingly one can conclude that equitised SOCBs 
achieved higher efficiency than non-equitised SOCBs. It can be expected that 
privatisation in general, and the participation of foreign investors in particular, have 
improved the performance of SOCBs as the operations of these banks are based on 
commercial incentives. 
Under the intermediation approach and the meta model, the coefficient of P is negative 
(-1.0477) and significant at the 1% level indicating that privatised banks perform better 
than other banks belonging to different ownership types. However, the result is reversed 
in the SOCB model with a positive coefficient (0.7439). This implies that the privatised 
banks are less efficient than other SOCBs in terms of providing lending services. Some 
may argue that after being privatised the equitised banks become more cautious in their 
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operations under the supervision of domestic and foreign shareholders and, hence, they 
take less risks in their lending decisions. While intervention from central or local 
government on the operations of these banks is abandoned, this is not the case for the 
other non-equitised SOCBs which are still totally owned by the State. These purely 
state-owned banks find it easier to lend with support from the State and, therefore, they 
make loans under the direction of the government. This explains why they are more 
efficient when providing intermediation services but less efficient in terms of profit 
maximisation in comparison with privatised banks. 
Bonin et al. (2005b) show that partial privatisation of SOCBs, in the cases of Vietnam 
and China where the State retains a controlling interest, cannot generate a performance 
improvement since, as the dominant shareholder, the State is continuously in a strong 
position to run the banks and subsequently there is no change in corporate governance. 
Furthermore, Kraft et al. (2006) found that comprehensive privatisation of public banks 
but incorporating no management modifications can result in a poorer performance in 
comparison with other bank ownership types. This study and that conducted by Berger 
et al. (2009) for the case of China under the impact of WTO entry, contradict Bonin et 
al. and suggest a positive influence of partial privatisation on SOCB performance. In the 
case of a less transparent environment, like that of Vietnam and China, SOCBs have to 
increase the quality of their management when being privatised to satisfy the standards 
of joint stock companies and as privatisation is in parallel with IPOs, they must upgrade 
accountability by publishing and announcing financial reports. These requirements push 
the SOCBs to improve their efficiency and competitiveness. 
Foreign strategic investors (FSI) 
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In the case of the JSB model, under the operating approach, the nexus between bank 
efficiency and FSI is a negative result, significant at 5%. A similar result, but not 
significant, is found in the meta model. Under the intermediation approach the 
relationship is also negative but insignificant in both the meta and JSB models. It seems 
that the participation of foreign investors helps private banks improve their efficiency. 
This finding is in line with Berger et al. (2009) where they found a positive relationship 
between minority foreign ownership and bank performance in the Chinese banking 
sector. Berger et al. investigated mechanisms that transfer the positive impacts of minor 
foreign ownership onto domestic bank efficiency. One mechanism is that minority 
foreign shareholders can attain positions on the boards of directors of banks and use 
these positions to improve the quality of corporate governance and risk management. 
The other mechanism is that, through overseas strategic investors, domestic banks are 
encouraged and more confident to go public and list equity products on the stock 
exchange.   
Transforming rural JSBs to urban JSBs (RU) 
Transformed JSBs perform more inefficiently than not only other JSBs but also than 
banks belonging to any other ownership form. The evidence for this is that estimates of 
the RU parameters are positive at 0.1280 (5% significance level) and 0.1025 (1% 
significance level) under the meta and JSB models respectively when the operating 
approach is applied. In the case of the intermediation approach, these estimates are also 
positive at 0.2603 (1% significance level) when estimated by the meta model and 
0.2465 (5% significance level) when estimated by the JSB model. There are two 
possible reasons for this. First, governance capability is inadequate. Transformed banks 
have to cover a significantly larger range of operations than they had done before. To 
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become urban banks their customer base and assets had to increase many times over in 
only two or three years and many branches were opened nationwide. The second is that 
insufficiently selective decisions by the SBV on awarding licences to rural banks 
resulted in a rapid growth of credit by inexperienced bankers which leading to risk 
taking and failure to adequately diversify their assets. In reality, many of the small 
transformed JSBs used the bulk of their credit to purchase property and stocks. 
6.3.2 Specific bank characteristics (control variables) 
 
Loan to asset ratio (LA) 
Hasan and Marton (2003) see the LA variable as a proxy that captures variations in 
traditional banking services. Under the intermediation approach a positive association 
(negative result) between the loan to asset ratio and bank efficiency across the meta and 
three group models is found. This outcome is in line with the research conducted by 
Chortareas et al. (2013) supporting the argument that banks engaging more in 
traditional activities are more efficient. This can be explained by an expansionary 
monetary policy that was implemented to stimulate economic growth during the pre- 
and post-WTO periods and the fact that loans represent the bulk of bank assets. 
Domestic banks were in a race to expand branches nationwide and attract deposits from 
households and corporations. Under constraints relating to human and physical 
resources, banks maximised their capabilities of providing intermediation services and 
expected that the loans would bring back high profitability. This expectation can be 
examined by using the profit criteria of efficiency.  
Under the operating approach the regression results demonstrate a diversity of bank 
group responses to the LA variable. In the JSB model the estimate of the LA parameter 
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is 0.5146 at the 1% significance level, indicating a negative relationship. By contrast a 
positive association is obtained with an estimated parameter value of -0.3998 at the 
same 1% level in the case of SOCBs and -0.8174 at the 5% level in the case of the 
FJVB model. The different responses to LA can be clarified based on the characteristic 
of liquidity. The liquidity of private banks is in serious trouble
74
 which is not the case 
for the two other groups. In the illiquid condition, Altunbas et al. (2000) consider the 
loan to asset ratio as a proxy for liquidity risk that raises the cost of attracting deposits 
and borrowing. Thus, the negative relationship could indicate that the less efficient 
banks are more illiquid as recorded in the JSB model. However, the view of Altunbaset 
al. (2000) cannot be applied in the SOCB and FJVB models due to the more liquid 
condition of these two groups. Instead, the author follows the view of Hasan and 
Marton (2003) on the transaction cost of shifting into non-traditional assets
75
. Banks, 
when decreasing traditional assets (loans and advances) and increasing non-traditional 
assets (investments and securities), incurred higher costs; hence, a lower LA ratio can 
result in lower profitability.  
Equity to asset ratio (EA) 
The equity to asset ratio is a criterion to identify the financial soundness of a bank and a 
banking system. A bank with a higher EA ratio is safer in terms of capital and is in a 
stronger position to defend risks relating to equity losses. In the literature, the positive 
link between capital strength and efficiency is theoretically explained. According to 
Jeitschko and Jeung (2005), the managers of banks with less capital have more 
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 During the credit boom period (2005−2010) in Vietnam, the interest rate on the interbank market 
reached a record high of 30%/year caused by a high demand for cash from illiquid JSBs (Pincus, 2009; 
NAEC, 2012).   
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 The 2005−2012 period witnessed a significant change in banks‘ asset structure. On average, the portion 
of traditional assets decreased from 61% in 2005 to 51% in 2012. 
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incentives to engage in moral hazards because they face less shareholder scrutiny than 
banks with higher capital ratios. Berger and De Young (1997) point out that banks with 
higher risk levels in the medium-term have to employ more inputs to administer these 
higher risks which results in a decline of efficiency. Regulators can also force banks to 
increase capital and adequately account for risk-related costs commensurate with the 
degree of risk taken (Gropp and Heider, 2010). The mainstream empirical studies 
support a positive association between capital and efficiency (e.g, Fries and Taci, 2005; 
Fiordelisi et al., 2011).    
However, in a shallow and weak regulatory/supervisory framework like Vietnam‘s, 
these relationships may be reversed. Risk-related costs and equity can be inadequately 
accounted for; thus, figures on bank profitability are not commensurate with the level of 
risk (Laeven, 1999). Moreover, outdated Vietnamese accounting standards have not 
caught up with risks occurring within banks (IMF, 2012). These factors implicitly 
stimulate banks to provide more intermediate services (especially loans) and obtain a 
higher rate of return. This cycle is repeated many times and creates a negative 
relationship between capital and efficiency. Banks that have lower equity to asset ratio, 
will provide more intermediate services to customers and achieve a higher level of 
profitability. Under the operating approach, all four models give similar and significant 
results, showing a negative association (positive result) between the EA ratio and bank 
efficiency.
76
 
It is worth noting that domestic banks react differently to the EA variable when 
compared with their foreign rivals under the intermediation approach. A negative 
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 Rossi et al. (2009) also found a negative relationship between capital and efficiency using the Granger-
causality methodology to investigate the impact of diversification of bank size/industry on cost/profit 
efficiency, capital and risk in Austria from 1997−2003. 
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association between the EA and bank efficiency in domestic banks (significant in the 
case of the SOCB model but insignificant in the JSB model) was obtained. This can be 
explained by the expansionary monetary policy implemented in the pre- and post-WTO 
era. Domestic banks were encouraged to lend to the economy in order to stimulate 
economic growth. However, this result is reversed in the FJVB model due to the 
limitations on attracting deposits and lending in Vietnamese dong imposed on foreign 
and joint venture banks. 
Return on assets (ROA) 
ROA is the ratio of before-tax profit to total assets and is used to measure bank 
profitability. The meta model and the other three group models come to a consensus 
with a positive relationship between ROA and bank efficiency under the operating 
approach, employing interest and non-interest revenues as outputs and interest and non-
interest costs as inputs. This result is also consistent with that obtained by Das and 
Ghosh (2006) and Fang et al. (2011). 
Nevertheless, these results are reversed if the banks‘ capability to provide 
intermediation services is used as the criterion. ROA is positively related to bank 
efficiency in the JSB and SOCB models with the relevant coefficients of -10.4705 (5% 
significance level) and -76.5449 (1% significance level) respectively. This result shows 
that the bulk of domestic banks‘ revenues are created from lending activities. 
Meanwhile, the profitability of foreign rivals reacts negatively to bank efficiency. The 
proof is that the relevant coefficient in the FJVB model is 10.4718 which is significant 
at the 10% level. This is because interest revenue is not a major item and, due to the 
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diversification of banking services, the profit of foreign and joint venture banks is less 
dependent on lending services than the domestic banks.    
Time trend (T) 
The private banks‘ efficiency increased during the period 2005–2012. The evidence for 
this is that the coefficients of the time trend variable are -0.0391 (1% significance) 
and -0.0949 (1% significance) under both the operating and intermediation approaches 
respectively.  Only when using the intermediation approach in the SOCB model can an 
increasing trend of bank efficiency be observed. By contrast, changes of bank efficiency 
in the FJVB model under both approaches are not revealed. The time trend under meta-
models is not obvious (increasing or decreasing), and this result is in line those in 
section 5.3 that there is no significant change in terms of efficiency between the pre- 
and post-WTO periods. 
6.4 Productivity analysis using the aggregate Malmquist total factor productivity 
index 
Due to the fact that the data sample is unbalanced and balanced data is necessary to 
capture productivity over time, a number of banks with the necessary data covering the 
years 2007–2012 are chosen. Foreign banks which only started operating in Vietnam 
from 2009 were omitted due to their short time period in the market. This leaves 24 
banks, consisting of five SOCBs and 19 JSBs, in the sample which can be used for 
productivity analysis. Using both the intermediation and operating approaches, 
productivity changes and its component changes for each group as well as the whole 
banking sector is now measured and compared. 
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6.4.1 Intermediation approach 
 
In general, when viewed under the intermediation approach, banking sector productivity 
has slightly regressed (see Table 6.3). This is because the AMPI is 0.9770 indicating 
that productivity decreased 2.3% per year during the period from 2007–2012. The 
reason for this trend can be found by analysing changes in the productivity components. 
The index of aggregate efficiency change is 1.0049 and this is very close to unity 
suggesting that the efficiency of the banking sector has remained constant. Thus, the 
change of productivity is mostly explained by the other component, technology, with 
the technical change index being 0.9722 implying a 2.88% decrease per year. The 
negative technology change effect is more serious for JSBs than for SOCBs. Technical 
change
77
 declined at an annual rate of 4.37% in the case of JSBs which is much greater 
than the 1.31% decline in the case of SOCBs. 
The technology regression can be explained in two ways. First, although the period 
2000–2005 witnessed a booming growth of Automatic Teller Machines (ATMs) and all 
banks applied core banking software to manage their banking operations, electronic 
transactions over the Internet, up to now, have been very limited due to a lack of 
regulation and legalisation. Second, the quality of bank governance has not improved 
over the period. Due to cross-ownership between business groups and JSBs a number of 
senior positions in these banks are held by representatives coming from industry who 
are less experienced in the financial sector. Foreign investors are allowed to join the 
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 Oh and Lee (2010) apply the meta-frontier approach in the context of Malmquist index. And they use 
BPC (best practice change) index to measure the technology change within a group. Furthermore, to 
examine which groups leading the growth in the industry, Oh and Lee (2010) use the TGR (technology 
gap ratio) and TGC (technology gap change). Although their method has advantages when investigating 
the technology changes in groups but it cannot be applied in my thesis. This is because the number of 
banks in the SOCB group is too small, five banks; hence, if estimating the SOCB group frontier, it would 
lead to unreliable results.  
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banking sector, but only as minority shareholders. Under the regulations set by the 
government the maximum equity that can be bought by foreigners is 30%. This 
restriction has inhibited long term involvement by foreign investors in the development 
of the banking sector and in terms of technology transfer. 
The finding of technical regression is in line with the study of Nguyen and Simioni 
(2015) when they used the Färe-Primont index to measure Vietnamese banking 
productivity during the 2008−2012 period. They attribute the technical regression to 
changes occurring in the business environment of banks with two particular major 
challenges. First, Vietnam has faced macroeconomic instability since 2007 with a 
double-digit inflation rate, large trade and fiscal deficits and substantial volatility in 
exchange and interest rates (WB, 2012).
78
 These uncertainties increase market-risk 
relevant costs which cannot be avoided and all banks, including the best practice ones, 
suffer. Second, a high level of non-performing loans has deteriorated banks‘ capacity to 
provide intermediation services. Increasing the proportion of bad debts in total bank 
assets leads to a decline of credit that could otherwise be utilised for new projects.
79
 
In particular, the trend of productivity of the private and public banks is decreasing at 
2.25% and 1.35% respectively. These decreases are mainly explained by technical 
regression at the rates of 4.37% for JSBs and 1.31% for SOCBs. While there was 
seemingly no improvement in efficiency of public banks (with a 0.9996 efficiency 
index), the level of efficiency has increased at an annual rate of 2.21% in their private 
rivals. 
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 The negative real interest rate due to high inflation discouraged depositors from keeping their money in 
banks. Instead, they withdrew their deposits and invested in more profitable assets such as property or 
gold (NAEC, 2012).   
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 For details on bad loans, credit growth and a review of the Vietnamese banking sector during the 
2007−2012 period, see Chapter 2. 
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One may argue that even though private banks have witnessed a large declining trend in 
productivity and technical regression, the JSBs, on average, have experienced an 
increase in technical efficiency. These seemingly conflicting issues can be reconciled by 
the fact that JSBs have benefited from the expansionary monetary policy conducted 
from 2007−2011. The private banks broadened their geographical scope, built more 
offices and recruited more staff. More deposits were attracted and more loans were 
provided. Accordingly, efficiency increased continuously till 2011 (see Table 6.3). In 
2011, the government changed monetary policy from being expansionary to being 
contractionary and, as a result, efficiency in the 2012/2011 period decreased. During the 
expansionary period (2007−2011) which was characterised by macroeconomic 
turmoil
80
, there was no significant or positive change of technology, quality of 
governance or risk management; therefore, the period observed a regression of technical 
factors in the JSB group (NAEC, 2012). The increasing efficiency factor (2.21%/year) 
is smaller than the rate of technical regression (4.37%/year); hence, overall, the 
productivity of the JSBs declined. 
29Table 6.3: Productivity of the Vietnamese banking sector over the years 2007–2012 
under the intermediation approach 
  08//07 09//08 10//09 11//10 12//11 07—12 
AMPI(JSBs) 0.8996 1.0153 1.1499 0.8870 0.9579 0.9775 
AEFCH(JSBs) 1.0475 1.0222 1.0375 1.0351 0.9700 1.0221 
ATECH(JSBs) 0.8588 0.9932 1.1084 0.8569 0.9875 0.9563 
AMPI(SOCBs) 0.9202 0.9653 1.0344 0.9493 1.0711 0.9865 
AEFCH(SOCBs) 1.0000 1.0000 0.9942 0.9991 1.0047 0.9996 
ATECH(SOCBs) 0.9202 0.9653 1.0404 0.9502 1.0660 0.9869 
AMPI(All) 0.9108 0.9716 1.0774 0.9178 1.0170 0.9770 
AEFCH(All) 1.0132 0.9991 1.0065 1.0164 0.9894 1.0049 
ATECH(All) 0.8990 0.9725 1.0704 0.9030 1.0278 0.9722 
Notes: AMPI: Aggregate Malmquist Productivity Index; AEFCH: aggregate efficiency change; ATECH: 
aggregate technical change; JSBs: joint stock banks; SOCBs: state-owned commercial banks. 
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 During the period 2007−2011,the inflation rate was a two-digit number. In 2008, this rate is quite high 
at 23%.  
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6.4.2 Operating approach 
 
Productivity of the banking sector under the operating approach has changed between 
private and state-owned banks. On average, SOCBs have improved their performance at 
a rate of 1.43% annually (see Table 6.4) over the period 2007–2012. This productivity 
increase is explained primarily by changes in technology, which grew at 1.49% per 
year. Meanwhile, the efficiency factor changed only slightly during the same period (the 
efficiency component index is 0.9994, equivalent to a 0.06% decrease). This technical 
progress can be explained by the fact that four of the five SOCBs were equitised and 
their equity was listed in the stock exchange during the period 2005–2008. When they 
went public, their operations had to be properly restructured to comply with the strict 
regulations of the Vietnam Security Commission on accounting standards and financial 
and operating reports. The participation of domestic and foreign investors also pushed 
the SOCBs to improve their productivity as they expected to receive a higher rate of 
return on their investments. However, there is a question on the conflicting performance 
of SOCBs under the two input/output approaches as it was found to decline under the 
intermediation approach. During the equitisation process the SOCBs were forced to turn 
from policy-based to commercial-based banking activity, and their priority became 
profit, not how best to provide loans for economic growth. Bad loans were resolved 
when policy lending was transferred to two specific banks - the Vietnam Development 
Bank and the Vietnam Bank for Social Policies. Moreover, foreign strategic investors 
play a substantive role in applying advanced technology, risk management and bank 
governance when their representatives hold high-ranking positions in SOCBs. These 
positive changes explain why the rate of NPLs significantly decreased and resulted in 
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lower costs for loan-loss provisioning in particular and a decrease of total operating 
costs in general.  
In contrast, the JSBs regressed at a faster rate, 4.67% each year, due to decreases of both 
efficiency (-1.63%) and technical change (-3.09%). There are three main reasons that 
led to this performance regression in the private banks. First, the SBV substantially 
loosened its regulations when permitting 13 rural banks to transform into urban banks in 
2006–2007 (NAEC, 2012). The quality of management in these banks was problematic 
and could not keep up with their substantially larger scope of operations. Before being 
transformed, they had focused on rural areas and most of their loans were allocated to 
agricultural activities. On becoming urban banks, they provided services nationwide to 
any economic field including commerce and industry. Operating on a larger scope but 
with an unchanged quality of management explains the low efficiency of these 
transformed banks. Second, cross-ownership between banks and industrial groups 
deteriorated bank performance. Under pressure from the SBV to recapitalise, small 
JSBs had to increase their capital levels by up to 10 times in a five-year period (NAEC, 
2012). Calling for equity participation from large banks, private business groups and 
SOEs became a popular option which, in return, resulted in complicated cross-
ownerships with JSBs (NAEC, 2012; IMF, 2012). Most loans were allocated to related 
parties rather than to the most profitable projects, resulting in a higher non-performing 
loan rates for JSBs
81
. In a general sense, this poor allocation of financial resources led to 
an inevitable loss of GDP growth. A lack of regulation on cross-ownership and the 
weak capability of supervisory departments worsened this situation. Third, a collapse of 
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 For example, 80% of total loans of the First bank ,  a JSB, was lent to its holding company and 40% of 
the total loan is non-performing and this data was recorded at the end of 2010 (NAEC, 2012). 
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speculative markets, such as real estate or stock, subsequently created mounting bad 
loans and worsened the profitability of JSBs.
82
   
Under the operating approach to data, the Vietnamese banking sector witnessed 
regression over the years 2007–2012. Specifically, the sector‘s productivity decreased 
1.19% and this can be decomposed into an efficiency change of -0.91% and technical 
change of -0.28%. Although public banks experienced progress, it was not enough to 
offset the decline in productivity of the JSBs. 
30Table 6.4: Productivity of the Vietnamese banking sector over the years 2007–2012 
under the operating approach 
  08//07 09//08 10//09 11//10 12//11 07—12 
AMPI(JSBs) 0.7673 1.0972 1.0082 0.9320 0.9953 0.9533 
AEFCH(JSBs) 0.8892 1.1003 0.9961 1.0019 0.9435 0.9837 
ATECH(JSBs) 0.8630 0.9972 1.0122 0.9302 1.0549 0.9691 
AMPI(SOCBs) 1.0845 1.0174 0.9712 1.0111 0.9910 1.0143 
AEFCH(SOCBs) 0.9755 1.0223 1.0004 1.0003 0.9992 0.9994 
ATECH(SOCBs) 1.1117 0.9953 0.9708 1.0109 0.9918 1.0149 
AMPI(All) 0.9513 1.0460 0.9850 0.9765 0.9842 0.9881 
AEFCH(All) 0.9416 1.0496 0.9965 1.0024 0.9677 0.9909 
ATECH(All) 1.0103 0.9966 0.9884 0.9742 1.0170 0.9972 
Notes: AMPI: Aggregate Malmquist Productivity Index; AEFCH: aggregate efficiency change; ATECH: 
aggregate technical change; JSBs: joint stock banks; SOCBs: state-owned commercial banks. 
6.5 Productivity analysis using the Hicks−Moorsteen total factor productivity 
index 
6.5.1 Intermediation approach 
Table 6.5 lists the geometric average values of different measures of the banks‘ TFP 
changes and its components under the intermediation approach to input/output data. An 
average value of the Hicks−Moorsteen index greater than unity indicates an 
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 The Vietnam stock market index (VNI) plummeted  from a peak of 1197 points in November 2007 to 
bottom out at 235.50 points (equal to approximately one fifth of the peak) in February 2009 (NAEC, 
2012).. 
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improvement and less than unity implies a regress of the measure. The average value of 
the TFP index over the years 2007−2012 is 0.9609, indicating a decrease of the banking 
sector‘s productivity by 3.91%. This decrease is due to a large technical regress of this 
industry with the component index at 0.8537, indicating a decreasing rate of 14.63%. 
This decrease is only partially offset by an increase of overall productive efficiency 
(TFPE) by 12.55%.  
Both bank groups experienced a decrease of productivity. Private banks experienced a 
productivity decline of 2.19% while their public counterparts witnessed a productivity 
deterioration of 5.6%. Both groups experienced technical regress and an overall 
efficiency improvement. The two components of TFP efficiency including output-
oriented technical efficiency (OTE) and output-oriented scale-mix efficiency (OSME) 
improved. In detail the values of dOTE and dOSME are 1.0103 and 1.1140, and both 
values are greater than unity. This result shows that the Vietnamese banking sector 
improved its management and positively changed the structure and scale of services 
provided to their customers in the aftermath of WTO entry. However, the observed 
changes in overall productive efficiency originated mainly from scale and mix 
efficiency in comparison to technical efficiency (11.40% versus 1.03%). 
 Table 6.6 shows the development of output-oriented scale and mix efficiency and its 
components following the decomposition as mentioned in equations (4.53) and (4.54). 
OSME of the whole banking system, on average, increased by 11.4% annually over the 
period 2007−2012. Moreover, the results also recorded a higher OSME rate for the JSBs 
group at 12.97% while it is 9.86% for the case of SOCBs. This increase in scale and 
mix efficiency can be mainly explained by an equal increase in scale efficiency, whether 
measured directly by OSE (11.49%) or residually by ROSE (10.83%). In fact, mix 
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efficiency seems to be unchanged over the period as dOME (1.0054) and dRME(0.9993) 
are very close to unity.  
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31Table 6.5: Changes in total factor productivity and its components using the 
Hicks−Moorsteen Index under the intermediation approach 
  08//07 09//08 10//09 11//10 12//11 07—12 
dHMI (JSBs) 0.8229 1.0518 1.1957 0.8640 1.0014 0.9781 
dTech(JSBs) 0.4965 1.0307 1.1420 0.8404 0.8941 0.8482 
dTFPE(JSBs) 1.6575 1.0206 1.0470 1.0281 1.1199 1.1532 
dOTE(JSBs) 1.0550 1.0149 1.0414 1.0116 0.9826 1.0208 
dOSME(JSBs) 1.5711 1.0055 1.0055 1.0163 1.1397 1.1297 
dHMI (SOCBs) 0.9095 0.8428 1.0210 0.9294 1.0308 0.9440 
dTech(SOCBs) 0.4898 1.0170 1.3866 0.8368 0.8106 0.8593 
dTFPE(SOCBs) 1.8570 0.8287 0.7363 1.1106 1.2716 1.0986 
dOTE(SOCBs) 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
dOSME(SOCBs) 1.8570 0.8287 0.7363 1.1106 1.2716 1.0986 
dHMI (All) 0.8651 0.9415 1.1049 0.8961 1.0160 0.9609 
dTech(All) 0.4931 1.0238 1.2583 0.8386 0.8514 0.8537 
dTFPE(All) 1.7544 0.9196 0.8780 1.0685 1.1934 1.1255 
dOTE(All) 1.0271 1.0074 1.0205 1.0058 0.9913 1.0103 
dOSME(All) 1.7081 0.9128 0.8604 1.0624 1.2039 1.1140 
Notes: dHMI: Hicks−Moorsteen index change; dTech: technical change; dTFPE: TFP efficiency change; 
dOTE: output-oriented technical efficiency change; dOSME: output-oriented scale-mix efficiency change; 
JSBs: joint stock banks; SOCBs: state-owned commercial banks. 
32Table 6.6: Changes in output-oriented scale-mix efficiency under the intermediation 
approach 
  08//07 09//08 10//09 11//10 12//11 07—12 
dOSME(JSBs) 1.5711 1.0055 1.0055 1.0163 1.1397 1.1297 
dOME(JSBs) 1.0299 1.0035 1.0203 1.0026 0.9865 1.0084 
dROSE(JSBs) 1.5255 1.0020 0.9854 1.0136 1.1553 1.1202 
dOSE(JSBs) 1.5950 1.0142 0.9841 1.0541 1.0959 1.1296 
dRME(JSBs) 0.9850 0.9915 1.0217 0.9641 1.0400 1.0001 
dOSME(SOCBs) 1.8570 0.8287 0.7363 1.1106 1.2716 1.0986 
dOME(SOCBs) 1.0038 0.9966 1.0304 0.9954 0.9845 1.0020 
dROSE(SOCBs) 1.8500 0.8315 0.7146 1.1158 1.2916 1.0964 
dOSE(SOCBs) 1.9176 0.8400 0.7035 1.1106 1.2815 1.1003 
dRME(SOCBs) 0.9684 0.9866 1.0467 1.0000 0.9923 0.9985 
dOSME(All) 1.7081 0.9128 0.8604 1.0624 1.2039 1.1140 
dOME(All) 1.0167 1.0010 1.0254 0.9990 0.9855 1.0054 
dROSE(All) 1.6800 0.9128 0.8392 1.0635 1.2216 1.1083 
dOSE(All) 1.7489 0.9230 0.8321 1.0820 1.1851 1.1149 
dRME(All) 0.9767 0.9890 1.0341 0.9819 1.0159 0.9993 
Notes: dOSME: output-oriented scale-mix efficiency change; dOME: output-oriented mix efficiency 
change; dROSE: residual output-oriented scale efficiency change; dOSE: output-oriented scale efficiency 
change; dRME: residual mix efficiency change; JSBs: joint stock banks; SOCBs: state-owned commercial 
banks. 
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6.5.2 Operating approach 
Table 6.7 presents changes in TFP and its components under the operating approach. 
The productivity of Vietnamese banks as measured by the Hicks−Moorsteen index 
experienced a decline by 2.49%/year during the years after WTO entry. This decline is 
mostly explained by technical regress at a decreasing rate of 13.18%. Even though the 
period witnessed an improvement of overall efficiency, increasing at a rate of 12.3%, 
this was inadequate to offset technical regress. Components of efficiency experienced 
different changes. While technical efficiency of the banking sector suffered a slight 
deterioration (dOTE=0.9941) the two other efficiencies, including scale and mix 
efficiency, achieved progress (dOSME=1.1297). 
Table 6.8 shows results on how the OSME can be decomposed into two relevant 
components. Similar to the results under the intermediation approach the change of 
OSME is mostly due to scale efficiency that is either measured directly by dOSE or 
residually by dROSE, the respective rates of increase are 11.82% and 11.36%. The 
impact of mix efficiency is insignificant using both the OME and RME criterions; 
accordingly, they contributed only 1.45% and 1.03% to OSME growth, respectively. It 
is worth noting that the change of OSME is quite different across JSBs and SOCBs. 
While the data recorded a substantial change of OSME in private banks (22.81%) this is 
trivial in the case of their public rivals (3.91%). 
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33Table 6.7: Changes in total factor productivity and its components using the 
Hicks−Moorsteen Index under the operating approach 
  08//07 09//08 10//09 11//10 12//11 07—12 
dHMI (JSBs) 0.8063 1.0387 1.0627 0.8667 1.0621 0.9609 
dTech(JSBs) 0.6999 0.6721 1.1035 0.5270 1.1377 0.7918 
dTFPE(JSBs) 1.1521 1.5456 0.9630 1.6447 0.9336 1.2136 
dOTE(JSBs) 0.9126 1.0812 0.9888 1.0122 0.9544 0.9882 
dOSME(JSBs) 1.2625 1.4295 0.9739 1.6248 0.9783 1.2281 
dHMI (SOCBs) 0.9167 1.0172 0.9320 0.9409 1.1595 0.9894 
dTech(SOCBs) 0.7015 0.7196 1.2641 0.5899 2.0785 0.9521 
dTFPE(SOCBs) 1.3067 1.4134 0.7373 1.5951 0.5578 1.0391 
dOTE(SOCBs) 0.9742 1.0264 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
dOSME(SOCBs) 1.3412 1.3770 0.7373 1.5951 0.5578 1.0391 
dHMI (All) 0.8598 1.0279 0.9952 0.9030 1.1098 0.9751 
dTech(All) 0.7007 0.6954 1.1811 0.5575 1.5378 0.8682 
dTFPE(All) 1.2270 1.4780 0.8426 1.6197 0.7217 1.1230 
dOTE(All) 0.9429 1.0534 0.9944 1.0061 0.9769 0.9941 
dOSME(All) 1.3013 1.4030 0.8474 1.6099 0.7387 1.1297 
Notes: dHMI: Hicks−Moorsteen index change; dTech: technical change; dTFPE: TFP efficiency change; 
dOTE: output-oriented technical efficiency change; dOSME: output-oriented scale-mix efficiency change; 
JSBs: joint stock banks; SOCBs: state-owned commercial banks. 
34Table 6.8: Changes in output-oriented scale-mix efficiency under the operating 
approach 
  08//07 09//08 10//09 11//10 12//11 07—12 
dOSME(JSBs) 1.2625 1.4295 0.9739 1.6248 0.9783 1.2281 
dOME(JSBs) 0.9801 1.0071 1.0539 1.0165 1.0492 1.0210 
dROSE(JSBs) 1.2882 1.4194 0.9241 1.5985 0.9324 1.2029 
dOSE(JSBs) 1.2509 1.4029 0.9741 1.6111 0.9868 1.2214 
dRME(JSBs) 1.0093 1.0190 0.9998 1.0085 0.9914 1.0056 
dOSME(SOCBs) 1.3412 1.3770 0.7373 1.5951 0.5578 1.0391 
dOME(SOCBs) 0.9743 0.9695 1.0017 1.0885 1.0103 1.0080 
dROSE(SOCBs) 1.3767 1.4203 0.7360 1.4655 0.5521 1.0309 
dOSE(SOCBs) 1.2555 1.4864 0.7014 1.5374 0.5589 1.0238 
dRME(SOCBs) 1.0683 0.9264 1.0511 1.0376 0.9982 1.0150 
dOSME(All) 1.3013 1.4030 0.8474 1.6099 0.7387 1.1297 
dOME(All) 0.9772 0.9881 1.0275 1.0519 1.0295 1.0145 
dROSE(All) 1.3317 1.4199 0.8247 1.5305 0.7175 1.1136 
dOSE(All) 1.2532 1.4441 0.8266 1.5738 0.7426 1.1182 
dRME(All) 1.0384 0.9716 1.0252 1.0229 0.9948 1.0103 
Notes: dOSME: output-oriented scale-mix efficiency change; dOME: output-oriented mix efficiency 
change; dROSE: residual output-oriented scale efficiency change; dOSE: output-oriented scale efficiency 
change; dRME: residual mix efficiency change; JSBs: joint stock banks; SOCBs: state-owned commercial 
banks. 
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In summary, there is a consensus under both approaches to input/output data on the 
change of productivity as measured by the Hicks−Moorsteen TFP index as well as the 
causes of this change in the Vietnamese banking sector over the period 2007−2012. 
There is evidence that the banking system experienced productivity deterioration mainly 
due to technical regress. Although an improvement of TFP efficiency is recorded it was 
inadequate to offset the technology factor. Amongst a variety of efficiency measures, 
scale efficiency appears to be the most significant component contributing to the growth 
of overall productive efficiency.  
The results based on both the Malmquist and Hicks−Moorsteen TFP index reveal a 
similarity about developments in the productivity of Vietnamese banks during the 
2007−2012 period, which declined and the main cause of which is technical regress 
according to both approaches. However, due to the fact that the Malmquist index is not 
multiplicatively complete, other measures of efficiency, including scale and mix 
efficiency, cannot be seen via this approach (O‘Donnell, 2012a). Consequently, results 
for Vietnamese banking productivity, as measured by the Malmquist index, are biased 
and incomplete.  
6.6 Summary 
By combining a meta-frontier analysis and a double-bootstrap two-stage DEA method 
this study measured and analysed the technology gap to the meta-frontier of each bank 
group frontier. The results showed that JSBs have the greatest technology gap in 
comparison with their public and foreign counterparts under both input/output 
approaches. SOCBs find it easier to mimic the industry frontier under the intermediation 
approach compared with FJVBs; however, the result is reversed when applying the 
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operating approach. Based on the meta and group models the impact on bank efficiency 
of environmental variables was examined. Reform measures conducted in the post-
WTO period have had both negative and positive impacts on bank performance. These 
measures included equitisation of public banks and allowing foreign investors to take 
part in the banking sector, all aimed at fostering efficiency. In contrast, measures such 
as cross-ownership and rural-urban transformation have deteriorated the efficiency 
performance of the banking sector. Bank-specific variables including the loan to asset 
ratio, equity to asset ratio and return on assets responded differently in the different 
group models.    
The analysis of productivity showed that the banking system witnessed a decline during 
the period 2007–2012 under both the operating and intermediation approaches. This 
issue can be explained by regression of the technical component. While the efficiency 
component slightly increased under the intermediate approach, it decreased under the 
operating approach. 
The next chapter presents a number of policy implications and recommendations to 
improve Vietnamese bank efficiency based on this chapter‘s empirical findings. It 
recommends policies geared towards establishing a competitive banking market, 
improving related institutions and consolidating the legal and regulatory framework. 
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Chapter 7: Policy implications and recommendations 
7.1 Introduction 
The technical efficiency and productivity of the Vietnamese banking sector was 
empirically analysed in the two previous chapters using different approaches to 
inputs/outputs for the period 2005−2012 which encompassed the pre- and post-WTO 
periods. The author has found that state-owned banks are the most efficient and have the 
smallest technology gap relative to the meta-frontier. In contrast to the mainstream 
view, joint stock banks are the least efficient group and have the biggest technology 
gap. The impact of reform measures such as transforming rural to urban banks and 
allowing business groups to become involved in the banking sector have contributed 
negatively to bank performance.  
We find evidence that privatisation of the SOCBs can improve their capacity to earn 
profit but has reduced intermediation efficiency. The participation of foreign investors 
has improved the efficiency of joint stock banks. Regardless of ownership the results 
illustrate a negative relationship between bank capitalisation and performance under the 
operating approach. Foreign and joint venture banks are less dependent on lending 
activities and are more diversified in their operations than domestic banks. However, the 
responses of various bank groups to the same explanatory factors can be different. For 
example, the operating efficiency of state-owned banks is positively related to the loan 
to asset ratio while a negative relationship is recorded in the case of joint stock banks. 
The productivity of banks declined during the period studied, mainly due to 
technological regress. These findings provide an appropriate framework for relevant 
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authorities who are responsible for the initiation of innovative measures to improve the 
efficiency and productivity of the Vietnamese banking sector.   
The perspective of economic integration will be a main driving force for the 
liberalisation and restructuring of the banking sector in the next decade (Leung, 2015; 
Thanh, 2015). The ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), of which Vietnam will be a 
member, will be created in December 2015. Restrictions on the banking sector are 
targeted to be substantially removed by 2020 for all AEC members. By 2015, among 
the sub-sector including Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, banking services (acceptance of 
deposits and other repayable funds from the public, lending of all types, financial 
leasing, payment and money transmission, and guarantees) will be freely transacted 
across these countries.   
The Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), a regional regulatory and investment treaty led by 
the United States and including Vietnam, is expected to be established by 2020. The 
TPP covers important issues such as agriculture, intellectual property, services and 
investments. In the financial sector, including commercial banks, the TPP allows 
financial institutions in a member country to provide services to their clients in other 
countries without establishing overseas operations. A supplier of a TPP country may 
also provide any financial services in another TPP market if domestic companies in that 
market are allowed to do so (Summary of Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, Chapter 
11: Financial Services).
83
 The level of financial liberalisation embedded in the TPP is 
greater than that of any other free trade agreement to which Vietnam is a party (Thanh, 
2015). The AEC and TPP require Vietnam to liberalise the banking market for foreign 
                                                 
83
A summary of theTrans-Pacific Partnership Agreement can be downloaded from: https://ustr.gov/about-
us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2015/october/summary-trans-pacific-partnership  
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investors substantially
84
 and this presents challenges for the SBV and the government to 
improve banking sector performance.
85
 
Challenges exist not only from outside but also inside the banking system.  
First, the issue of ownership includes public ownership and cross-ownership. Public-
owned banks still dominate the banking system and remain under the control of the 
SBV and the government. Some argue that privatisation would drive them in a more 
commercially-based direction (Pincus, 2009; IMF, 2012); nonetheless, while three of 
the big four banks have been equitised, the bulk of their equity is still owned by the 
State, thereby ensuring their ongoing favour and substantial influence. Meanwhile, 
cross-ownership within private banks has been overwhelming and resulted in insider 
trading and misallocations of financial resources.  
In the context of Vietnam‘s transition economy, the second internal challenge emanates 
from a business environment where banks/companies belonging to different types of 
ownership are not treated equally. Public banks are preferred and receive privileges 
from the State which is not the case for their private counterparts. Foreign banks face 
                                                 
84
 Vietnam has been a full member of the WTO since 2007. In the banking sector all commitments to the 
WTO have been implemented. As mentioned previously the impact of the WTO on Vietnam has been to 
open its banking market to foreign investors in terms of: buying equity in domestic state-owned and 
domestic private banks; opening of 100% foreign-owned banks in Vietnam (e.g, HSBC, Standard 
Chartered Bank); and foreign bank branches being allowed to receive deposits in Vietnamese dong. 
However, there are still limits imposed on foreign investors. Specifically, they cannot take over more than 
30% of the total equity of a domestic bank and are not permitted to participate in mergers and 
acquisitions; furthermore, they bear further constraints in terms of geographical range and services 
provision. Hence, we can say that liberalisation of the banking sector in Vietnam is incomplete and quite 
different from that which occurred in the Eastern and Central European economies where all restrictions 
on foreign investors were removed and there was no discrimination between foreign and domestic 
investors. Consequently, there is room for Vietnam to continue liberalising its banking sector 
substantially and more comprehensively under the AEC and, especially, the TPP agreement. Further 
liberalising measures are mentioned in sections 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4. 
85
Thanh (2015) shows that overlapping forms of economic integration (WTO, AEC, TPP) can create a 
complex web of commitments and arrangements with huge distortions; however, all economies have to 
ensure maximal liberalisation under each scenario and access to benefits of related parties by domestic 
institutional and legal reforms accompanying the implementations of these trade agreements.  
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considerable restrictions on their operations in terms of attracting deposits and lending 
in Vietnamese dong, and this issue has prevented them from achieving a higher level of 
efficiency and approaching the industry production frontier (the meta-frontier discussed 
in Chapters 4, 5 and 6). 
Third, it is widely accepted that the regulatory and supervisory framework plays a key 
role in establishing and maintaining a sound and sustainable financial system (Beck et 
al., 2000; Barth et al., 2004). Recent financial crises such as the EAFC and GFC have 
pointed out the weakness of domestic regulators and supervisors. Vietnam launched its 
transition process in 1986 and since then the financial system has experienced three 
decades of development and change. The temporary recession of the economy in 
general and the banking sector in particular during the past 5 years (2011−2015) can be 
attributed to poor regulation and supervision in Vietnam (Nguyen and Simioni, 2015).  
Lastly, cash payments remain common in Vietnam due to consumer habits and 
preferences. This issue means the clients of banks do not liketo keep their money in 
bank deposits, rather they hold cash for their daily transactions. Banks must ensure that 
they have enough cash in their vaults to meet the needs of their clients on the one hand, 
but they can lose the chance to exploit earning deposits by providing more 
intermediation services on the other hand.       
The empirical results derived from this research and the challenges highlighted above 
suggest a number of important policies are required, aimed at improving the efficiency 
and productivity of Vietnam‘s banking system. The reform measures conducted in the 
post-WTO entry period impacted banks both positively and negatively and are a source 
of concern for Vietnamese policy makers as they have the potential to constrain the 
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future development of the overall economy. As indicated by the empirical results in the 
previous chapter there are no cases in which all banks are efficient and located on the 
production frontier. It would be more practicable if the banks were striving for a higher 
level of efficiency. In this context the Vietnamese Government must redesign their 
policies towards motivating competition in financial markets and guaranteeing a sound 
banking system by developing a strict and strong regulatory and supervisory system. 
Based on the empirical results presented previously, a number of policy implications are 
proposed and these are discussed in the following three sections. Section 7.2 presents 
suggestions and solutions to establish a competitive banking market. Measures to 
improve the quality of banks and relevant institutions are considered in Section 7.3. For 
a sound, safe and sustainable banking system, the legal and regulatory framework 
should be continuously consolidated with measures offered in Section 7.4. Section 7.5 
concludes and summarises the main policy implications looking towards improving the 
efficiency of the Vietnamese banking system. 
7.2 Establishing a competitive and fair banking market 
7.2.1 Independence of the SBV 
A number of studies (e.g, Kraft et al., 2006; Karas et al., 2010) have shown that one of 
the reasons for the superior efficiency of public banks over their private counterparts are 
the privileges and preferential treatment extended by the central bank (the SBV in 
Vietnam) and the government. The equity owned by the State in these SOCBs is 
managed by the SBV and this ensures their greater credibility to depositors in terms of 
their solvency. However, direct intervention by the SBV in the banking sector has 
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resulted in a heterogeneous banking environment that curbs fair competition and 
efficiency improvement. In this context two measures to increase the independence of 
the SBV are suggested. First, for the four equitised SOCBs, the government should 
decrease the state-owned equity by selling this to overseas investors
86
, who would bring 
in expertise, advanced technology and more funding. At the moment at least seventy-
five percent of the equity of SOCBs is held by the SBV and this ensures absolute 
control by the State. Selling more equity to foreign strategic investors could make 
SOCBs less dependent on the SBV and increase the opportunities for these investors to 
hold positions on the boards of directors which, in turn, would direct these banks 
towards a more commercially based footing.  
Second, the independence of the SBV should be increased by transferring all the equity 
held by this entity to another state authority. This action would definitely eliminate the 
direct influence of the SBV on SOCBs‘ operations.
87
 It is suggested that the Ministry of 
Finance (MOF) should, on behalf of the State, manage the equity transferred from the 
SBV. The MOF has the experience to hold the State‘s equity in most of the equitised 
SOEs.
88
 By doing this the SBV could become, relatively, more of a policy maker and 
                                                 
86
 In Chapter 6 it was shown that foreign investors have been proven to exert a positive influence on bank 
performance. 
87
 The Open Market Operations measure was established in 1999 according to Decision 340 of the SBV 
and this is an important market mechanism for controlling the banking sector and conducting monetary 
policy. Some may ask why the SBV utilises such market-based measures while persistently holding onto 
the SOCBs as a non-market measure. The explanation of this paradox goes beyond economics, being 
politically based. The Vietnamese communist party, known as the unique and State-holding party, sees 
SOEs in general and SOCBs in particular as the backbone of the economy and this will be their long-term 
role as mentioned in the 2013 Vietnamese Constitution. Article 51 of the Constitution states that the 
Vietnamese economy is a socialist-oriented market economy with multiple forms of ownership and a 
multi-sector economic structure; the state economic sector plays the leading role. This article requires 
SOEs to participate in all important sectors of the economy, of which the banking sector is one, and this 
argument clarifies why the SBV, representing the state, continues to control SOCBs even though it has 
adequate market-based tools.  
88
Transferring the state-owned equity in SOCBs from the SBV to the MOF would increase transparency 
and independence in the SBV‘s policies. When the SBV holds state-ownership in SOCBs, it has to be 
administratively responsible for all operations of these banks and this explains why the SBV tends to 
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the relationship with public banks would be more transparent and independent. 
However, this change of state authority should be seen as a short-term one because, as 
the minority proportion of equity in the equitised SOCBs owned by the private sector 
remains unchanged, consequently, the problem of agency is still unresolved. In the 
long-run the problem can only be addressed when all state-owned equity is sold on the 
stock exchange
89
 as occurred in many of the Eastern and Central European transition 
economies (Poghosyan and Poghosyan, 2010; Bonin and Schnabel, 2011).
90
 
It is worth noting that transition economies such as Vietnam and China are conducting a 
gradual transformation to market based economies (Beresford, 2008), during which the 
banking sector remains mostly under the control of government. The challenge for 
policy makers is to reconcile conflicts between: state ownership and bank efficiency; 
efficiency and the autonomy of the SBV; and lastly between state ownership and SBV 
autonomy. It could be more practical for the State to continue to hold 51% of SOCB 
equity, vested in the MOF rather than the SBV, and let the rest be owned by strategic 
investors.
91
 Lessons from the Eastern and Central European transition economies during 
                                                                                                                                               
directly provide privileges and discriminative treatment (for instance, in terms of lending activities) for 
SOCBs. In the case where the MOF holds the state-owned equity in SOCBs, one may argue the MOF 
could collude with the SBV and this suggests the monetary authority of the government could continue to 
prefer SOCBs. Obviously, this scenario is possible but it would take time to organise due to the increased 
number of attending agencies (the MOF, the SBV and the government) and would be hampered by the 
requirement for clear explanations from the MOF acting in the role as the owner. When more authorities 
take part in the decision making process of the SBV, the policies generated by this agency would become 
more transparent and relatively more independent from the SOCBs‘ operations. It is worth noting that, 
under either the SBV or MOF management regime, the majority state ownership is unchanged; thus, the 
agent-principal problem remains in effect in the public banks. 
89
The total value of the stock exchange (USD 65 billion at end 2014) is much larger than the total market 
value of all SOCBs (USD 6.6 billion at end 2014) and the market will be strengthened by the involvement 
of overseas investors when the TPP becomes effective. 
90
Körner and Schnabel (2011) found a negative impact of state-ownership in banking on long-term 
economic growth in countries having low financial development and weak political institutions such as 
Vietnam has. However, this relationship is no longer clear or even positive in financially developed 
economies. 
91
The policy should balance two competing objectives: (1) ensuring control by the State over the banking 
sector so that state-owned equity can dominate in SOCBs (more than 50%), (2) improving efficiency and 
 
 
222 
 
the 1990s show that privatisation focusing on foreign strategic investors is more 
successful than other approaches
92
 (Barisitz, 2009). Participation by foreign investors 
injects know-how, experience, technology, corporate governance and capital, thus 
boosting competitiveness, encouraging competition and enhancing creditability in the 
banking system. At the moment the equity proportion owned by overseas investors 
cannot exceed 30%. This limit is due to the Vietnamese State‘s desire to control the 
banking sector, hence ensuring its absolute sovereignty over the country‘s financial 
system in particular and the economy in general (Kovsted et al., 2005; IMF, 2012).
93
 
Nonetheless, the government does expect the public banks to operate efficiently and, 
learning from the experiences of other transition countries, foreign investors are likely 
to play a strategically important part in the privatisation of SOCBs.   
Holding more than half of the equity ensures control by the State; however, this also 
makes foreign investors suspicious of the relevant state authority‘s functions within the 
SOCBs and their contributions to the long-term strategy of these banks. As a result, 
                                                                                                                                               
competitiveness in SOCBs, hence increasing the equity owned by foreign strategic investors as much as 
possible but not equal to or exceeding 50% of total equity (suggesting a cap at 49%). At the moment, 
foreign investors are allowed to hold a maximum 30% of SOCB equity and the empirical evidence in the 
literature as well as in this thesis supports their participation in the banking sector. Hence, these 
objectives are compatible and achievable. 
92
 There are other approaches to bank privatisation. Specifically, insider privatisation is an approach in 
which shares of state-owned banks are sold to employees of these banks (Barisitz, 2009). In addition, 
indirect privatisation occurred in countries such as Croatia where the state-owned banks are owned by 
other SOEs. Then when these SOEs were privatised, the banks were indirectly privatised (Kraft et al., 
2006). 
93
 As long as article 51 of the Vietnamese constitution is effective the government will not remove the 
restrictions imposed on foreign investors in the banking sector. Accordingly, the state economic sector 
must be the driving force of the economy in general and the banking sector as an important industry in 
particular, despite the fact that Vietnam has fully been a WTO member and is going to be a party to the 
AEC and TPP. Vietnam does not accept any regulations from these free trade agreements on absolutely 
and thoroughly opening its banking sector. However, it is urgent to remove such limits on operations of 
foreign investors. This is because the banking sector in Vietnam is in turmoil due to bad loans and weak 
governance and it needs a strong and new capital flow from overseas in parallel with advanced expertise 
and technology to strengthen itself. The two conflicting issues cannot be thoroughly addressed in the 
economic-political context of Vietnam these days. Nonetheless, compromising suggestions as mentioned 
in the previous section, such as reducing the state-ownership equity in SOCBs but ensuring the State still 
dominates the total and increasing the fraction of equity available to be held by foreign investors up to but 
not exceeding 50%, seem practicable and achievable. 
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regulation on the functions and limits on state representatives in the public banks needs 
to be issued as a guarantee for the benefit of investors and to ensure the operations of 
SOCBs are clear, transparent, accountable and commercially based. The experiences of 
other transition economies in Europe show that, to attract overseas strategic investors, 
institutional and legal conditions (notably protection of property rights and the rule of 
laws and contracts) play a pivotal function (Barisitz, 2009). Moreover, the CEOs of 
public banks should be chosen through a competitive and transparent recruitment 
process rather than being appointed by a board of directors consisting of the 
representatives of both private institutions and state authorities, as it has been. A 
contract mechanism
94
 could be implemented for the CEOs of public banks in which 
they have to commit to achieving certain objectives imposed by the board of directors. 
7.2.2 Removing barriers against foreign banks/investors 
The empirical evidence from Chapter 6 reveals that the participation of foreign investors 
in domestic banks helps improve efficiency. However, the government has a limit of 
30% on the equity of a bank, either public or domestic private, that foreign investors can 
buy. This limitation has prevented technology transfer and long-term co-operation with 
foreign investors. Hence, the 30% limit should be eliminated or at least be loosened to a 
significantly higher percentage of 49%.  
In the Eastern and Central European transition economies during the 1990s there was no 
limit on the participation of overseas investors in either private or state-owned banks 
(Bonin and Schnabel, 2011). However, in the case of Vietnam, the limit on maximal 
equity participation should be completely eliminated for private banks and a limit 
                                                 
94
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) state that contract mechanisms alleviate the agent-principal problem and, 
therefore, increase firm efficiency. 
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of49% of equity owned by foreign investors can be applied in SOCBs as discussed in 
Section 7.2.1. Further participation of foreign investors in the banking sector in Vietnam 
could help provide more capital inflow from overseas, and additionally could provide 
advanced technology and a high quality of corporate governance. 
7.3 Improving relevant institutions/banks 
7.3.1 Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) 
In the previous chapter it was found that the JSBs that transformed from rural to urban 
banks are less efficient under both the intermediation and operating approaches. 
Moreover, the Hicks−Moorsteen index based results show that scale effects impact 
significantly on productivity changes of the Vietnamese banking system. Consequently, 
a possible solution for these small, inefficient banks is that the SBV should require them 
to merge or be acquired by larger and sounder domestic banks.
95
 This argument is also 
supported by Wheelock and Wilson (2000) when they empirically show that small and 
managerially inefficient banks, in general, are more likely to be acquired or controlled 
for leverage. At the moment foreign banks are not permitted to take part in merger and 
acquisitionactivities; nonetheless, the experience of Eastern and Central European 
transition economies shows that overseas investors are the main driving force of 
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 One may argue that the merger and acquisition policy would undermine the capital structure of the 
acquiring/merging banks. To avoid such a problem and following the lessons learned from the EAFC 
(Williams and Nguyen, 2005), the SBV needs to issue a standard procedure in which the asset and equity 
values of acquired/merged banks have to be precisely identified beforehand. For this purpose, bad assets 
and loans must be removed from the balance sheet and relevant loan-loss provisioning costs must be 
adequately accounted for. In the aftermath, based on the market values of equity of both 
acquiring/merging and acquired/merged parties, the transfer rate of acquired/merged bank equity into 
acquiring/merging bank equity will be identified. Such measures would ensure the fairness of any merger 
and acquisition transactions and the quality of assets and equity of the new banks after the 
acquiring/merging processes. Accordingly, the value of capital ratio may change but the quality of capital 
and assets of the acquiring/merging banks will not be negatively impacted. 
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mergers and acquisitions (Hasan and Marton, 2003; Bonin et al., 2005a; 2005b; Fang et 
al., 2011). Through mergers and acquisitions, transformed banks have the opportunity 
to widen their operating range and save operating costs (Wheelock and Wilson, 2000). 
Furthermore, they can be supported by their partners to innovate, improve their 
governance, and improve risk management and capital capability (Houston et al., 2001; 
Worthington, 2001). 
7.3.2 Improving the quality of risk management in JSBs 
The JSB model shows that private banks with a higher loan to asset ratio (a proxy for 
risk preference) are less efficient than other banks in the same group under the operating 
approach. This result raises a concern about the quality of risk management in private 
banks. Possible policy suggestions for this problem include: 1) issuing stringent 
regulations on lending activities, the capital adequacy ratio, credit limitations, the loan 
to deposit ratio, the maximum ratio of short-term liabilities over mid- and long-term 
loans, and liquidity ratios; 2) calling for foreign strategic investors to take part in private 
domestic banks. These investors can help improve the quality of risk management 
through banking technology transfers and training of bank staff; and 3) diversification 
of banking activities in order to decrease the loan to asset ratio. One of the weaknesses 
of domestic banks compared to their foreign rivals is that they concentrate their business 
on lending that, in turn, can lead to a risky asset portfolio.
96
 A diversification of banking 
services would help banks avoid systematic risks from the market and become more 
resilient to external shocks. 
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 Wheelock and Wilson (2000) argue that loans are typically the least liquid and most risky bank assets 
and the more the banks concentrate on loans, the greater the likelihood of failure. A study by Laeven 
(1999) showed that in emerging markets with weak enforcement of banking regulations, banks with 
excessive loan growth would show a high technical efficiency by taking on excessive risk. Rapid growth 
of loans in the short- and mid-term is traded off against an increase of credit risk in the long-term.    
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7.4 Consolidating the legal and regulatory framework 
7.4.1 Improving Vietnamese bank accounting standards 
According to assessments by the IMF, the Vietnamese system relating to banking 
regulations is still far from international accounting standards and the Basel Accord I, 
and is not capable of catching up with recent developments in the banking sector (IMF 
2012; 2014). Vietnamese Accounting Standards (VAS) were mainly established in 2003 
by the Law of Accounting and they tend to overstate profitability, asset values and the 
solvency situation of reporting entities. In the case of SOEs, the weaknesses of the VAS 
are aggravated by supplemental accounting rules against ―the loss of state capital‖ that 
hinder recognition of losses and mask the weak performance of several SOEs (IMF, 
2014). Moreover, the empirical evidence in the previous chapter shows the weakness of 
temporary bank accounting standards. In particular, the negative relationship between 
the equity to asset ratio and operating efficiency is due to the fact that risk-related costs 
are inadequately accounted for. 
Hence, the hidden risks inside the banking system are underestimated. Another 
consequence is that the relevant authority may then issue distorted or inadequate 
policies on banks when they are not receiving enough reliable information on banking 
operations under the weak and poorly enforced bank accounting and regulatory 
standards. It is necessary to create a new system of accounting standards for banking 
that can handle the evolution of banks and can account for all activities and possible 
risks. 
7.4.2 The law on internet banking 
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The analysis of productivity from this study has shown that the technical component of 
Vietnamese banks regressed during the studied period and this has resulted in a decline 
of Vietnamese banking productivity. According to Lin et al. (2015), the percentage of 
Vietnamese people using the Internet in 2014 is 40% and of the total 89.6 million 
citizens, 24 million were ATM card holders. There are 48 card issuers, 11,000 ATMs 
and 38,000 EFT points of sale nationwide in 2012. Moreover, all commercial banks did 
have Internet-based services by the end of 2014. However, few people have used these 
new Internet banking products as only 1.16% of total transactions were conducted by 
this means in the first half of 2014
97
. The reasons for this fact are: the preference for 
cash payments by consumers, weak coordination among banks, worries about security 
and privacy, and an inadequate perception of usefulness (Lin et al., 2015).    
The consequence of the lack of popularity of Internet banking activities is that banks 
still have to maintain a large number of employees and branches and this results in a 
high operating cost. By using internet banking, clients could perform banking 
transactions at home or at their work and the banks could serve a much larger client 
base with a smaller number of staff and branches. The application of internet banking 
helps banks to save costs and improve productivity (Wheelock and Wilson, 1999; 
Berger, 2003). In order to encourage people to use internet banking services and ensure 
that all relevant transactions are guaranteed, the Vietnamese Parliament should issue a 
law on internet banking to establish a legal background for this type of service. 
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Source: 
http://www.sbv.gov.vn/portal/faces/vi/pages/trangchu/hdk/cntt/udptcntt/udptcntt_chitiet?dDocName=SBV
WEBAPP01SBV075439&dID=77608&_afrLoop=3366875192051715&_afrWindowMode=0&_afrWind
owId=null#%40%3FdID%3D77608%26_afrWindowId%3Dnull%26_afrLoop%3D3366875192051715%
26dDocName%3DSBVWEBAPP01SBV075439%26_afrWindowMode%3D0%26_adf.ctrl-
state%3Deyauo4b0w_4 
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7.4.3 The law on cross-ownership 
As discussed previously, cross-ownership has been occurring between business groups 
and private banks. This includes ownership of JSBs by other banks (SOCBs and other 
JSBs) and by business groups (including SOEs), and this complicated shareholding 
structure raises concerns about conflicts of interest, connected lending and distorted 
credit allocation. The results from Chapter 6 show that this nexus has negatively 
impacted bank performance in terms of profit maximisation and the provision of 
intermediation services. 
The circumstance of the Vietnamese banking sector in the post-WTO period is 
somewhat similar to that of countries (including Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Thailand) during the East Asia Financial Crisis. According to Williams 
and Nguyen (2005) these economies are characterised by the prevailing dominance of 
large, and in some cases family owned, corporations which owned financial 
subsidiaries, circumventing restrictions on lending. This interrelated economic model 
between finance and ownership lay behind connected lending and was a major root 
cause of the EAFC. This potential problem was compounded by an underdeveloped 
institutional environment characterised by weak supervision and regulations. In general, 
governments in these aforementioned Asian countries responded to the financial distress 
by: nationalising banks; closing unviable banks; carrying out compulsory purchases and 
transferring assets to healthy and sound banks; creating larger core banks; removing bad 
assets to state-owned and managed asset management companies; and injecting capital 
to recapitalise banks (Laeven, 1999; Williams and Nguyen, 2005). When these 
measures were completed these restructured and nationalised banks were returned to the 
private sector through a privatisation process (Lindgren et al., 2000; Radelet and Sachs, 
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2000). Other solutions were also implemented to improve the quality of management 
and ensure that these restructured banks would be more transparent, efficient and safer  
including: broadening access for foreign-owned banks and allowing majority foreign 
ownership; replacing underdeveloped management; and revising managerial incentives. 
Furthermore, international standards on supervision and regulation were implemented in 
order to improve the institutional environment. 
Vietnam can learn from the experiences of these Asian countries to resolve its similar 
problems. For example, nationalising or even closing unviable banks; establishing an 
asset management corporation
98
; allowing majority foreign ownership
99
; and applying 
international standards to establish a sound regulatory and supervisory framework 
including enacting a law on cross-ownership. 
7.4.4 The law on bank regulation and supervision 
To maintain a sound and efficient banking sector Vietnam has to improve its banking 
regulatory and supervisory framework as it currently is underdeveloped and faces 
substantial challenges (IMF, 2012; 2014). A law on supervision should be enacted to 
address serious gaps in the regulatory framework. These gaps include:  
(1) the definition of related parties
100
 is overly narrow, hindering the 
identification and assessment of ultimate beneficiaries. This affects various 
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 The Vietnam Asset Management Company was indeed established in 2013. 
99
Foreign investors should be allowed to hold more than half of the capital of domestic banks. By doing 
this they will commit to long-run investments and, by taking control of the domestic banks, the quality of 
management will be improved to meet international and far more advanced standards. 
100
 According to International Accounting Standard 24, a related party is a person or entity that is related 
to the entity that is preparing its financial statements. At the moment the definition of related parties in the 
banking sector in Vietnam is narrow and it has not caught up with the international criterion and has not 
adequately accounted for all people and corporations possibly impacting on the operations of banks (IMF, 
2014). As a result, risks relevant to related parties may be ignored.  
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aspects of supervision, including licensing, transfer of ownership, acquisition, 
related party lending and capital adequacy (IMF, 2012; 2014);  
(2) the framework of authorisation is too prescriptive and does not allow 
enough room for supervisors to conduct proper screening and assessment; and  
(3) capital adequacy requirements are still based on the Basel I Accord and there 
is a lack of guidance on market, operational and interest rate risks (IMF, 2012; 
2014). 
7.5 Summary 
In this chapter, valuable policy implications and recommendations have been drawn 
from the empirical evidence presented in this thesis that include:  
(1) the impact of policy changes in the post-WTO era and of bank specific 
variables on the technical efficiency of the Vietnamese banking sector during the 
2005−2012 period using a double-bootstrap two-stage DEA model and meta-
frontier analysis; 
(2) comparisons of technical efficiency between public, private, foreign and joint 
venture bank groups using the Li (1996) and the Simar and Zelenyuk (2007) 
tests; and 
(3) analysis of Vietnamese bank productivity using the AMPI.  
In order to improve the technical efficiency and productivity of Vietnamese banks, 
specific policies should be targeted on:  
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(1) ensuring the independence of the SBV by reducing the volume of equity 
owned by the State in SOCBs and transferring the equity to the MOF; 
(2) removing all limits relevant to the participation of foreign investors in 
domestic banks; 
(3) requiring small and inefficient banks to merge/be acquired by bigger, 
financially sound banks; 
(4) improving the quality of risk management in private banks by issuing 
stringent regulations on lending, thereby encouraging foreign investors to take a 
larger part in management and diversification of banking activities; 
(5) improving Vietnamese bank accounting standards to adequately account for 
recent developments in the banking sector; 
(6) enacting a law on internet banking to ensure the benefits are taken up and to 
enhance its credibility for consumers; 
(7) enacting a law regulating cross-ownership in private banks to ensure that 
there are no conflicts of interest or connected lending and to avoid distorted 
credit allocation; and  
(8) consolidating the regulatory and supervisory framework by enacting a law on 
bank regulation and supervision. 
In the next and final chapter, the major conclusions from the thesis, limitations and 
suggestion for further research will be presented.
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35Table 7.1: A summary of the key challenges and implications for policy makers relating to the Vietnamese banking sector 
 
Findings Challenges and limitations Implications for policy makers 
Treatment of the SBV: extending privileges to 
SOCBs and discriminating against JSBs and 
FJVBs. 
As a result, SOCBs access the production 
frontier more easily than other banks. 
Independence of the SBV 1) The government should broaden the equity ownership of SOCBs to 
include private and foreign investors (it is suggested that the 
maximal proportion of equity owned by the private sector be set at 
49%). 
2) The equity in SOCBs held by the SBV should be transferred to 
another state authority (the MOF is suggested). In the long-run, 
under a planned roadmap, this state-held equity should be returned 
to the private sector through selling on the stock exchange and sales 
to strategic foreign investors. 
JSBs with foreign investors are more efficient 
than the other bank types under the operating 
approach. 
FJVBs are more efficient than JSBs under both 
approaches. 
Barriers against foreign 
banks/investors 
1) Remove the 30% ceiling on bank equity that can be sold to foreign 
investors. 
2) Remove the restrictions on financial services imposed on foreign 
banks. 
3) Allow foreign banks to establish branches and offices nationwide.  
The rural-urban transformed JSBs are the least 
efficient under both approaches. 
Rural-urban transformed banks 1) Nationalise these banks and after that, sell to potential investors 
including foreign investors. 
2) Force them to be acquired/merged with bigger, financially sound 
banks. 
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Findings Challenges and limitations Implications for policy makers 
JSBs with a higher loan to asset ratio are less 
efficient under the operating approach. 
Poor quality of risk management in 
private banks 
1) Issue stringent regulations on banking activities. 
2) Encourage foreign investors to take part in private banks. 
3) Diversify banking activities. 
The cross-ownership between JSBs and 
business groups negatively impacts bank 
performance in terms of profit maximisation 
and the provision of intermediation services. 
Cross-ownership  1) Nationalise or close unviable cross-owned banks. 
2) Carry out compulsory purchases and transfer assets to healthy, 
financially sound banks. 
3) Broaden access for foreign-owned banks to take part in 
restructuring processes by acquiring weak banks or becoming 
majority shareholders. 
Negative relationship between the equity to 
asset ratio and operating efficiency exposes the 
fact that risk-related costs are inadequately 
accounted for.  
Weak accounting standards on 
banking  
1) Review and rebuild the domestic accounting standards to catch up 
with international standards. 
Based on all the above findings. 
Banking productivity has declined due to 
technical regression.  
Gaps in banking legislation 1) Build three banking-relevant laws:  
- Law governing internet banking 
- Law on cross-ownership 
- Law on bank regulation and supervision 
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Chapter 8: Summary and conclusions 
8.1 Introduction 
There is a close and positive relationship between economic growth and a country‘s 
level of financial development in both developed and newly emerging market 
economies (Levine, 1997; 1998; Beck et al., 2000). In Vietnam, the banking sector 
contributes a substantial proportion, 90%, of the total assets of the financial system 
(IMF, 2014), and thus plays a pivotal role in providing capital to the economy. As a 
consequence, the efficiency and productivity of the Vietnamese banking sector impacts 
significantly on the quality and magnitude of economic growth.  
Vietnam‘s entry to the WTO in 2007 marked an important point in the banking sector‘s 
liberalisation; accordingly, a number of policy measures were conducted to improve 
bank performance and competitiveness. For example, as part of its commitments to the 
WTO, overseas investors were allowed to open 100% foreign-invested banks in 
Vietnam. These banks are recognised as being important because of their advanced 
technology and high quality of governance. Foreign investors, furthermore, are allowed 
to take part in domestic banks as minority shareholders. Rural banks are permitted to 
transform into urban banks. Four of the five state-owned banks were equitised and 
foreign strategic investors were encouraged to participate in this process. The pre- and 
post-WTO entry period experienced rapid credit growth at an average rate of 35% 
annually
101
. The relevant policy changes after the WTO event could be expected to have 
impacts on bank efficiency and productivity; however, no study has been carried out to 
assess these possible impacts. Therefore, the aim of this thesis has been to shed light on 
                                                 
101
See Chapter 2 for more details. 
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the impact of WTO entry on bank efficiency and productivity in Vietnam, which is seen 
as being critical to the future sustained growth of the economy. 
The objective of this study has been to answer the following questions: 1) How has the 
Vietnamese banking sector evolved since its transformation from a one-tier to two-tier 
system in 1988? 2) Which methods can be best utilised to measure and analyse the 
efficiency and productivity of a banking sector, especially in the case of a transition 
economy such as Vietnam‘s? 3) What has been the level of efficiency and productivity 
changes in Vietnamese banks encompassing the pre- and post-WTO entry periods? 4) 
What has been the impact of policy changes implemented after WTO accession? 5) 
What are the important sources of inefficiency from the perspective of the Vietnamese 
banking system?  
This chapter summarises the main findings related to these questions and is structured 
as follows. Section 8.2 provides a summary of the main findings presented in previous 
chapters and how these findings address the research questions and hypotheses 
highlighted in Chapter 1. The policy implications and recommendations for the SBV 
and Vietnamese government to improve banking sector performance provide the focus 
of Section 8.3. Section 8.4 offers a description of the study‘s limitations. Lastly, Section 
8.5 suggests areas for further research based on the limitations and possible extensions 
of the thesis.  
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8.2 Summary of empirical findings 
8.2.1 Findings for the research questions 
As the focus of the thesis, a number of research questions and hypotheses were raised in 
chapter 1. The questions and hypotheses concentrated on: estimating and comparing the 
technical efficiency and productivity performance of the Vietnamese banking system 
during the 2005−2012 period, examining the significance of policy changes 
implemented in the post-WTO accession period, identifying bank-specific 
characteristics and time trends impacting on bank performance, and  identifying key 
policy priorities for the government and the SBV concerned with enhancing the 
technical efficiency and fostering the productivity of the Vietnamese banking sector. 
The main findings for each of these research questions are now discussed.  
How has the Vietnamese banking sector evolved during its transformation from a 
one-tier to two-tier system starting in 1988?  
To answer this question, the literature related to the historical development of 
Vietnam‘s banks from initiation of the transformation process from a mono system to a 
two-tier system in 1988 to the present was collected, reviewed and analysed. During this 
time period both the successes and failures relating to the Vietnamese banking sector 
were analysed in depth; moreover, a comparison with other transition countries was also 
conducted highlighting differences and similarities. In general, evolution of the 
Vietnamese banking sector can be divided into four phases: (1) the first phase 
(1988−1997) marked the transition process from a one- to two-tier banking system 
which ended with the onset of the EAFC, (2) the second phase (1998−2006) is 
characterised by a substantial change in the legal system with the issuance of the 
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banking law that formulated the functions of the SBV and eliminated direct control over 
the interest rate, (3) the third phase (2007−2010) recorded a dramatic growth of the 
banking sector after Vietnam joined the WTO in 2007; however, turmoil arising  from 
hidden risks related to financial asset bubbles and intra-lending activities generated 
concern for  policy makers, (4) the fourth phase began from 2011 up to the present and 
was characterised by reform measures to stabilise and sustainably restructure the 
banking system. Overall, development of the Vietnamese banking sector has been 
significantly impacted by economic liberalisation and integration such as from its 
membership of the WTO in 2007 and from its membership of regional free trade 
agreements such as the AEC and TPP in 2015. 
What methods can be utilised to measure and analyse the efficiency and productivity 
of a banking sector, especially in the case of a transition economy such as Vietnam’s?  
The non-parametric method – DEA was employed to estimate the production frontiers 
and measure the efficiency and productivity of Vietnamese banks and the overall 
banking sector during the period 2005–2012. An advantage of this thesis is that the 
author employs bootstrap techniques in the context of DEA which can give less biased 
and more consistent estimates of efficiency; therefore, the results obtained are more 
reliable. The bootstrap-based tests of Simar and Zelenyuk (2006) and Simar and 
Zelenyuk (2007) have been utilised to examine bank technical efficiency differences 
across different periods and amongst groups. Furthermore, applying the double-
bootstrap two-stage DEA method of Simar and Wilson (2007) to examine the impact of 
environmental variables on efficiency is another merit of this study because the method 
provides less biased and more consistent coefficients. An aggregate Malmquist 
productivity index was initially utilised to measure bank performance. The advantage of 
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this method is that it accounts for the relevant importance of individual banks 
(weighting) while conventional Malmquist productivity indexes see banks as having 
equal weighting. Furthermore, Hick−Moorsteen index that is knows as a 
multiplicatively complete TFP index was also utilisd in this thesis. This better index 
provides a comprehensive measures of efficiency changes in a comparison with any 
types of Malmquist index. By combining the double-bootstrap two-stage DEA with a 
meta-frontier analysis, this approach was proven to be the appropriate methodology for 
analysing the Vietnamese banking sector where the business environment in which 
banks are operating is heterogeneous. Therefore, the author has addressed the question 
of which methodology should be employed to analyse the performance of Vietnamese 
banks.   
What has been the level of efficiency and productivity changes in Vietnam’s banks 
encompassing the pre- and post-WTO entry periods?  
In answering this question, DEA-based tests including those of Li (1996) and Simar and 
Zelenyuk (2007) were utilised to measure and compare the technical efficiency of 
Vietnamese banks between the pre- and post-WTO periods. The analysis was carried 
out using unbalanced panel data obtained from the financial reports of commercial 
banks in Vietnam consisting of state-owned, domestic and foreign private banks from 
2005 to 2012. A total of 232 bank-year observations were used to measure technical 
efficiency, as presented in Section 5.2 of Chapter 5. The empirical results indicated that 
the banking sector in both the pre- and post-WTO periods operated below its potential 
capability using both aggregate and mean technical efficiency, and the values of 
efficiency estimated by the intermediation approach were bigger than those estimated 
under the operating approach. 
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The Simar and Zelenyuk (2007) test shows that the technical efficiency of the 
Vietnamese banking sector in the pre-WTO period is the same as that in the post-WTO 
period, using both the aggregate and mean criteria and under both the operating and 
intermediation approaches. The equality of efficiency between the two periods implies 
that there was no significant improvement in bank performance. The policy measures 
implemented in the wake of WTO entry aimed at improving the technical efficiency of 
banks, therefore, proved to be largely ineffective. This conclusion is also supported by 
the Li (1996) test on the distribution of efficiency scores between the two periods. The 
results of the Li (1996) test show that the capability of banks to access the industry 
frontier in the pre-WTO period is the same as that in the post-WTO period under both 
approaches to input/output data. 
What has been the impact of policy changes implemented after WTO accession?  
For each policy change a hypothesis was elaborated to postulate its possible impact on 
bank performance, as indicated in Chapter 1. In order to identify these impacts, dummy 
variables were used as proxies for relevant policy changes and were utilised in the 
different models. Under the meta-frontier analysis approach, banks belonging to 
different ownership types are assumed to have their own technology sets and this 
required estimating the production frontier for each group. There are two types of 
models that can be used: (1) a meta-model that embraces all banks regardless of their 
ownership, (2) a group model that only includes banks of a specific ownership type, and 
there are three group models that are relevant - state, private and foreign ownership. For 
each model a regression is conducted to observe the impact of a specific policy change 
on bank efficiency and repeated twice under the two approaches to input/output data. 
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The impacts of policy changes in the post-WTO era were hypothesised and they are 
presented in detail in section 8.2.2;      
What are the important sources of inefficiency in the Vietnamese banking system? 
The empirical analysis in this study showed two sources of inefficiency in the 
Vietnamese banking sector. First, policy changes in the post-WTO period when 
Vietnam had to conduct its commitments after joining this organisation. Details on the 
possible impact of these banking-related policy changes are presented in section 8.2.2 
below. Second, other control variables including bank characteristics and a time trend 
capturing the evolution of bank efficiency along a timeline starting in 2005 (before the 
WTO entry event - 2007) and ending in 2012 are also included in the regression models 
to see their influence. 
To see the impact of asset structure on bank efficiency the loan to asset ratio (LA) was 
employed across the meta- and all three group models (JSB, SOCB, and FJVB models). 
Under the intermediation approach the results are consistent and show a significant and 
positive relationship between the LA ratio and bank efficiency. Nevertheless, the results 
are inconsistent under the operating approach. In the JSB model the above mentioned 
relationship is negative while it is positive in the two remaining group models (SOCB 
and FJVB models). 
The equity to asset ratio (EA) represents capital strength and its relationship with bank 
efficiency. Using the profit maximising criterion to input/output data, the relevant 
coefficients of all meta- and three group models show a consistent result that the EA 
ratio has a negative relationship with bank performance. However, results using the 
intermediation approach are inconsistent. A negative association between capital 
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strength and bank efficiency is recorded in the JSB and SOCB models but it is positive 
in the FJVB model.  
The characteristic of bank profitability is proxied by the return on asset ratio (ROA) and 
this variable appears in all four regression models. The relationship of ROA with that of 
bank efficiency is consistently positive across the different models under the operating 
approach. Meanwhile, the impact is inconsistent across different group models under 
the intermediation approach to input/output data. Specifically, bank profitability has a 
negative impact in the FJVB model while it is positive in the other two group models 
including those for private and public banks.   
To control for the impact of a time trend on bank performance, the variable T is used 
and constructed linearly under the rule that for the first year it receives a value of one 
and receives a value of two in the second year. This process is repeated until the last 
year of the studied period. The empirical results showed that the time trend is significant 
in the meta- and JSB model using the operating approach; meanwhile, under the 
intermediation approach the variable is significant in the meta-, JSB, and SOCB models. 
The disparity of bank groups‘ reaction to the time variable implies that banks belonging 
to different ownership types evolve along a variety of directions, and this is also 
significant evidence to support the assumption that the business environment in 
Vietnam is heterogeneous and, operating under such conditions, bank groups cannot 
have the same trajectory of development.  
8.2.2 Findings for the research hypotheses 
To know whether the impact of a policy change is significant or not, the values of the 
relevant coefficients of the dummy variables were compared to zero. The double-
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bootstrap two-stage DEA method provided a sampling distribution of each coefficient 
and also identified its confidence interval that is characterised by upper and lower 
values. At α significance degree, if both bounds are smaller than zero then it can be 
concluded that the related coefficient value is significantly negative. On the other hand 
if both bounds are bigger than zero then the conclusion is that the coefficient value is 
significantly positive. The rest of this section focuses on how the empirical results 
answer the hypotheses posed in chapter 1. 
Hypothesis 1:  
The capital participation of several large SOEs and private business groups decreased 
the efficiency performance s of banks.  
The dummy variable BG appearing in the meta- and JSB model was used as a proxy to 
indicate the capital participation of private and state-owned business groups in JSBs. 
There is evidence to suggest that the efficiency of private banks with cross-ownership 
from business groups deteriorated under the profit maximising criterion. Specifically, 
the coefficients of BG were significantly positive under the meta- and group models. 
This empirical proof supports hypothesis 1 that cross-ownership has resulted in a 
misallocation of credit that has eventually resulted in bad loans. The resolution of bad 
loans takes time, incurs high cost and undermines the efficiency of these banks. 
Hypothesis 2:  
Privatisation of SOCBs has increased the technical efficiency of these banks.  
Privatising public banks is a measure to alleviate the agency problem and increase bank 
efficiency as postulated in hypothesis 2. The influence of this policy change was 
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presented by the dummy variable P, referring to privatised SOCBs. This binary variable 
appears in both the meta- and SOCB models. Under the operating approach the 
empirical results showed a significant and positive impact of P in the two mentioned 
models and also provided support for hypothesis 2. Under the intermediation approach 
the impact of P was positive in the meta-model but was negative in the SOCB model, 
implying that privatised banks are less efficient than non-privatised banks. This result 
can be explained by the fact that, after privatisation, SOCBs became more cautious in 
their lending activities and more commercially-based when their priority is profit rather 
than providing credit as much as possible to targeted economic sectors or areas.  
Hypothesis 3: 
Foreign involvement in domestic banks (both SOCBs and JSBs) has exerted a positive 
impact on the technical efficiency of Vietnamese banks.  
To test hypothesis 3 the dummy variable FSI was included in the regression models and 
indicates banks with foreign involvement. The variable FSI appears in both the meta-
model and group model. Due to the fact that when SOCBs are privatised their equity is 
simultaneously sold to strategic investors; we cannot distinguish between the two 
variables FSI and P in the SOCB group model. In addition, allowing overseas 
investments in SOCBs is just an important component of the privatisation process and 
so FSI is excluded from the SOCB model. Consequently, FSI was included in only the 
meta-model and JSB model.    
In the JSB model the empirical outcome showed a positive impact of foreign 
participation in private banks on income-based efficiency, and this outcome supports 
hypothesis 3 that strategic investors from overseas with expertise, advanced technology 
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and strong capital capability can contribute positively to the decision making process of 
domestic banks, improve the quality of management, and develop new banking services 
and products.  
Hypothesis 4:  
The deregulation of rural banks into urban banks by the SBV reduced the mean 
efficiency of the banking sector.  
To examine the impact of transforming rural into urban banks by the SBV the dummy 
variable RU was utilised to distinguish transformed banks from others. The RU variable 
was included in the meta- and JSB models. The regression outcomes demonstrated a 
negative relationship between RU and bank performance under the two approaches and 
two mentioned regression models. Accordingly, the results support hypothesis 4 that, 
under an inadequately selective process, the decision of the SBV to transform rural 
banks into urban ones resulted in their low efficiency in particular and deteriorated the 
performance of the banking industry in general. 
8.3 Policy implications and recommendations 
 
The empirical analysis presented in this thesis has shown that Vietnamese banks are 
operating far from their optimal capability, especially in terms of providing 
intermediation services, and it is likely to constrain the development of the financial 
system and economic growth. A number of policy implications and recommendations 
have been suggested to improve the efficiency and productivity of the banking sector. 
First, the authorities need to establish a competitive and fair market for all banks 
regardless of which type of ownership they belong to. This could be achieved via 
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reducing or divesting equity in SOCBs held by the SBV, and eliminating or increasing 
the maximal proportion of equity that can be owned by foreign investors in Vietnamese 
banks.  
Second, the SBV has to implement measures to upgrade the quality of banks. Due to the 
scale effect, the weak and small banks, especially rural-urban transformed banks, should 
be encouraged to merge or be acquired by sound big banks. The quality of risk 
management can be improved by issuing stringent regulations on lending, capital 
adequacy ratio, credit limitation, loan to deposit ratio; calling for foreign strategic 
investors to participate in private banks; and diversifying banking operations. Banks 
should be regularly recapitalised and this can be seen as a guarantee against equity-loss 
risks. 
Third, the legal and regulatory framework needs to be consolidated in order to increase 
the transparency and accountability of banks. There are a number of laws on banking 
activities suggested for efficiency improvement that need to be constructed, including a 
law on the accounting standards of banking, a law on internet banking, a law on cross-
ownership, and a law on banking regulation and supervision.   
8.4 Limitations 
There are a number of limitations of this thesis. First, due to the long-term process 
involved in completing this study, new and advanced techniques relating to DEA have 
not been incorporated. The double-bootstrap two-stage DEA of Simar and Wilson 
(2007) is based on the strict condition that the production set and environmental 
variables are separable. This weakness can be overcome by using conditional efficiency 
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measures as suggested by Bădin et al. (2012; 2014) and Daraio and Simar (2014). 
Another limitation is that the aggregate Malmquist productivity index is a DEA-based 
method and so it inherits the downward-biased nature of DEA efficiency estimates and 
cannot allow for statistical inference. The quality of accounting data is also a limitation 
due to out-dated Vietnamese accounting standards if compared with present 
international accounting standards. In term of methods to estimate production frontiers, 
the parametric methods such as SFA can be applied in this thesis and it has a number of 
advantages when compared with DEA, for example, SFA allows for random errors. 
Using dummies to examine hypotheses can limit other alternatives to test these 
hypotheses in more controlled environment. Lastly, although the author has tried to 
collect data on bad loans it has not been possible to obtain this from the SBV. Once the 
data for bad loans becomes available the performance of Vietnamese banks can be 
analysed using this undesirable output/outcome. 
8.5 Areas for further research 
The limitations and empirical evidence presented in this thesis propose further academic 
work in order to enrich our understanding and knowledge of the banking sector in 
general and Vietnamese bank efficiency in particular. An opportunity for future research 
is to develop an algorithm to incorporate the bootstrap technique into an aggregate 
Malmquist productivity index. 
Second, when the data on bad loans become available then this variable can be seen as 
an undesirable output because banks have to account for these loans as a provisioning 
cost and consequently reduce their profitability. The bad loans and other desirable 
outputs such as loans and investments are simultaneously generated from the production 
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process of banks. Thus, the efficiency of Vietnamese banks can be measured more 
comprehensively and consistently if incorporating bad loans.  
Third, in terms of technical issues, it would be more consistent for empirical analysis of 
the impact of environmental variables on bank efficiency if conditional efficiency 
measures were utilised. This new method does not require a separability condition on 
the relationship between input-output combinations and environmental variables as is 
the case for double-bootstrap two-stage DEA. 
The second and the third areas for further study can be combined to give a 
comprehensive measure of bank efficiency at the first stage and consistent results on the 
impact of variables at the second stage.     
This study has also highlighted the similarity of China and Vietnam‘s conduct of a 
gradual approach to the liberalisation of the banking sector. A comparative study of the 
impact of reform measures implemented after the WTO event on bank performance in 
these two banking systems would be an interesting area for future research. 
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Appendix A: Technical efficiency between pre- and post-GFC period 
Table A1: A comparison of technical efficiency between pre- and post-GFC period using Simar and Zelenyuk (2007) test 
 
Notes: Agg.Eff. Pre-GFC and Agg.Eff. Post-GFCare aggregate efficiency scores of banks in the pre- and post-GFC era, respectively. Agg.Eff is the aggregate efficiency score 
of the whole sample covering both the pre- and post-GFC era. M.Eff. Pre-GFC and M.Eff. Post-GFCare mean efficiency scores of banks in the pre- and post-GFC era, 
respectively. M.Eff is the mean efficiency scores for the whole sample. AER is the ratio of the aggregate efficiency score of banks pre-GFC on that of the post-GFC period. 
MER is the ratio of the mean efficiency score of banks pre-GFC to that post-GFC. For each significance degree, there are two columns indicating the upper and lower bounds 
of the estimators. The AER and MRE both include unity at the 10 and 5% of significance degrees, under the intermediation and operating approaches, implying an equality of 
efficiency scores between pre- and post-GFC periods.  
 
 
  
Intermediation Approach Operating Approach 
DEA  
Estimation 
Standard 
Error 
Bias 
Correction 
Estimation 
Confidence Interval Bounds 
DEA  
Estimation 
Standard 
Error 
Bias 
Correction 
Estimation 
Confidence Interval Bounds 
90% 95% 90% 95% 
Agg.Eff. Pre-GFC 1.1144 0.0348 1.1676 1.1031 1.2105 1.0866 1.2149 1.1191 0.0332 1.1775 1.1132 1.2173 1.0944 1.2211 
Agg.Eff. Post-GFC 1.1420 0.0273 1.2147 1.1623 1.2515 1.1502 1.2554 1.1137 0.0232 1.1713 1.1279 1.2020 1.1165 1.2054 
Agg.Eff. 1.1352 0.0210 1.2060 1.1668 1.2356 1.1552 1.2392 1.1149 0.0194 1.1747 1.1390 1.2015 1.1296 1.2051 
M.Eff. Pre-GFC 1.2717 0.0591 1.3959 1.2835 1.4783 1.2577 1.4873 1.2957 0.0523 1.4413 1.3452 1.5189 1.3282 1.5282 
M.Eff. Post-GFC 1.3158 0.0419 1.4818 1.4055 1.5458 1.3883 1.5538 1.2809 0.0414 1.4150 1.3412 1.4754 1.3224 1.4835 
M.Eff. 1.3038 0.0376 1.4586 1.3916 1.5148 1.3760 1.5224 1.2850 0.0393 1.4219 1.3536 1.4813 1.3364 1.4890 
AER 0.9758 0.0403 0.9586 0.8892 1.0189 0.8698 1.0294 1.0049 0.0357 1.0049 0.9419 1.0566 0.9251 1.0654 
MER 0.9631 0.0558 0.9274 0.8274 1.0137 0.8071 1.0268 1.0090 0.0415 1.0147 0.9446 1.0792 0.9242 1.0921 
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Table A2: Li (1996) test on the technical efficiency density of banks in the pre- versus post-GFC era 
  Ho (f is density) Li test [p_value] Decision on Ho 
Intermediation approach f1(pre-GFC) = f1(post-GFC) 0.6856 [0.3750] Cannot reject Ho 
Operating approach f2(pre-GFC) = f2(post-GFC) -1.0546[0.1317] Cannot reject Ho 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Ho: densities of the two bank groups are equal. The p-values at 0.3750 and 0.1317 under the intermediation and operating approaches suggest an equality of 
efficiency density functions between pre- and post-GFC periods. 
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Appendix B: Confidence interval of coefficients in meta- and group models 
Table B1: Confidence interval of coefficients estimated in meta model 
  
Operating approach Intermediation approach 
99% 95% 90% 99% 95% 90% 
Intercept 0.9737 1.5576 1.0377 1.4826 1.0747 1.4380 1.9320 2.7385 2.0674 2.6660 2.1176 2.6215 
BG -0.0327 0.2089 -0.0015 0.1815 0.0124 0.1694 -0.1700 0.1625 -0.1196 0.1303 -0.0990 0.1104 
P -1.0855 -0.1983 -1.0108 -0.3945 -0.9774 -0.4727 -1.5772 -0.1333 -1.4859 -0.4191 -1.4377 -0.5432 
FSI -0.2108 0.0833 -0.1743 0.0470 -0.1549 0.0285 -0.2088 0.1867 -0.1630 0.1258 -0.1348 0.1020 
RU -0.0033 0.2663 0.0271 0.2295 0.0441 0.2135 0.0741 0.4422 0.1198 0.4034 0.1440 0.3790 
LA 0.0996 0.8469 0.2129 0.7624 0.2535 0.7244 -2.3311 -1.1302 -2.2127 -1.2843 -2.1620 -1.3680 
EA 0.8928 2.2142 1.0178 2.0329 1.0979 1.9472 -0.9446 0.8306 -0.7771 0.5843 -0.6619 0.4843 
ROA -16.1187 -4.0046 -14.8919 -5.5525 -14.1964 -6.4167 -11.1657 5.6674 -8.8371 4.0448 -7.6826 2.9600 
T -0.0803 -0.0201 -0.0735 -0.0288 -0.0692 -0.0330 -0.0635 0.0181 -0.0552 0.0046 -0.0513 -0.0003 
Note: At each significance degree there are two columns indicating upper and lower bounds of the estimators. ―BG‖ is a dummy variable that indicates JSBs with equity 
participation from business groups. ―P‖ is a dummy variable that indicates SOCBs after privatisation. ―FSI‖ is a dummy variable that indicates domestic banks with foreign 
strategic investors. ―RU‖ is a dummy variable that indicates rural-urban transformed JSBs. ―LA‖ is the loan to asset ratio. ―EA‖ is the equity to asset ratio. ―ROA‖ is the 
return to assets ratio. ―T‖ is a time trend variable. 
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Table B2: Confidence interval of coefficients estimated in JSB model 
  
Operating approach Intermediation approach 
99% 95% 90% 99% 95% 90% 
Intercept 0.9530 1.3041 0.9922 1.2654 1.0125 1.2391 2.2357 3.4469 2.5002 3.3429 2.5801 3.2793 
BG 0.0262 0.1852 0.0459 0.1619 0.0564 0.1518 -0.1462 0.2696 -0.0917 0.2139 -0.0633 0.1875 
FSI -0.1817 0.0020 -0.1608 -0.0202 -0.1473 -0.0309 -0.3121 0.1467 -0.2585 0.0817 -0.2316 0.0524 
RU 0.0174 0.1962 0.0383 0.1699 0.0473 0.1596 -0.0008 0.4767 0.0757 0.4190 0.1049 0.3933 
LA 0.2297 0.7517 0.3130 0.7099 0.3455 0.6769 -3.7768 -1.5341 -3.6186 -2.0286 -3.5025 -2.2034 
EA 0.3206 1.4179 0.4615 1.3009 0.5283 1.2381 -0.6005 2.1909 -0.2791 1.8877 -0.1309 1.7138 
ROA -12.8540 -3.9785 -11.9684 -5.1568 -11.2877 -5.6650 -21.7449 1.6770 -18.9898 -1.6951 -17.9151 -3.3998 
T -0.0574 -0.0199 -0.0535 -0.0248 -0.0517 -0.0273 -0.1504 -0.0344 -0.1373 -0.0517 -0.1318 -0.0601 
Note: At each significance degree there are two columns indicating upper and lower bounds of the estimators. ―BG‖ is a dummy variable that indicates JSBs with equity 
participation from business groups. ―FSI‖ is a dummy variable that indicates domestic banks with foreign strategic investors. ―RU‖ is a dummy variable that indicates rural-
urban transformed JSBs. ―LA‖ is the loan to asset ratio. ―EA‖ is the equity to asset ratio. ―ROA‖ is the return to assets ratio. ―T‖ is a time trend variable. 
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Table B3: Confidence interval of coefficients estimated in SOCB model 
  
Operating approach Intermediation approach 
99% 95% 90% 99% 95% 90% 
Intercept 1.0185 1.5747 1.1019 1.5124 1.1324 1.4760 1.4008 3.0754 1.5923 2.8413 1.7134 2.7130 
P -0.3066 0.0627 -0.2744 -0.0076 -0.2557 -0.0427 0.3647 1.3605 0.4732 1.2724 0.5234 1.1995 
LA -0.7846 -0.0243 -0.6859 -0.1246 -0.6426 -0.1747 -2.2723 -0.0715 -2.0677 -0.4633 -1.8960 -0.6316 
EA 0.9833 7.9976 1.9812 7.3113 2.5540 6.9435 -0.1508 17.3493 2.6659 15.7974 4.2589 14.8233 
ROA -27.0337 -3.7401 -24.8441 -7.3402 -23.8153 -9.3332 -132.8996 -46.1892 -125.3304 -54.2683 -118.1186 -57.8058 
T -0.0317 0.0121 -0.0272 0.0068 -0.0249 0.0043 -0.2404 -0.0657 -0.2237 -0.0896 -0.2107 -0.0983 
Note: At each significance degree there are two columns indicating upper and lower bounds of the estimators. ―P‖ is a dummy variable that indicates SOCBs after 
privatisation. ―LA‖ is the loan to asset ratio. ―EA‖ is the equity to asset ratio. ―ROA‖ is the return to assets ratio. ―T‖ is a time trend variable. 
Table B4:  Confidence interval of coefficients estimated in FJVB model 
  
Operating approach Intermediation approach 
99% 95% 90% 99% 95% 90% 
Intercept 1.4667 3.3294 1.7509 3.1504 1.8769 3.0452 0.1784 2.9053 0.4729 2.3163 0.5931 2.0418 
LA -1.8382 0.2254 -1.5904 -0.0553 -1.4823 -0.2075 -2.2477 1.1186 -1.6624 0.5455 -1.4583 0.2947 
EA -0.3753 2.2231 0.1018 1.9135 0.2330 1.7803 -3.1478 0.4785 -2.9176 -0.3338 -2.7798 -0.7247 
ROA -50.3338 -14.3535 -48.0518 -20.1837 -46.6832 -22.7481 -9.3972 25.1850 -1.5922 21.1693 1.2834 19.9860 
T -0.1137 0.0381 -0.1000 0.0141 -0.0924 0.0030 -0.0854 0.1489 -0.0185 0.1260 -0.0025 0.1164 
Note: At each significance degree there are two columns indicating upper and lower bounds of the estimators. ―LA‖ is the loan to asset ratio. ―EA‖ is the equity to asset ratio. 
―ROA‖ is the return to assets ratio. ―T‖ is a time trend variable.  
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